

A
S Y S T E M
O F
Moral Philosophy.

Of the Importance and Certainty of Morality.	Of the objects of Virtue.
Of Morality in general, and of the Nature of Happiness.	Of Reason, and particularly as it is a Principle of Human Actions.
Of the necessity of fixing right our Chief End.	Of the Will.
Of the Chief Good which Reason can prove to be designed for Man, and the Characteristics of it.	Of the Ends of Human Actions.
Of the highest Happiness attainable in the present life.	Of the several Kinds of Human Actions.
	Of the Passions in general.
	Of the primitive Passions.
	Of the mixed Passions.

By the late Reverend and Learned
Mr. HENRY GROVE,
of TAUNTON.

Published from the Author's MANUSCRIPT.

V O L. I.

The SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N.


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Head in Lombard-Street. M.DCC.XLIX.*

First Philosophy

Of the mixed blood
of the native Indians
of the island of Hispaniola.
The first of these was
the chief of the nation
of the Taino people,
who were the original
inhabitants of the island.

By the late Reverend and Learned
M. HENRY GOROV
of Tarrant.

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TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
HUGH,
Lord *Willoughby of Parham.*

My LORD,



AD the worthy
Author lived to
publish this Work
himself, which I
have now the honour to pre-
sent to You, he would, I

Dedication.

I am persuaded, have chosen to send it into the world under your LORDSHIP'S Patronage : nor could he have easily found a more proper Patron, than a Nobleman whose Character and Conduct have given so bright a specimen of the excellence of the Principles, and of the dignity and beauty of the Virtues, recommended in it ; and whose fine Taste and good Learning qualify him so well to determine the Merit of such a Performance.

Though your LORDSHIP'S high relish of the ease and dignity of Social Freedom and Learned Converse, may have indeed

Dedication.

indeed prevented your pushing into the more active scenes of ambitious life; yet it must have been observed, with what assiduity and disinterested attention, your LORDSHIP has answered your important Trust, as a Member of the Supreme Judicature of the *British* Nation. Nor can it but be matter of some concern, that Abilities so extensive, and Industry so unwearyed (under the conduct of Principles that alone can add dignity to human nature) should move in a sphere less enlarged than the Benevolence of your heart.

Dedication.

It would have heightened with Mr. GROVE the satisfaction of doing justice to so much Merit, that he could reflect on his having formerly cultivated, by the Work now tendered to your LORDSHIP, the seeds of those excellent dispositions, which have produced fruits so honourable; and have enabled him with more confidence of success to offer it to the world.

That which his too early Death prevented him from doing, your LORDSHIP will please to accept now it is done by one, to whom he particularly commended this his favourite Production. Nor shall

Dedication.

shall I esteem it a small recompence for the pains taken to give it to the Publick, in a manner not wholly unworthy of its Author, that it has the honour of your LORDSHIP's approbation, and has given me this opportunity to express the very great esteem with which I am,

My LORD,

YOUR LORDSHIP'S

most Obedient,

most Humble Servant,

Thomas Amory.

shall I esteem it a small
consequence for the pains
to give it to the Publick
manner not wholly unworthy
of an Author, that it has the
honour of your Lordship's
approbation, and has given me
this opportunity to express the
very great esteem with which
I am

My Lord
for me to say any thing by
the Honourable Secretary of the
Treasury, and importance of
the subject, after what
Mr. Gr. has so largely discoursed on the
subject in the Introduction: and it may
be necessary to mention some of the
particulars, which is now offered to the
Publick.
I am
Your Lordship's
Thomas Amory



THE
PREFACE.



It will be thought needless for me to say any thing by way of Preface, on the Usefulness and Importance of Moral Philosophy, after what Mr. GROVE has so largely discoursed on this subject in the INTRODUCTION; but it may be necessary to speak something of this particular System, which is now offered to the Publick.

It

PREFACE.

It was composed by Mr. GROVE, for the direction and assistance of Youth in the study of *Morality*; and during more than Thirty Years that he used it for this purpose, he was continually correcting and improving it. A little before his Death he had begun to transcribe it for the Press, and to insert in their proper places the additional Observations and Reflections, which were, as they had occurred, written in the margin of his original Copy. On his Death Bed he recommended the Work to my care, and I have endeavoured to answer the Trust, by making the best use I could of his additional Observations and Corrections; inserting these in their proper places, and making such alterations in conformity to the other, as were necessary to render the whole consistent with his latest and most exact sentiments.

I am far from thinking, after all, that this Work will appear in that beauty and perfection, which the Author himself would have given it, had he lived to compleat his Design. Yet I flatter myself, that the evidence

P R E F A C E

dence of his *Principles*, the clearness and strength of his *Reasonings*, and the beauty and justness with which he has described the several *Virtues*, are such, that the friends of true Religion and Goodness will think the Work well deserving of the public notice.

The Illustrations from the antient *Moralists* and *Poets* will also recommend the Work to Readers of Taste, the Translations of which are added for the sake of the english Reader; but for the exactness of these Mr. GROVE is not answerable. To render this Treatise more useful to the Students of *Morality*, there is added at the end of every Chapter a List of the principal Writers, who have treated the particular subjects of each Chapter. But the judicious Reader will (as it is reasonable) determine as to the merit of this Work from an attentive and impartial perusal of it, rather than from any thing here offered by way of recommendation: I will not therefore detain him longer from the Work itself, but finish this Preface with returning
my

P R E F A C E.

my thanks to the many worthy Persons, who by their Subscriptions have encouraged this publication; and with assuring them, that no care shall be wanting as to the remaining Volume, which it is hoped will be ready to be delivered in *December*.

Thomas Amory.

Taunton.

April 1. 1749.



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T H E



THE
INTRODUCTION.

*Of the Importance and Certainty of
Morality.*

SECT. I.



MORALITY, being nothing else but the knowledge and practice of those things that concern man as a *Moral Agent*, a Being endowed with understanding, and liberty of choice, capable of acting in a reasonable manner, that is, in a manner suitable to the dignity of his nature, and his rank and station in the universe, and thereby contributing to his own happiness, and that of his fellow-creatures; cannot, from this general idea of it, be supposed to be an idle or intricate speculation, a mere amusement of the mind, of little or no use

B

in

in life, presenting us only with ingenious hypotheses, and specious conjectures, and better fitted to engage a man in endless doubts and perplexities, than to settle him in a state of solid and lasting satisfaction. On the contrary, Morality is of the utmost *importance* to all mankind, lies *level to the apprehensions* of the weakest minds, that are but sincere and well disposed, and is attended with all the *certainty* that any impartial and considerate person can desire.

SECT. II. I. It is of the utmost *importance* to all mankind. If there be any thing that deserves the name of *important*; if it be not a thing indifferent in what state of mind, and condition of life a man finds himself, whether his Being is a pleasure, or a burthen to him, his faculties are used or not used, imployed right or wrong; whether he enjoys life or suffers it, is in favour with his Maker, and with himself, and approved by other intelligent Beings, or at war with the whole world; if there be a difference in these things, the *importance* of Morality, which instructs us to observe this difference, and to conduct ourselves by it, must be undeniable.

SECT. III. The *importance* of Morality is just the same as that of happiness, with which it hath an immediate and necessary
con-

connection. All men desire happiness, the inclination sticks close, and is never to be put off. And, in general, they are not wrong in their notion of happiness, apprehending it to be a state which hath no *good* wanting to it, no *evil* mingled with it; and the nearer any state approaches this idea of perfection, the happier it is; but when they come to particulars, as they must do, in order to act rationally and consistently, they are extremely divided. Now the design of Morality is to unite the distracted opinions of mankind in one uniform invariable idea of happiness, to lead them to the enjoyments in which it is to be found, and to direct to the means for the attainment of it. Their interest both in the present and future state of their existence depends upon it. Without some observation of its rules there could be no society, or none but what was worse than solitude; Virtue is the cement that makes the union, in greater or lesser combinations, from a community consisting of many millions down to a friendship between two single persons, delightful and lasting; and it supplies the sweetest pleasures, and most exalted entertainments of retired life. In the conduct of his actions, the wise man, rejecting fancy and passion, and example, fetches all his measures from hence. It was this led Monsieur *Rapin* to conjecture, that the *Dæmon* of *Socrates* was no-

thing else than his knowledge of Morality, an habitual Prudence, which he had gained by his experience of things, and his reflections on their events, in which he was seldom mistaken^a. This character of his Prudence is confirmed by Xenophon^b, who saith, in praise of it, that he never erred in his judgment of what he was to choose or reject, and needed not any one's assistance herein, being self-sufficient in this sort of knowledge. Had the Poet carried the same justness of thinking into every part of the doctrine of Morals that he discovers in some parts of it, and acted up to the account he gives of himself, none of the Philosophers, not even Socrates himself, would have surpassed him. What can be more agreeably expressed, or with more spirit, than the sentiments are in the following passages^c?

*Quid verum, atq; decens, curo & rogo, & omnis
in hoc sum.*

Virtutis veræ custos, rigidusq; satelles.

*—tarda fluunt ingrataq; tempora, quæ spem
Consiliumq; morantur agendi gnæviter, id quod
Æquè pauperibus prodest, locupletibus æquè,
Æquè neglectum pueris senibusq; nocebit.
Restat, ut his ego me ipse regam, solerq; elementis.*

Invidus

^a Reflections upon Morality.

^b Xenophon's Memorabil. L. 4.

^c Hor. L. 1. Ep. 1.

*Invidus, iracundus, iners, vinosus, amator ;
Nemo adeò ferus est, ut non mitescere possit,
Si modò culturæ patientem commodet aurem.*

If you believe him, the inquiry, what is true and decent in manners, took him up intirely—he was an inseparable follower of Virtue—impatient of every thing that interrupted him in the pursuit of that which is alike useful to the poor and the rich, and not to be neglected without equal danger to the young and the old—and resolved that this should be the rule of his life, and the source of his joys—whatever distemper the mind labours under, here is the cure, only listen to the instructions of Virtue, and you will quickly find an alteration.

SECT. IV. The *practick part* is undoubtedly the chief thing to be regarded, but not the only one. If the theory, without the practice, be like the advantage of eyes to one who hath no active powers to be guided by them, or is too indolent to make use of them; the practice, without the theory, may too justly be compared to the strength and vigour of a blind man, which for want of sight to direct them, cannot be so usefully employed, either for his own, or the benefit of mankind. The conduct must ne-

cessarily fluctuate in uncertainty, when it is not fixed by steady rules, of which the virtuous man had need have the same clear view, as the traveller of his way, that he may not wander from it. There is a very great satisfaction in knowing *what* a man does, and *why* he ought to do it, but very little without it.

SECT. V. It is true, the study of Morality, in a philosophical method, is not the province of all. It is not necessary that all should enter into the depths of this science, and pursue the chain of moral ideas, link after link, as far as it will lead them; but it is greatly to be wished that all, who have leisure and capacity for it, would apply themselves to these inquiries; and even necessary that some should, in order to propagate juster notions among those who have not time, or patience, or ability, to think for themselves, and to guard them against the dangerous impulses of *enthusiasm*, the fallacious insinuations of their *passions*, and the influence of prevailing *customs*, and pernicious *maxims*, that by length of time have gained too much authority in the world. The *Gentleman*, who owes it to his birth and quality, and the superior advantages of his condition, to get his mind more brightened and adorned, his judgment
more

more correct, his sentiments more generous and exalted, his actions more exquisitely finished^d, according to the exactest rules of truth, honour, and equity, than those of the *Vulgar*; who is capable of doing so much good or harm by his opinions and example, whose Virtue is in so much the greater danger as he hath more frequent and inviting opportunities to gratify all his inclinations, and who is exposed to the attempts of persons who make it their business to corrupt his *Morals*, that he may become the easier proselyte to their wretched schemes of *Infidelity*. The *Lawyer*^e, who hath it

B 4

so

^d ——— animo cogites,

Quam vos facillime agitis, quam estis maxime
Potentes, dites, fortunati, nobiles.

Tam maxime vos æquo animo æqua noscere
Oportet, si vos vultis perhiberi probos.

Terent. Adelp.

^e Juris consulti itaque, quod inter omnes constat, plerique cum Legum studio Philosophiam olim conjunxere, ex ejusque principiis Leges sunt interpretati. *Heinecci Antiquit. Roman. Jurisprud. illustrant. Syntagma*, p. 33.

His explicatis, fons Legum & Juris inveniri potest. The explication of those things (*sc.* of the nature of man, the duties we are born to fulfill, and the bonds of society) will point us to the fountain of Laws and Right. — And again, *Non a Prætoris Edicto, &c.* The discipline of the *Civil Law* is not to be fetched from the *Prætor's Edicts*, which is the method now most followed, nor from the *Twelve Tables*, by the authority of which our Ancestors were determined, but from the depths of Philosophy. *Cicer. de Leg. L. 1. §. 5.* And afterwards to the same purpose, *altè verò, et, ut oportet, a Capite, &c.* you are in the right to run up the subject of our inquiries

so often in his power to clear or confound the rights of mankind, to compose or widen their differences, to patronise or betray injured innocence, to vindicate a good cause, or to put a fair gloss on a bad; urged, on one hand, by a sense of duty, and the conscientious pleasure of always espousing the juster side, tempted and solicited on the other by the prospect of gain. The *Divine*, who not only stands in the room of the *Priest* in other Religions, but of the *Philosopher*^f, is by profession an instructor and guide in the ways of Virtue, reads publick lectures on the whole duty of man, and is supposed in a readiness to answer those who privately consult him in dubious cases; all these are under peculiar obligations to be well versed in the science of Morals, that they may do all the service to the world that their characters and advantages give others a right to expect from them.

SECT. VI. This, in a particular manner, is the concern of the persons last named, I mean

inquiries to its original, and they who handle the *Civil Law* after any other manner, do not so properly teach Justice as the art of Wrangling.

^f *Philosophia virtutis continet & officii & bene vivendi disciplinam; quam qui profitetur, gravissimam mihi sustinere personam videtur. Cicer. Orat. in L. C. Pisonem. — De illis vero rebus, quæ in Philosophia versantur, numquid, est quod quisquam divinorum aut respondere soleat, aut consuli, quid bonum sit, quid malum, quid neutrum? De Divinat. L. 2. §. 4.*

mean the Guides and Ministers of the Christian Church. For how is it possible he should be a *good Preacher*, who is not thoroughly acquainted with moral subjects? The *Doctrines* of Religion being intended to promote the observation of its *Precepts*, it is of the last consequence that people should be well instructed in their duty, and the bounds of Virtue and Vice be exactly marked out, not by telling them, *quam prope ad peccatum liceat accedere sine peccato*, "how near they may venture to approach to a sin without sinning," (which hath been charged, not without reason, on the Casuists of the *Roman Church*) but by so stating, characterising, and circumscribing them, that they may not be mistaken one for the other. But *instruction* is not all. After the Understanding is convinced, the harder task is still behind, to bring over the Will to the interests of Virtue, which, as far as it is effected in a moral and rational way, is best done by demonstrating the necessity of moral duties, painting Virtue in its native charms, and setting before men the several motives to it; in the choice of which a great deal of prudence is required, as well as skill in the manner of representing them, suitably to the time and place, and to the various characters, views, and dispositions of men. The art of governing his own Passions, which is taught by this science, will open him

him a way into the human heart, enable him better to understand its weaknesses, and unfold its artful doublings; and, in a word, by well ruling his own (in which consists a great part of the character of a *virtuous man*) will give him an ascendant over the Passions of others, which he will know how to lead this way and that at pleasure, the chief praise of the accomplished Orator. Upon this head, what a judicious Writer^s hath observed merits well to be considered; who, speaking of the *Defects of the Clergy* as one cause of the present corruption of Christians, takes notice, that Morality of all things is that which is the most superficially handled in the greatest part of Sermons, either from a prejudice against Morality, or a vain conceit of Learning, which makes men foolishly imagine, that to preach Morals argues but an ordinary measure of parts, and little skill in Divinity; or from its being more difficult to treat of Morality in a proper manner than to explain doctrinal subjects. The faults of Preachers in this kind, which he remarks as most ordinary, are, that their Morality is too *general*, *defective*, and sometimes *false*, being either too remiss, or too severe, and sometimes contradictory.

SECT.

^s *Ostervald's Treatise of the Causes of the Present Corruption of Christians, and the Remedies thereof.*

SECT. VII. But against this there lies a popular and plausible *objection*—What need of our going so far about? Morality is best studied in the *Scriptures*. To examine these matters by *Reason*, when we have *Revelation*, a privilege so much superior, is like lighting up a candle at noon-day. Dr. *Mathew*^h, a Divine of *New England*, is so severe in his censure of Moral Philosophy, as to call it by no better name than *Impietas in artis formam redacta*. And though I know of none who have run the charge so high as this Gentleman, yet too many out of a *mistaken* (though it should be a *real*) zeal for Christianity, have said things not very favourable to it, and which, if true, would oblige us to own, that the loss would not be great if it were quite banished the Schools. Dr. *Waterland*ⁱ, particularly, seems to apprehend, that one thing which hath occasioned the growth of *Deism*, hath been mens advancing Morality so much as they have done. He more than insinuates the needlessness of this study by citing the authority of Mr. *Locke*^k with applause, who, saith he, when intreated to draw up a
System

^h *Manuductio ad Ministerium*.

ⁱ Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacraments.

^k *Locke's Letters*, p. 546. of the Fol. Ed. of his Works.

System of Morals, returned this very wise and just answer. " Did the world want a
 " rule, I confess there could be no work so
 " necessary, nor so commendable, but the
 " *Gospel* contains so perfect a Body of *Ethicks*,
 " that *Reason* may be excused from that in-
 " quiry, since she may find man's duty
 " clearer and easier in *Revelation*, than in
 " herself."

SECT. VIII. But now, what *Horace*¹ saith
 of the conjunction of *nature* and *art* in Poetry,

———— *alterius sic*
Altera poscit opem res, & conjurat amicè.

Each by itself is vain I'm sure, but join'd,
 Their force is strong, each proves the other's
 Friend.

Creech.

seems to me justly applicable to the assistance
 that *Reason* and *Revelation* mutually lend
 one the other in these searches. There can
 be no doubt that Morality is extremely in-
 debted to the *Christian Revelation* on several
 accounts. For dispelling the mists in which
 it was involved, clearing its sight, restoring
 its liberty, and exciting it to the pursuit of
 Virtue by the promise of divine aid, and the
 prospect

¹ De Arte Poetica. v. 411.

prospect of the most glorious rewards, *Reason* is to thank *Revelation*, without whose help man would not have been able to discern his duty so plainly and easily, or to have discharged it so successfully as he may now do. Of which more at the conclusion of this Work. But then after all this, and much more, to the advantage of *Revelation*, is granted, it will still remain true, that inquiring into the foundations of moral goodness, as laid in the nature of things, and carefully fixing and distinguishing the ideas of the several Virtues by right *Reason*, is not only a very innocent and agreeable entertainment, but of singular use to the *Christian*.

SECT. IX. It is a guard against the ill consequences that may be shewn to have proceeded from an unacquaintance with these inquiries. From whence but from the want of just notions of *right* and *wrong*, *reasonable* and *unreasonable*, *fit* and *unfit*, of what is *true*, *honourable*, and *lovely*, and the contrary, came that unworthy idea of the *Deity*, which in effect leaves out his *Moral Attributes*, or most miserably disfigures and misrepresents them? As the *Heathens* would never have had that opportunity to corrupt the principles of *Natural Religion*, had they not begun with those of Morality, first of all suiting their *moral belief* to their *immoral practices*,
then

then in their vain imaginations setting up Gods like themselves; after much the same manner hath *Revealed Religion* suffered among the professors of it. Their *Reason* hath been first set wrong, and then their *Religion*. Can it be supposed that the distinction betwixt God's *secret* and *revealed* Will, in the sense it is meant by some persons, the doctrine of the *Divine Sovereignty*, as stated by the same men, and of *Absolute Decrees*, would have got footing in the christian world, if the essential and everlasting differences in things had been rightly understood, and men had considered that the *Moral Perfections* of God, signifying nothing else but the unchangeable determinations of his Will, in conformity to these differences; all such notions concerning the Decrees of God, and his dealings with mankind, as are absolutely repugnant to the clearest conceptions of *Justice*, *Goodness*, *Sincerity*, &c. must needs be false, and therefore cannot be taught men by God? From the same source the wrong apprehensions of Christianity so common in the world had their original. Had not men been shamefully ignorant of the nature of *Moral Truth*, must they not have seen the indispensable obligation of the *Moral Law*; and, while they saw this, could they, unless depraved in the disposition of their minds,

minds, have represented the *Gospel* as a contrivance of *Divine Wisdom* to conduct men to happiness by a shorter and easier way than that of a sober, righteous and godly life, as it is well known the *Antinomians* have done?

SECT. X. The unhappy use of *Scripture-Examples*, is another thing prevented by this soundness in the moral understanding. *Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile*^m. An example, for the greater part good, that hath faulty mixtures in it, which are easily imitated, will deceive without care. In the Sacred Writings we find *persons* commended, because of their general character, who nevertheless had very great failings; or *actions*, on account of something praise-worthy in them, though in other respects culpable. This will help us in understanding the elogiums given to the *Worthies*, mentioned in the Eleventh to the *Hebrews*, for their *Faith*, which either formed their general behaviour, or influenced them upon particular occasions, of whom there were several who had things exceptionable in their character. When the *intrinsic* good or evil of actions is not regarded as it ought to be, too many, without distinguishing betwixt the good and the bad, follow that they like best; as the example

^m Hor. L. 1. Ep. 19.

example of *Rahab*, particularly, when they are tempted to lie. And so when they observe, that *David* bears such a high character in sacred History, as to be stiled *a man after God's own heart* (notwithstanding those passages of his life which can by no means be justified) especially when it is added, *that he did that which was right in the sight of the Lord, excepting in the matter of Uriah*; having no clear and settled notions as to these things, and glad to lay hold on any pretence, they conclude, that setting aside the crimes of murder and adultery, the things objected against him, if generally blameable, yet were not so in him; and that it is not so much the *sins* committed, as the *persons* committing them that we are to consider, together with the *circumstances*; which may be so peculiar as almost to sanctify any action; as when a good cause is promoted, though by means not the most honourable, and against the enemies of the true Religion. And then taking it for granted, that the circumstances they are in are of this nature, they will not scruple what others, who have better studied the true foundations of moral good and evil, or been taught them in the discourses they have heard or read, regard as highly criminal. And, accordingly, this hath too often in fact been the use made of such *Scripture-Examples*. Thus *Cromwell* being

being asked, "How he could excuse all the
 "prevarications, and other ill things of
 "which he and his party were visibly
 "guilty in the conduct of their affairs," re-
 plied, they believed there were great occasi-
 ons on which some men were called to great
 services, in the doing which they were excu-
 sed from the common rules of Morality;
 such were the practices of *Ehud* and *Jael*,
Sampson and *David*; and by this they fanci-
 ed they had a privilege from observing those
 standing rules. It is very obvious (saith the
ⁿ *Historian*) how far this principle may be
 carried, and how all Justice and Mercy may
 be laid aside on this pretence by every wild
 Enthusiast.

SECT. XI. How easily are the *Precepts* of
Scripture misunderstood by people of weak
 heads, or a wrong turn of mind, when they
 have never been accustomed to reason about
 moral duties, nor been well instructed in
 them by others? Where commands are de-
 livered in a parabolical and figurative style
 (as many of those in our Saviour's Sermon
 on the Mount are, *if thine enemy smite thee*
on the one cheek, turn the other also, &c.) or
 in general and unlimited terms, as *lend,*
hoping for nothing again — resist not evil —
 C *servants*

ⁿ Bishop Burnet's History of his Life and Times. Vol. I.
 p. 46.

servants obey your masters in all things — swear not at all, &c. the meaning of such precepts, though easy enough to men of sober sense, that think it no crime to use their *Reason* in Religion, is liable to be mistaken by persons who with an enthusiastical imagination have not sufficient strength of judgment to guide it; or, which is as bad, to be misrepresented to such by others that have their designs to serve upon them. — Of so great use is a rational view of things to keep the *Christian* from those misapprehensions, and misapplications of the *Doctrines, Examples, and Precepts* of *Scripture*, which he might otherwise be apt to run or be led into.

SECT. XII. It is further highly proper that, as *Christianity* is a most reasonable institution, all that profess it should be made sensible of its being so, to the end they may give it the honour due to it above all other Religions, be the more firmly established in the belief of its truth^o, admire and adore the divine perfections therein displayed, and have their hearts more delightfully and immoveably attached to it. But now of this superior

° Certe interim sumus nihil unquam veris Rationis nostræ dictatis contra dictorium a Deo unquam revelari posse. Immo Sacra Scripturas ideo credimus a Deo seu Naturæ auctore proficisci, quoniam leges naturales ubique illustrent, muniant, promoventque. Cumberland de L. N. Prolegom.

superior reasonableness of the Christian Institution, none have so clear a discernment as those who are the best judges of the incomparable beauty and excellence of its *Precepts*; as, *cæteris paribus*, none can pretend to make so exact an estimate of these, as persons, who being habituated to moral and divine contemplations, are able to demonstrate the general plan of the Gospel to be formed on the highest *Reason*. And as such persons do best apprehend the reasonableness of Christianity, so likewise its truly noble and excellent design; finding the entire scheme, after the closest survey of it, to be intended and admirably adapted to the exaltation and improvement of *human nature*, that, being made conformable to the *divine* in *purity* and *holiness*, it may by this means be more and more fitted to resemble it in *felicity* too.

And whereas some are ready to think we pay more respect to the *Revealer*, by taking every part of the *Revelation* solely upon his authority, without inquiring into the reasons of his commands any further than he hath been pleased to point them out in the Scriptures, this is certainly a mistake, since, besides the dependance which the proof of Christianity, from its intrinsic evidence, hath upon it, we may truly say, that God hath shewn us *what* is good, and *why* it is good, by our own frame, and that of the universe, in which he speaks to us as *proper-*

ly, though not so *fully*, as he does in the Scripture. And why hath the Supreme Being thus discovered to us by our *Reason* the ground and foundation of moral duties, but with an intent we should take notice of it? Some will think it a judicious observation of *Chrysostom*^p, examining that question, why God, when he commanded men *to honour their parents, not to kill, &c.* adds not any reason to shew the equity of these laws, that the reason of this was, that these things were already known to the whole world, being maxims of natural light; whereas, the Law, which regards the *Sabbath*, being a *positive Law* (meaning, I suppose, as it challenges a *seventh part* of time, and such a *particular seventh*, with some other appendages of the Law) is followed with a large account of the reason that led the Creator to impose the observation of this feast on the *Jews*. Since by being Christians we do not cease to be men, and the light of *Reason*, instead of being extinguished by that of *Revelation*, shines the brighter, it cannot be improper that, among the motives and principles of our obedience to the divine commands, those drawn from the reason of things should conspire with such as are peculiar to the Gospel; by which alliance they will, indeed, receive the greater force one from the other: nor will our obedience be the less acceptable to God, the *Father*

^p As quoted by *Puffendorf* de Jur. N. & G. L. 2. C. 3.

ther of Lights, whether of Reason or Revelation, and the Author of Nature, as well as the God of Grace.

SECT. XIII. The same thing is necessary in order to adjust the respective value and importance of duties. Duties equally commanded in the *Word of God* may happen to interfere in the exercise of them on some occasions. In such a juncture, which shall take place? Doubtless, those that are of the greatest weight. But which are these? Persons used to resolve the obligations of mankind into the reason and nature of things will not find it very difficult to be able to tell which. The Christian Lawgiver himself calls moral duties the *weightier matters of the Law*, which is a plain intimation that these are to be preferred to *positive Institutions*, purely as such; and this not only in *theory*, but *practice*, unless when the positive appointment hath some superior moral duty mixed with it, that requires more immediate notice; in which case, it is not really the positive duty that is preferred to the moral, but one moral duty to another; for among moral duties themselves there are degrees of excellence and dignity, and, consequently, of obligation to perform, and of guilt in the violation of them. To be able to marshal all the virtues and duties of the christian life, and assign to each the degree

of inward respect, as well as the proper time and place to the exercise of it, we had need know what it is, in the nature of things, that constitutes *moral excellence*, and be used to compare ideas with one another by some common and immutable standard.

SECT. XIV. Add this consideration more, that the objection against Christianity from the severity of its *Precepts* is better capable of being answered this way, to the satisfaction of the professors of it, who may be tempted to think it might have born less hard upon their inclinations; and the silencing its enemies, who are glad of any thing at which to cavil. For when it is demonstrated, that the best and most refined Reason gives its suffrage to the same duties, such as self-denial, the forgiveness of injuries, and the like; and that some or other of the most virtuous and knowing *Heathens* have seen and taught the reasonableness of such duties, the objection vanishes; the enemies of the Gospel have nothing to say against it that will bear examination; and they that own the obligations of it go on more chearfully in the way of their duty, and dare not, for shame, mention the difficulty of Virtues, that were not only acknowledged, but practised too, in an inferior degree, by men who had not the same glorious motives, and powerful assistances to animate them.—In fine, the

the *Prophets* appeal to the natural sense of mens minds, *He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God*⁹. And the same do the *Writers of the New Testament*, *Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are venerable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things*^r. Of which goodness of the things commanded by God, and loveliness of Virtue, two men of equal piety have more distinct or confused conceptions, according to the clearness and adequateness of their ideas on moral subjects; and the perfection of the *practical judgment*, which, no less than that of the *speculative*, must very much depend on the frequent and right exercise of it. I have spent more time upon this objection than it deserves, upon the account of its being so common, and represented as a dead weight on all attempts to support the credit of *Moral Philosophy*.

SECT. XV. II. Morality lies level to the apprehensions of the weakest minds, if sincere and well disposed. It doth not require an uncommon capacity to understand the character of an honest and good man, what are his

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⁹ Micah vi. 8.^r Phil. iv. 8.

his predominant qualities, and what the duties by the uniform constant discharge of which he approves his integrity; nor to see the beauty of such a character. Not that the light of truth, even moral truth, and the objects discoverable by it, are to be perceived with as little trouble and pains as this corporeal light, and the general spectacle of nature, which forces itself upon the sense whether we will or no. Moral objects are only to be discerned in a moral way, by the exercise of those intellectual faculties with which our Maker hath endowed us. There must be some degree of attention, and freedom from prejudice, otherwise we shall be no judges of this sort of beauty and proportion. We may have a general idea of something owing from us to God, and our fellow-creatures, and of a right behaviour as to ourselves, but then it will be confused and indistinct, like the first view of some excellent piece of *perspective*, which only offers to the eye a few rude irregular parts of a noble building, or other object, lying without any order, till the eye hath dwelt upon it for some time; and then the hidden beauties come forth to light, every part appears to be nicely framed, and all together make one elegant and harmonious *whole*. And it is the praise of this sort of knowledge, that where there is this attention and liberty of mind, little else is necessary to make a man a tolerable

lerable master of it; which cannot be always said of *abstract* and *metaphysical*, or *mathematical* and *physical* discoveries. These lie quite out of the way of common minds, they strain their faculties, and perplex their thoughts. Even *nature* herself, whose superficial beauties are so obvious to the sense, and strike it so strongly, is a perfect mystery to the greater part of spectators, as to the connection of the parts, the extent of the whole frame, and the laws by which she conducts her operations; they know nothing of these things, and can hardly be made to conceive them.

SECT. XVI. Not that it can be expected the notions of common people should have the regularity and exactness which we look for in *Systems*; that they should be able to deduce the rights or duties of human-kind from their first principles, and to explain and unfold them to others. In these things it is the *Scholar* hath the advantage of the *Mechanick*, and ought to be a better Moralist than he. But though it is not for every one to be able to trace up the stream to its fountain-head, or to find out truth by his own unguided searches, much less to do it with any degree of perfection, yet every one hath an ability of distinguishing right and wrong when they are fairly proposed to him, to understand the foundations of them, and the agreement or disagreement of this sort of ideas when they are

are set before him in a plain and judicious manner. Morality being the concern of all, must be within the reach of all. And it may be observed to the honour of the divine wisdom and goodness, that there is something in the human frame that very much facilitates our intimacy with objects of this nature; Moral truths have a double congruity with the mind of man, that of *truth*, and that of *goodness*, by one of which they take hold of the *understanding*, by the other of the *heart*. And it is often seen that the rectitude of the heart is, in these matters, a great help to the weakness of the head. This is no little encouragement to the study of Morality, to all those that are in a situation for it, that they have such a prospect of success in their inquiries, and shall be able to communicate the result of their searches to others with so little trouble, and by this means diffuse light and happiness all around them; especially, when it is added,

SECT. XVII. III. Morality is attended with all the *certainty* that any considerate and impartial person can desire. The certainty is proportionable to the importance. And what but this hath made the *Mathematics* so much courted? Truth will always be agreeable to an inquisitive mind. And if *all*, how much more *ethical* truth, supposing the taste of the mind not to be vitiated,

tiated, which is at once fitted to rouse the affections, and to satisfy the understanding; under the conduct of which every faculty hath its proper employment, and the whole man as a *sensitive*, a *moral*, and an *intellectual* Being, finds his advantage? The *Data*, on which Morality is established, the *Duties* it prescribes, and the *Happiness* it promises, are too evident to be justly called in question.

SECT. XVIII. I. The *Data*, or things taken for granted, and that serve as *first principles* to this science, are indubitably certain. Particularly these *two*, viz. that there is such a Being as *God*, and such a Creature as *Man*. These are supposed as objects, without which Morality could have no existence; the former, likewise, as the original cause of all *being*, *action*, and *injoyment*, the very life and soul of *moral agents*, and of *moral duties*¹. It is presumed, as already proved, that *there is a God*, a supreme intelligence, the first and best of Beings, possessed of every moral, as well as of all other excellence, in the most transcendent degree, the *Parent*, *Governor*, and *Judge*, of the universe. That there is such a species of reasonable Beings as mankind, related after various manners to God, and to one another, is also laid down as an uncontroverted truth.

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¹ See the Author's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, in his Posthumous Works, Vol. IV.

Let the *divine*, or even the *human* nature be in other respects never so mysterious and unknown, we have yet all the knowledge of both that is absolutely necessary to regulate our behaviour according to the present state and circumstances of our Being; nor does the unavoidable ignorance we labour under argue the uncertainty and imperfection of our Morality, so much as of our *Metaphysics*, and *Natural Philosophy*. What though we are not able to conceive of *self-existence*, *eternity*, *omniscience*, or any other attribute as *infinite*? Notwithstanding this, the general idea of God as the center of all perfection, and the fountain of all good; as a *Creator*, *Preserver*, *Benefactor*, and *Ruler*, this idea, I say, so fruitful of practical propositions, is plain enough, how little soever we comprehend of the *mode* of existence of any one attribute, or of exerting any one operation. And so, of the soul of man, as a cogitative, self-determining Being, what *it is*, and how *it acts*, of the secret tie that unites it to the body, and their mutual dependance upon each other, we are able to frame but very dim notions, and uncertain conjectures. But the idea of man, by which every man's own actions, and those of others towards him, are to be formed, being only that of a rational, free, and sensitive agent, (of all which we have experience every moment in ourselves) is easy and obvious to all. The *intrin-*
trinsic

trinsick nature of these several powers, is an abstruse speculation, more curious than useful.

SECT. XIX. And then, as to the existence of other Beings, besides himself; since no man can have the least reason to make a serious doubt of it, every man's obligations will be the very same, though there should be a *bare possibility* of things not existing that *appear* to exist; inasmuch as the rule of judgment, and consequently of action, to reasonable Beings, *is*, or *ought* to be, what appears, not what appears not; otherwise, it will not be unreasonable to act against every appearance of *truth* and *reality*, that is, to choose utter darkness to walk in, as better than the clearest day-light, which is absurd. This, by the way, shews the folly and guilt of a life abandoned to *inclination*, without all regard to God and man, upon the principles of the *Sceptick* himself; there being few, I believe, so given up to a doubting-humour as not to allow one thing to be more *probable* than another; in particular, that there is a world of men and other Beings, and a God that ruleth over all. And if this be acknowledged but *probable*, the obligation is not only *probable* but *certain* to act after the same manner, as if the supposition of God or man's *not existing* could be reduced to an express contradiction.

SECT.

SECT. XX. 2. Answerable to the evidence of the *things given*, or demanded, in Morality, is that of the *Duties prescribed*. This will be shewn more distinctly and largely under the *Demonstration of the Law of Nature*, and in treating the *Particular Virtues*. At present, I shall only make two or three *general Observations*. The *first* is concerning the *fundamental duty* of all Morality, *viz.* a sincere endeavour to know, and, as far as known, to perform all the duties we stand obliged to. This inquiry, being previous to all particular duties, is very properly called the *fundamental duty*. And nothing more certain, than that neither *less*, nor *more*, than this is required of any man. That *less* than this will not acquit us may be easily demonstrated. For upon the first glance of his thoughts every reasonable Being must be invincibly conscious that not existing alone in the universe, but only as a small part of a vast system, to which himself and all his actions bear some relation, it is very possible that every kind of behaviour may not be, and highly probable that it is not, alike proper; (not to put the case of a reasonable Being supposed to know of no other existing, which is purely imaginary) that therefore he ought to inquire what behaviour is most proper in order to make it the rule of his own conduct. It is next to impossible

impossible for any one that thinks and reasons to avoid this reflection, or to withstand the conviction it carries along with it. *So much* then is necessary, and *no more*, because more than this is impossible. We can do no more than *inquire impartially*, and then *honestly act* according to the best judgment we can make of things, after having inquired into them; all beyond this is impossible, and therefore no part of our duty.

SECT. XXI. The next observation or step is, that behaviour must apparently be most reasonable that bears the greatest correspondence to my own, and the nature of other intelligent Beings, and to the relations subsisting between us. Other Beings, unless they have a false notion of things, must needs be best pleased with such a behaviour, as the same behaviour must naturally yield most pleasure to my own mind, it being the only one that I can approve in myself or others. And here too I tread on firm ground as before. Do I take care of my Being and faculties, and pursue my own true happiness? And am I affected after a friendly manner to other intelligent Beings? This is the deciding point. Virtue immediately consists in the acts and dispositions of the mind, and as these are capable of being well known, and are invariably the same, the idea of Virtue is determinate and immutable. In regard

gard of *external actions*, the moral good or evil of these is not *intrinsic* and *immediate*, but wholly depends upon those inward acts and principles with which they are connected, and from which they take their rise. Whatever conduct or behaviour proceeds from a prevailing regard to my own real improvement and happiness, and amicable affections towards other Beings that come within my cognizance, is demonstrably right.

SECT. XXII. Concerning these outward actions then, the only question is, how in every circumstance I shall be able to approve the integrity and rectitude of my heart? Or which way of acting is most adapted to answer this end? And it is very happy that, excepting in some extraordinary cases, there is no one solicitous to find the right road, but may do it without much difficulty, and be very sure of it too. In the common train of life is it so hard to determine whether by doing or not doing an action proposed, or doing the contrary, I shall be my own friend, and the friend of mankind, shall keep closest to the character of a good man, a good neighbour, a good member of a family, a good citizen, a good magistrate or subject, and of one grateful to the Deity on whom he constantly depends? Let us only observe how the case stands between us and those whose interest we heartily desire and
rightly

rightly apprehend. Are we often at a loss about our actions as they respect such persons, or apt to mistake in those things which justice and benevolence demand from us? No more should we ordinarily be in other cases, relating to self-government, justice in our intercourses with mankind, and piety and devotion towards God, if our judgments were not perverted by wrong affections, and much more if they were helped and enlightened by right ones.

SECT. XXIII. As to actions confessedly doubtful we have another way of coming at certainty even in these; for *duty* being a *relative term*, bearing a constant proportion to the knowledge and abilities of the agent, the difference between several agents in the degrees of understanding, and, in consequence of that, in the appearance of the same action, which by one of them is esteemed disputable, by another not, makes no odds, as to the certainty of the *general rule* of proceeding, which is *always to act according to the greatest evidence*. Though a person of superior knowledge should be at a certainty where one of a lower class can reach no further than probability, yet that this *latter* is bound to follow the greater probability (I mean, as it appears *upon the whole*, or in the *final question*, *all things considered*, *ought the action to be done or left undone*, or *may it be done or*
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not ?) is no more to be doubted than that the former ought to govern himself by his certain knowledge. Were there no absurdity in counteracting a lesser degree of evidence, there would be none in resisting the highest, these two differing only as a greater *quantity* from a smaller, not as more or less real. The magnitude of a *Mite*, is as truly magnitude, though it be not so sensible, as that of an *Elephant*. So a lesser fault or folly, may be as certainly a fault, or folly, as a greater one.

SECT. XXIV. Upon the whole then, in what constitutes a virtuous temper and character, greater certainty cannot be desired, there being all that is necessary, supposing a conformity of practice, to secure self-approbation, the approbation of the Deity, and that of all wise and good men; abundantly enough to answer all the needs and exigencies of the *moral world*, in the present state of it, the preservation and good order of which depend upon the knowledge we have of the moral distinctions of actions, and the influence this knowledge hath upon us; in like manner as the health and vigour of our natural constitution do on our knowing and observing the qualities of our food and physick, and other things relating to the body; with this difference, that the knowledge of the nature of actions, morally considered, is generally

generally as much clearer and more certain than that of physical causes and effects, as our *moral life* is more important than our *natural*.

Finally ; We have all the certainty concerning *moral duties* that is requisite to our attaining the happiness of *moral agents* ; as will be presently shown. It is judiciously observed by an admirable Writer ^t in this way, that in external operations, where the question is often perplexed by the multiplicity of circumstances, our not being able always to arrive at precise determinations, no more affects the certainty of Morality, than it does the truth and usefulness of the principles of Geometry about the measuring of Lines, Surfaces, and Solids ; that neither by the Senses nor the help of Instruments it is possible to effect a Line perfectly strait, or a Surface perfectly plain or spherical, or a Body perfectly regular. It is enough that we approach so near to the utmost exactness, that nothing of any moment to human use is wanting. And so much may be attained by the principles of moral doctrine.—The method, the rules of operations, and the way of deducing one thing from another are the same (in *Morality*, as in *Mathematicks*) neither do the uses of life require a compleat

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^t *Cumberland de Leg. N. C. 4.* Where there is a most ingenious comparison between *Algebra* and *Morality* as to the method of finding out Truth, and teaching it when found.

accuracy, any more than the same is necessary in measuring Planes and Solids.

SECT. XXV. Another celebrated Author^u hath remarked, that *moral* quantities, as they are not capable of being adjusted in their mutual proportions with so much exactness as *physical* quantities are, so they do not need such a precision, but allow of a latitude. Thus in estimating the merit of persons, the value of things and actions, the proportion of the punishment to the crime, and in the exercise of the greater part of the Virtues, excepting Justice, *e. g.* Liberality, Gratitude, Equity, Charity, &c. there is a certain latitude or extent. It cannot be denied that the nature of the *subject matter*^w is different in moral and mathematical sciences; and according to this difference in the *subject* there is a like difference in the *kind* of evidence; from which it will by no means follow, that because the evidence to be expected in Morality, is not the same as that of the Mathematicks, that therefore it is not satisfactory. What hath been said, if I mistake not, shews the contrary. To this let it be added.

SECT. XXVI. 3. Morality gives satisfaction, where it is most of all desirable, in the

^u Puffendorf de Jur. N. & G. L. 1. C. 2. §. 10.

^w η υποκειμενη υλη. *Arist.*

the inquiry after happiness. The end of Morality is happiness; and will any one say that happiness is an impossible attainment? A most wise and good God hath made ample provision for other creatures, that they might reach the ends to which they incline, and for which by their several natures he hath fitted them, and it is hard to conceive, that man only should be under a necessity of falling short of the happiness of which he is capable. It is possible for God to make man happy, the thing does not imply a contradiction; nor is there any incapacity in the subject to oppose it; for being furnished both with Understanding and Will, man wants not the principles of fruition. And who can doubt, but that infinite power can supply objects of injoyment adequate to the faculty? Certain it is then that God *can* make man happy, and because he is infinitely good we are justified to infer that he *will* do it, with this only condition, that man be not wanting to himself.

But as man is not now in a state of innocence, but degeneracy, this argument may be thought to lose somewhat of its force and evidence; I will therefore place the matter in a different light. We will not then make the end of Morality to be the highest point of happiness, that it is absolutely possible for man to injoy, but the highest attainable by man in the present circumstances of his

Being, considered as frail and degenerate, whatever that happiness should prove to be; and of this Morality is secured, as the certain portion of those who faithfully follow its rules. For since there is a God, a Being of almighty power, and the fountain of all moral perfection, this God cannot but love those most who most resemble him; not only as all Beings delight in a similitude of nature, but as that which constitutes this likeness is in itself most excellent and lovely. And what God delights in and approves, he cannot but distinguish by suitable marks of his favour; and all whom God wills to be happy, must be as happy as he wills them to be, since he wants not power to accomplish his Will. This not only proves the greatest happiness to be the assured reward of the virtuous, but that there must be an after life, when this reward shall be bestowed, forasmuch as it is not fully and exactly conferred in the present state. The *natural* tendencies and effects of Virtue and Vice obvious to all, show them with certainty what God approves or disapproves. Virtue naturally produces happiness, Vice misery; so that if the virtuous man always enjoyed the natural effects of his Virtue, and the vicious man suffered the natural effects of his Viciousness, there would be no comparison between them in point of happiness. But forasmuch as this order of things does not always

ways take place in this life, it must be a satisfaction that we can have recourse to a Supreme Mind, whose future retributions will solve all wrong appearances, and make this truth secure, that in spite of every hindrance, the virtuous man will in the end, and upon the whole, be the happiest man. We now often see the most god-like souls in crazy miserable bodies, and the best of men placed in the worst circumstances of life; which introduces the necessity of a future state, when this seeming disorder in the conduct of things shall be rectified, and Virtue receives its crown. A *Heathen** Moralist reasons much after the same manner. "If as it is
 "probable the gods have regard to human
 "things, it is agreeable to Reason to suppose,
 "they delight in that which is best and
 "nearest akin to themselves, and will re-
 "ward those who most love and honour
 "them, and act rightly and becomingly."

SECT. XXVII. Upon the whole then, it seems sufficiently evinced that *certainty* belongs to *Ethicks*; and in concluding after this manner we are far from being singular. Mr. *Dryden* tells us concerning *Plutarch*, in his life of that celebrated Philosopher, that *Moral Philosophy* was his greatest aim, because the principles of it admitted of less
 D 4 doubt,

* Εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμελεῖα τῶν ἀνθρώπων, &c. Aristot. Eth. ad Nicom.

doubt, and were most conducive to the benefit of human life. And though ¹ *Cicero* professes himself an *Academic* even in Morality, pretending to no more than *probability* in the things he discourses of, yet when it is considered, that his design herein was not to represent *Ethicks* as less evident than those sciences, which are accounted to have the greatest certainty; and that by *probability* this Philosopher intended all that evidence which admits of the least possibility of mistake, which notion of the word will perhaps comprehend what we call *moral certainty*, I shall not be afraid to reckon him of our side. Nay, which at first sight appears strange, *Hobbs* ² himself, the man that denies all natural distinctions of moral good and evil, affirms Morality to be capable of demonstration; but then the odd reason which he gives for this shows, that he meant it no kindness. "Morality may be demonstrated, because we ourselves are the authors of the difference between Justice and Injustice, by the establishment of Laws and Conventions, to which moral good and evil owe all their being." His meaning is, that men may certainly know what actions are violations of those laws or rules, which they themselves have settled.

SECT.

¹ *Cic. De Offic. L. 2. §. 2. & Grav. in loc.*

² *De Homine. C. 10.*

SECT. XXVIII. Mr. *Locke's* ^a opinion is well known, that Morality is capable of demonstration; but it is doubted whether the reason he gives for it be conclusive. “Up-
“ on this ground it is (says this great man)
“ that I am bold to think, that Morality is
“ capable of demonstration, as well as Ma-
“ thematicks, since the precise real essence
“ of the things moral words stand for,
“ may be perfectly known; and so the
“ congruity or incongruity of the things
“ themselves be certainly discovered, in
“ which consists perfect knowledge.” The meaning seems to be this, that *moral* terms standing for ideas in the mind, which are not considered as existing in any real patterns without it, as is the case in *Natural Philosophy*, it is our own fault if we do not clearly define the terms we make use of in moral Propositions. And this being done, a certain judgment may be easily formed concerning the Propositions, whether they be true or false. But methinks this *supposes* rather than *proves* the certainty of Morality; or at most proves no more than this, that having a demonstration of it in our own minds, we can convey this knowledge to others, by first laying down precise definitions of the terms we imploy; by means of which others may as easily conceive our mean-

^a Human Understanding, B. 3. C. 2. §. 16.

meaning in the words *Justice*, *Probity*, *Fraud*, or the like, as they can of the words *Square*, *Circle*, *Triangle*, and the like, when the figures themselves are exhibited before them. But with submission, something more is necessary than this, *viz.* proving that my ideas as connected with praise or dispraise, with good or ill desert, have a foundation in the nature of things. Justice being first defined, it may not be difficult to show that an action is just or unjust according to the definition; but is it reasonable, is it praise-worthy and deserving the approbation of God and men? To demonstrate this, which is demonstrating the moral obligation of the action, something more is evidently necessary, than exactly defining the terms. What this is which is further necessary will be shown in the proof of the Law of Nature.

SECT. XXIX. Against the certainty of Morality these two things are commonly objected:

1. The *different* sentiments of mankind concerning the same actions, which some are ready to think were hardly possible, if they had one plain uniform rule by which to judge. The answer to this will be more conveniently placed under the Demonstration of the Law of Nature, where I shall have occasion to consider it at large, for which reason

reason I only mention the objection now, with this general remark upon it, that mens not *using* the rule is no proof of their not having it in their possession.

2. There are many actions confessedly of a doubtful nature, and what becomes of the certainty of Morality in these cases? I answer, our doubts here are not so much about the *moral*, as *physical* nature of actions. Virtue immediately consists in the disposition of the mind, and what this ought to be in every case may be easily demonstrated. But as to external actions the good or evil of them depending upon the disposition of mind with which they are or ought to be connected; though it be demonstrable that whatever actions flow from right dispositions are right, and whatever actions are owing to a want of such dispositions, and much more to the prevalence of the contrary, are not right but wrong; yet in such cases it may be doubted, what actions are on account of their *physical* nature (or aptitude to express and promote good dispositions) to be chosen. Yet here it is plain, as long as this ignorance or doubt is not to be ascribed to a faulty disposition of mind, they do not at all affect the certainty of Morality. A man acting wrong in such a case does it from an ignorance or mistake, like that of a person who drinks an intoxicating liquor, not knowing the quality of it, which deprives

prives him for a time of the use of his Reason; here is the *appearance* but not the *crime* of drunkenness. A virtuous man is not infallible in opinions or facts; but though destitute of certainty in one sense, he has it in another. Though he may not be certain of the intrinsic nature of an action, that is, whether it be good or evil in itself, yet he may be certain of its relative nature, whether it be good or evil to him, all circumstances considered^b. For either the doubt concerns the *necessity* of the action only, or our being obliged to do it, the *lawfulness* of it being out of dispute; on which supposition it is our undoubted duty to perform the action: or the doubt is of the *lawfulness* of the action, at the same time that we are persuaded of its *not* being necessary to be done; in which case it is manifest that I am bound to forbear. Or a doubt lies on both sides, that the doing of the action may be sinful, and so likewise the forbearance of it, and yet one or the other must be chosen; in this uncertainty we are not without sure footing, nor without sufficient light to direct us; for having sought divine illumination humbly and fervently, and done all we are morally capable of doing to extricate ourselves from the strait, laying aside all prejudices from passion and interest; if after all no more reason appears for one side of

^b See this matter more largely treated. P. II. §. 2. C. 1.

of the question than the other, it is certain, which way soever we act, there is no danger of our fining. But in case the probabilities after all appear unequal, we must act on that side which we apprehend has the greatest to justify it. In every vicious action the Will is in fault, either directly or indirectly, which it not being here, the action must be pronounced innocent.

SECT. XXX. The result of the whole is, that Morality is of the greatest moment, and capable of the most satisfactory proof. And this will justify the Oracle of *Apollo* in declaring *Socrates* the wisest man of the age in which he lived; for this reason, that despising the sophistry and trifling of the Philosophy then in vogue, he directed his chief application to the study of himself, and the correction of his manners. As much as to say, the study of Morality is indeed the study of Wisdom. ^a *Socrates* recommended studying Geometry and Astronomy, as far as these sciences were practical and of use in life; but beyond this (as for instance abstruse and difficult theories in Geometry, and in Astronomy, inquiring into the mechanism by which God framed

^c A summary of his Moral Philosophy is given by *Xenophon*, in his four books *de Memorabilibus Soc: & Cic. Academic. L. 1.*

^d *Xen. de Memor. L. 4. C. 7.*

and moved the heavenly bodies) he did not approve an application to these studies; esteeming *Anaxagoras* to have been no better than a mad man upon this account. In this preference of moral science the *Chinese* agree with *Socrates*, whose ^e Laws admit none to the Magistracy, but those who have for a long time and with success applied themselves to study the *Moral Philosophy* of *Confucius*, the *Socrates* of the *Chinese*. But then this preference of moral science must not be carried so far, as the treating other sciences with contempt, as it is in fact done by ^f Lord *Shaftesbury*; since by reason of the connection which *Cicero* observes there is between all the parts of learning, the most *speculative* sciences may be very assistant to those that are *practical*. Besides, we cannot be supposed to fill up all our hours of study with the study of Morality, other speculations are necessary to enlarge, entertain, and exercise the mind. “Philosophy
 “ (as a fine Writer ^g observes) was putting
 “ on a new face about the age of *Philostrophus*;
 “ it was begining to forsake the natural
 “ precepts of *life* and *morals*, to neglect
 “ that noble connection, which the
 “ first masters had established between *physical*
 “ contemplations and this prime science
 “ of

^e Burnet's Archæol. p. 15.

^f Advice to an Author. Part III. §. 1.

^g Inquiry into the Life and Writings of *Homer*, §. 12.

“ of *manners* and *actions*. A connection
 “ never to be overlooked; and which we
 “ have the satisfaction to see revived, since
 “ the sciences have gained a new lustre,
 “ and by the happy application of *Geometry*
 “ and *Numbers* to the appearances of nature
 “ have lost that uncertainty which was long
 “ their reproach, and the cause of their de-
 “ cay.” The Author quotes as instances,
 Sir *Isaac Newton*’s Principles of Natural
 Philosophy, *Scholium* the last, his *Chrono-*
logy, C. 2, and 3. *Cumberland* de Legibus,
Wolaston’s Religion of Nature, *Derham*’s
 Astro-& Physico-Theology, and others.
 This observation shows the great usefulness
 of *Natural* Philosophy to the Moralist; the
 knowledge of nature being certainly a very
 good preparation to the study of morals.
 This science then being confessedly the most
 important, it may be of some use to re-
 mark, that God did not wholly neglect the
beathen world, he raised up a *Socrates* in
Greece, a ^h *Confucius* in *China*; and the same
 is true of other nations, as teachers and
 examples of righteousness.

SECT. XXXI. Can we now help admir-
 ing the vanity of man, which diverts him
 from the pursuit of moral knowledge, that
 so nearly concerns him, and would reward
 his industry with the most solid satisfaction,
 and

^ See the General Dictionary, Article *Confucius*.

and bewilders him among the distractions of human opinions, which commonly are as little profitable as certain? This shows the general taste to be extremely vitiated, and the need there is, not only of a resolute opposition to vulgar prejudices, but of some higher principle to correct it. For this reason I shall close this *Introduction* with some counsels, for the more successful pursuit of moral truth, after giving a necessary caution against the error of those, who, as ¹ *Cicero* takes notice, “study Morality, “that they may make a show of their learning, not that they may live according to “its rules.” In opposition to this error * *Seneca* justly observes, “The design of “Philosophy is not popularity or ostentation; and it consists not in talking plausibly, but acting well. It animates and “forms the mind, directs the life, governs “our actions, shows what we are to do, “and what forbear, and sitting at the helm “guides our course over the sea of life.” The advice I would recommend to be observed by those who would study Morals with success, may be reduced to these *three* heads.

1. Be not so attached to any preconceived notions, however positive you may
hitherto

¹ *Moralem disciplinam ostentationem scientiæ non legem vitæ putant.*

* *Epist. 16.*

hitherto have been of their truth, as to be backward to part with them upon better evidence, even though the discovery of your errors should deprive you of some pleasing delusion, and oblige you to the practice of something naturally ungrateful.

2. Impose an absolute silence on your *Passions*, and guard against the flatteries of *Sense* and *Imagination*, resolving to be guided in your judgments only by sober, improved, and enlightened *Reason*. The clearness and stilness of the *medium*, as well as the goodness of the *organ*, are necessary to an exact view of the object. The ¹ *Platonists* therefore define Philosophy, “the disingagement
“and abstraction of the mind from the
“body, that it might be capable of apply-
“ing itself to things intelligible, and that
“have a true and proper being.” “As to
“the passionate part of the soul, says the
“same Author, a Philosopher ought to be
“furnished with the coldest and most in-
“different temper to corporeal delights.” The mind or diviner part of man is often mislead by the corrupt affections of the heart, which having lost its relish of true good, seeks to draw the Understanding into the same error. For this reason you should not only be aware of the artifices of the heart, and guard against them, but

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3. La-

¹ *Alcinou* Introd. ad Philos. Platoniam.

3. Labour incessantly to purge and reform the heart, and to have it inflamed with the love of truth and goodness; and for this end by fervent devotion to obtain from God, the great restorer of nature, that sacred light and influence, which will direct you to form right judgments of things, and enable you to act conformably.

Books proper to be consulted on the subject of the *Introduction*, besides those that are cited in it, are

Barbeyrac's Large Preface to his Translation of *Puffendorf's* Law of Nature, &c.
§. 1—10.

Puffendorf's Preface to his Book *De Officio Hominis & Civis*.

Grove's Queries on Reason and Revelation. Vol. 4.

Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness. §. 1, and 2. C. 1, 2, 3.





PART I.

Of Happiness.



CHAP. I.

Of Ethicks or Morality in general, and of the nature of Happiness.

SECT. I.



ETHICKS or Mora-

lity, *ἠθικη*, is so named

απο των ἠθων, and *ἠθος* again

is derived *απο τε ἠθους*, as

Aristotle^a has observed,

by an easy transmutation of a short vowel into a long one; between which two words there seems to be much the same difference, if we critically distinguish them, as between *Custom* and *Habit* in our language: *ἠθος* or

E 2

Habit

^a *Eth. Eudaim. L. 2. §. 2.*

Habit signifying an internal rooted disposition of soul, acquired or improved *δια τῆς ἔθους* by *Custom*, or a frequent repetition of the actions proper to generate it. And even the word *Mores*, from whence *Morality* has its name, and so likewise our english word *Manners*, does not simply denote human actions, but actions to which men are accustomed. Dr. *Grew*^b indeed observes, “that though the Philosophy which treateth of Virtue, is by the *Greeks* called *ἠθικὴ*, it is not because Custom maketh Virtue, but because Virtue is the parent of Custom; so far as this is useful to all communities, or agreeable to the best Reason in any one.” But I will venture to say, that Custom is in some sense the parent of Virtue; not as if Virtue consisted in a conformity to publick Custom, but because a Custom of doing virtuous actions forms a habit of Virtue, from whence *ἠθικὴ*^c has its derivation.

Ethicks or Morality is a Science directing human actions for the attainment of happiness. You see the genus of the definition is Science, for so Morality is in a proper sense; moral knowledge being fixed and certain. The objects of this Science, by which it is differenced from all others, are the actions of mankind, as capable of being directed

^b Cosmol. Sacra. B. 2. C. 7.

^c *Arist.* Eth. ad Nicom. L. 2. C. 1.

directed by a moral rule, and made subservient to the acquisition of happiness.

SECT. II. In my *division* of Ethicks I shall follow one of the oldest and most common, not knowing where to find a better; and accordingly part it under these two general heads, of *happiness*, and of the *method* to be observed for its attainment. I give happiness the first place, not so much for the reason commonly assigned, that happiness is the end of Morality, and the end is still first in intention, but upon these *two* considerations.

1. The nature of the end regulates that of the means, and ought therefore to be first known and established; in so much that the end being low, sensual, and momentary, the means must be agreeable; as on the contrary the means must partake of the dignity of the end. If the happiness which a wise man is to pursue ariseth from sensual gratifications, or worldly power, wealth, and greatness, who does not see, that sensuality, covetousness, and ambition, within certain bounds, are not only lawful, but commendable^d?

E 3

And

^d Supposing no happiness beyond this life, too many would be apt to think after this manner, and to reason concerning all *mental* pleasures, which cost us a pretty deal of pains to come at them, and after all could not be carried to any great degree, as *Horace* concerning the Philosophy of *Archytas* the *Pythagorean*.

Te

And though the pleasures of the mind should in themselves be preferable to those of the body, yet supposing the duration of human happiness, whatever that happiness be, not to extend beyond this life, a very great change must follow in respect of moral obligations. It would, to say the least, be doubtful, whether among the duties owing to God we were to place refusing to comply with the Established Religion, against our inward sentiments, at the expence of our lives, or what we held dearest in them; or such degrees of devotion, and so strict a regard to truth as truth, where the laws of justice were not violated; or to the workings of our minds, as we are now obliged to maintain. And as to our neighbour, whether all the same instances of benevolence, *e. g.* hazarding our own lives to save those of other persons; and as to ourselves, that exact temperance in the enjoyment of bodily pleasures, that industry and improvement of our time, which are duties

now,

*Te maris & terræ, numeroque carentis arenæ
Menforem cohibent, Archyta,
Pulveris exigui prope littus parva Matinum
Munera: nec quidquam tibi prodest
Aeris tentasse domos, animoque rotundum
Percurrisse polum, morituro.*

Hor. L. 1. Od. 28.

Whether this would be right or no, yet thus would they reason, and of consequence run into all kinds of sensual indulgence, having no principle left strong enough to restrain them.

now, would be the same then. Or though Reason should determine for all the same duties and obligations upon both suppositions; yet as upon supposition of no happiness beyond this life, we could not so easily and effectually silence those who abandoned themselves to their vices, who would laugh at any that should talk to them of the reasonableness of curbing their inclinations; it is upon this account also very necessary, that the happiness which men have in view should be first fixed, because upon the other supposition of a happiness remaining for the virtuous in a future state, of which the perfection of Virtue and Piety, and the most exalted exercises of it, will constitute a principal part; all disputes about the obligation to the several instances of Virtue and Piety, even the most expensive and self-denying, are cut off at once. A stream will rise as high, and no higher, as it is forced to ascend by the weight of the fountain. It would also be very hard to show in many cases the crime of *self-murder* if there were no future state.

SECT. III. *Grotius** having quoted a passage from *Aristotle, de Moribus*, L. 9. C. 8. wherein he saith, "that whereas the vulgar
" call those *lovers of themselves*, who are
" for ingrossing the things of this world,

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" he

* Comment. in Matt. xvi. 24.

" he for his part reckoning that to be the
 " man, which was most excellent in him,
 " could not but esteem him to be the lover
 " of himself, who loved and gratified his
 " most excellent part, though he was to die
 " for it;" adds, " which opinion whether
 " it can be defended by a *Philosopher*, who
 " acknowledges no rewards or punishments
 " after this life, may justly be questioned.
 " St. *Austin* was of the mind, that setting
 " aside those rewards and punishments, the
 " truth would lie on the side of *Epicurus*."
Puffendorf^f having said, " that the Law of
 " Nature considered in itself is shut up
 " within the bounds of this life, tending
 " only to render man *sociable*; while the
 " end of *Moral Theology* is to form the
 " *Christian*, that is, a man who ought in-
 " deed to live here below honestly and
 " peaceably, but who nevertheless expects
 " the principal rewards of his Piety after
 " this life:" *Leibnitz* in his *Judgment upon*
Puffendorf had too much reason to object,
 " that to neglect the consideration of *ano-*
 " *ther life*, was to deprive this Science of
 " the finest things belonging to it, and at
 " the same time to destroy many duties
 " of life."

SECT. IV. As all Morality has its foun-
 dation in Religion, or the belief of a Su-
 preme

^f *Præfat. de Offic. Hom. & Civ. §. 6.*

preme Being, and the hopes and fears of mankind relating to him, if there be no other life of man but what is animal and dying, Religion vanishes of course, and with that Morality, as far as it flows from conscience, regulates the habit and temper of the mind, and is supported by the awe or love of a Divine Being. For what is Providence in the *moral* world, but the regard which the Supreme Ruler of it has to human actions, between the doers of which he will make a distinction in his treatment of them, suitable to their respective actions, whether good or evil, and the degrees of goodness or viciousness in each; now no such distinction being ordinarily made in this world, if there be no future state where it shall be done, can men think there is such a thing in God as *approbation* or *dislike* of the actions of men, and consequently any regard to them, or any Moral Providence? And if there be no Moral Providence, to what purpose is Religion, or what room is there for Morality, as far as that depends upon Religion, and has it interwoven with it?

Religion and Morality were divided amongst the *Heathen*, the *Priesthood* had the care of Religion, the *Philosophers* of Morality. Religion among them consisted only in the knowledge and practice of certain rites and ceremonies, so that it is no wonder

der Morality was not deduced from their Religion, such a Religion was not a proper foundation for it. As on the other hand, it is no wonder that a Morality not founded in Religion was imperfect, it was impossible it should be otherwise. Christianity has reconciled these two, the *Christian Minister* is instead of the *Pagan Priest* and the *Pagan Philosopher*, he takes care of both provinces, and with more success by means of their union. This argument may be improved to show, that both our Religion and Morality are the only true and genuine. *Lactantius*^s has much the same observation. Herein *Aristotle's Ethics* and *Cicero's Offices* appear to be defective, the duties we owe to God being omitted, and the duties we owe our fellow-creatures not being founded upon right principles,

SECT. V. 2. The knowledge of the *end* puts life into the execution of the *means*. When men run in a race they run with greater speed, having the prize in view; and the more glorious that is, the more vigorous and unfainting is their motion. After the lovely scene is once displayed, and it has been clearly shown what happiness means, a man will find his passions stirred, his hopes and desires will be in motion, and very inquisitive he will be how to secure him-

^s *Lact. Institut. Div. L. 4. C. 3.*

himself of so invaluable a treasure; and when he is thus prepared, the *Moralist* has a stronger handle by which to turn and guide him. The precepts of Virtue which make up the *second* part will then have a more favourable hearing, and he will then be held attentive to instruction, being already convinced that his greatest interest is concerned. *Divines* indeed in their discourses to the people generally go a contrary way, they first state the duty and then enforce it by motives taken from the rewards that attend it. But in proceeding after this manner they take it for granted, that their hearers are before possessed of the knowledge of the reward from Revelation, and so carry the idea of it all along with them, and need only to have it a little more opened and illustrated in the close; whereas we are now upon the inquiry after happiness by the light of natural Reason.

SECT. VI. A man never acts upon previous thought, but he is under a necessity of acting for some end; if for no other, to imploy the activity of his Being, and to avoid that satiety and weariness which is the natural punishment of sloth. Should a person to disprove this attempt to lay aside all views and designs in any particular action, and then think he has hereby confuted this assertion, he deceives himself egregiously; for

for he directly confirms it, his end being plainly this, to contradict the above mentioned *axiom*, that man never acts but for some end. And as man acts for some end, so this end is a *good*, really such, or imagined so to be^h. He may indeed will *evil*, but not under the notion of *evil*; this is a contradiction and impossibility, the same as placing our happiness in being miserable. If the *Poet*ⁱ makes the apostate angel say,

———— *All Good to me is lost.*
Evil be thou my Good! ———

by *evil* he means not his *own misery*, but the revenge which this would provoke him to take, in gratifying which he should enjoy a criminal and monstrous delight. The Devil himself would be glad to separate between his punishment and his guilt.

SECT. VII. Good is either moral or natural. *Moral* good is the goodness of actions as conformable to right Reason, and deserving of approbation. An action done because it is reasonable and fit, is in that view of it *morally* good, of which more hereafter. *Natural* good is either happiness itself,

^h *πᾶσα τὰν ἐμὲ λυχὼν κίνησις, κ. τ. λ.* All action is for the sake of some *good*, either real or appearing to be such; for even flight from evil is for the sake of *good*; and because it is thought to be useful.

Simplic. in Epiſt. C. 1.

ⁱ *Milton's Paradise Lost. B. 4.*

or what has a relation to happiness, considered purely in that view. The meeting of these two in the same action does not make them ever the less distinct; for the aptitude of an action to produce happiness, which is its natural goodness, is one thing; and doing such an action, because it is fit and reasonable you should do it, (which is the *moral* goodness of such actions when so done) is another. Virtue in one view of it is *natural* good, as it gives satisfactions of the best kind in the action, and in the reflection, and as it improves and enlarges the faculties of enjoyment; but this idea of it is evidently distinct from its *moral* goodness, or its being practised by us because conformable to right Reason, and deserving of approbation. It is only of *natural* good that we are here discoursing. And not only happiness itself, but what has a relation to happiness is good in that relation. Hence is the goodness of the natural powers and faculties of an agent, by which he is able to contribute to the producing of happiness, either his own or others; and the more extensive these faculties the better and more excellent they are.

SECT. VIII. Good in this acceptation of it may be thus defined. *It is that which either makes or denominates a Being happy, or prepares him for happiness; or at least prevents*

vents or removes his misery. The full meaning of which definition you may take in the following Propositions.

1. *Happiness consists in Pleasure.* My chief reason for saying so is this. The contrary to what bespeaks a man miserable must be his happiness; that which bespeaks a man miserable is pain, and the contrary of pain is pleasure. But then the notion of pain is by no means to be confined to the complaints of the body, but takes in all uneasinesses of the mind, whether arising immediately from its own imperfections and disorders, which as unavoidably produce mental uneasiness, as a distortion of the limbs, a dislocation of the bones, or the discontinuity of the parts, is attended with pain in the frame of the body; or from reflections on its irregularities; or be caused by something without apprehended as an evil, whether it be present or future, whether it be real or only supposed. He that boasts of being happy in *Phalaris's* Bull, talks more like a mad than a wise man. ^k *Seneca* quotes a saying of *Epicurus's* to this purpose, and gives him the honour of it; but what can be plainer, than that if the words were *Epicurus*, yet none but a *Stoic* could ever speak them seriously? In the mouth of *Epicurus* they were nothing else but a severe banter upon the *Stoics*. What other air have

^k Epist. 66.

have these words, *Quam suave est, quam nihil curo!* "How pleasant I find it, how
 "unconcerned I am!" which *Epicurus* says a
 wise man would utter in the extremity of
 pain. And thus *Cicero*¹ understood them.
 They are excellent words, and worth all the
 romantic strains of the *Stoics*, which *Xeno-*
phon^m puts into the mouth of *Cyrus*, in an
 oration to his soldiers tending to prove, that
pleasure is the aim of all human actions,
 even of the severest Virtue. "It is my
 "judgment, that men would not strive to
 "excel in any Virtue, if when masters of
 "their wish, they should enjoy nothing
 "more than the wicked. And as for them
 "who despise present pleasures, they do it
 "not as if they were indifferent whether
 "ever they knew any thing of delight, but
 "from the prospect they have, that this
 "continence of theirs will be the occasion
 "of their tasting much greater pleasures af-
 "terward." "When men lose their plea-
 "sure (saith the *Chorus* in a play of *Sophocles*ⁿ) I reckon not that such do live,
 "but count them breathing carcases. Be
 "rich if thou wilt at home, and possess a
 "government; but if joy be absent from
 "all this, all other things the world can
 "afford are vain as clouds of smoke, in
 "com-

¹ De Finibus. L. 5. & Tusc. Qu. L. 2. §. 7.

^m *Kypis waiseta*. Lib. 1.

ⁿ *Antigone*. Act 5. Sc. 1.

"comparison of real felicity." That happiness differs not but in name from pleasure, is likewise evident from this, that the highest pleasure is nothing else but the result of the regular frame and disposition of nature, and the due exercise of its faculties; so that pleasure is somewhat springing out of nature, which crowns its operations. It is the reward of the wise Author of things, by which he intimates his approbation, and gives us to understand, that nature is in that temperament, and exerts itself after the manner, which he would have it. And what can this reward be but happiness?

X

SECT. IX. 2. Good is either *objective* or *formal*. This distinction is implied in the definition, for *objective* good, or *objective* happiness, (as others somewhat improperly call it) is that which *makes* us happy; *formal* good, or the pleasure resulting from the application of the faculty to the object, is that which *denominates* us happy. And it may be of some use to these *two* to add a *third*, and to call it *intermediate*, this is no other than *fruition*. I term it a *good*, because it is the next and immediate foundation of pleasure. I call it *intermediate*, because it comes between the pleasure and the object which gives being to it. Some there are with whom this passes under the name of *formal* happiness; so say the *Schoolmen*, but

but certainly without reason, for as I showed just now, happiness is the same with pleasure; but bare enjoyment, or the exercise of the Understanding and the Will in the contemplation or love of any object, is not pleasure, but the *medium* of it. Besides which I might observe, that *formal* happiness is for the sake of no other, but *operation* of what kind soever it be is subservient to pleasure. *Pleasure* therefore is the *formal* happiness of man, the thing enjoyed is *objective* happiness, or good rather, and fruition is the *intermediate* good.

SECT. X. 3. The nature and excellency of any good is to be estimated by the nature of the Being to which it is adapted. As there is an order of Beings one rising above another, so without all doubt of happiness too. And as one Being is specifically different from another, as far as it is so, its happiness cannot be the same. The more excellent the Being, the more excellent the pleasure proper to that Being; for according to the excellency of the Being is that of the faculties of enjoyment; and in proportion as these are more perfect, the pleasure they convey will be answerable in value. Together with the Being the pleasure of a *Beast* must be superior to that of an *Oyster*, of a *Man* to a *Beast*, of an *Angel* to a *Man*. Agreeable to this is the observation of *Aristotle*.

Aristotle. "There is a difference in pleasures
 " suitable to the difference of functions.
 " Every animal aims to have his peculiar
 " pleasure, as well as his particular opera-
 " tions. The pleasures of a Horse, a Dog, a
 " Man, are not the same." The difference
 in some Beings is such, as to require differ-
 ent objects of enjoyment; and here the ad-
 vantage one has above the other may be
 estimated by the object, the noblest object
 yielding the noblest pleasure. Such is the
 difference between *rational* creatures and
 creatures endowed only with *sense*. And
 where the object enjoyed is the same, yet a
 diversity in the *manner*, or *degree* of fruition,
 will make way for a variety of happiness;
 which is probably the case of Angels, and the
 spirits of just men made perfect. This ob-
 servation, if we governed ourselves by it,
 might be of great use. For having first con-
 sidered what kind of Beings we are, and the
 distinction between the soul and the body,
 we shall not be ignorant of the happiness
 which we ought to prefer and pursue.

SECT. XI. 4. A thing may make us hap-
 py by a *proper* and *immediate causality* of its
 own, or by *procuring* what will make us
 happy. By this means it is that Virtue
 comes to be so great a good. Virtue it is
 granted

* *Eth. ad Nicom. L. 10. C. 5.* See also *C. 4.* where he
 proves at large, that Pleasures are *specifically* different.

granted is in itself good, as abstracting from all other considerations it causes pleasure; but the pleasure it now affords from its own fund is small, in comparison of the pleasure for which it qualifies and prepares the soul. And on this account its greatest goodness lies, not in making us happy at present by its own efficiency, but in giving us a title to that from which we shall receive all the happiness we can desire. Nay, in this view, things in themselves wholly indifferent put on the nature of good. For instance, *Money* separate from its use, as in a state of perfect solitude, is of no more value than common earth; only remove the scene into society, and there a competency of it is not to be despised, helping to furnish us with the advantages of life. It is easy to transfer this to actions. An Action in itself indifferent, I mean as to its moral nature, and as to any pleasure or pain it gives us in the performance, if commanded by God, and we do it because commanded, passes into the quality of good, by commending us to the divine favour. Yea further, that which in itself and abstractly taken is evil, in the relation it bears to a succeeding pleasure that is more than equal to it, and of which it is the occasion or condition, ought to be numbered among the things that are good. An *incision* in the flesh is painful, and therefore ordinarily to

be avoided as evil; but when it tends to the recovery of health, and preservation of life, which are the foundation of all pleasure, it puts on another name. And thus all the *afflictions* and *disappointments* which the good man suffers in this world, Religion will inform him are favours for which he is bound to give thanks, in regard of their connection with the perfect happiness of a better state.

SECT. XII. 5. He that feels *more pain* than he enjoys *pleasure* is upon the whole a *miserable* man. For things are always to be denominated *a majori*, from their prevailing quality; consequently whatever it be that gives me pleasure, though in a very high degree, and must conclude in a greater degree of pain, is not to be accounted good, because in the result it does not make me happy but miserable. That the pleasure is *present*, and the pain *future*, alters not the case; a thinking Being ought to consider what is future as present, for as much as it will once be so. For to what purpose had I Reason given to me, by the help of which I might penetrate into futurity, and bring the most distant prospect home to my view, if I leave things *future* out of the account? In this light *sinful pleasures* appear not to be good, and sinners therefore not to be the happy men they proclaim themselves,

selves, not injoying any good to make them so.

6. Happiness consisting in pleasure, the *absence of pleasure* is not *so great an evil*, as the *presence of pain*; for this reason, that one is only a negation of happiness, the other as something positive stands in direct opposition to it, and must needs be further removed from happiness, than that which lies between.

— *Nocet empty dolore voluptas.*

“ That pleasure is an evil, that is bought
“ with pain.” This shows the wisdom of denying one’s self the pleasure that must be paid for with after pains and remorses; a person suffering much less in such a voluntary denial, than he would have done in the painful perceptions subsequent to the gratification of his appetites. Yea, this abstinence from one sort of pleasure is rewarded with pleasure of another kind, whereas the pain is aggravated by the reflection on a foregoing pleasure,

SECT. XIII. 7. A lesser good, that cannot be injoyed but with the loss or hazard of one vastly greater, is a *comparative evil*. And when the difference is exceeding great,

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both

both in respect of *degree* and *duration*, tho' the greater be only *probably* future, yet is it preferable to a lesser which is present, how much more when it is *certainly* future. The same, *vice versa*, holds of a lesser evil.

8. The desire after good or happiness being *inextinguishable*, they must be unavoidably miserable who fall short of it. Desires disappointed cause torment, especially if they are natural and urgent; as the desire of happiness is universally acknowledged to be. A man excluded from happiness cannot forbear panting after it still, and so in the condition of a person, that should be supposed to suffer the extremity of hunger and thirst, and have nothing to gratify them; or which is worse, should behold at a great distance from him a sumptuous banquet which he must never touch. This consideration should make every one solicitous that he does not mistake in the nature of true happiness, or as to the means of obtaining it.

SECT. XIV. 9. A state of *indolence*, in a thinking Being, is a state of *pleasure*. Not that indolence and pleasure are the same, as say the *Epicureans*, they are plainly distinct, unless a thing may be the cause and effect of itself. *Doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas*, "the absence of all pain is
" justly

"justly called *pleasure*," saith a Philosopher of this tribe in *Cicero*¹. Others will tell you, that pain is a privation of pleasure; but good sense will not admit of our saying, that either of them is the privation of the other, all sensations being equally positive. A privation indeed may be the cause of either. The privation or absence of pleasure may be the cause of uneasiness or mental pain; and the removal of pain, for instance of hunger and thirst, may be attended with a corporeal pleasure. Though that it is not properly the removal of this painful sensation, that is the cause of the consequent pleasure, is plain from hence, that when the pain is intirely removed, the pleasure is at an end; whereas then it ought to be greatest, since if the removal of pain in a less degree be pleasure, the greatest pleasure must consist in the removal of all the pain. The true cause of pleasure therefore in eating and drinking must be something positive. This by the by. But though indolence be not the same as pleasure, nor in strictness of speaking always the cause of it, yet to a reasonable man it should administer pleasure to reflect, that he is not in pain. He considers that it is possible for him to be miserable, he sees others who are so, and from hence he takes occasion to rejoice in that goodness which has placed him in better

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circum-

¹ De Finibus. L. 1. §. 11.

circumstances. And if this be true, then the absence of evil is a good, it is the occasion of our happiness; or at least it is our own fault if it be not, for it has a tendency to beget pleasure in a grateful considerate mind; and whatever makes us happy or pleased is a good.

SECT. XV. 10. Whatever *prepares* a man for happiness, by purifying, strengthening, exalting, and perfecting the faculties of enjoyment, is deservedly called good, being the object of a rational desire; which nothing that is not truly good can be. The excellent Dr. Cumberland's definition of good is taken wholly from hence. "Good, saith he, is what preserves the faculties of any Being, or which more improves and perfects them." Against which definition I have these *two* exceptions to make. 1. That it is far from expressing the *whole* idea of good, and so is too *narrow*, as may appear from what has been before offered for explaining the nature of good. 2. That as it contains but part of the idea of good, so not the *principal* part neither. Happiness or pleasure constitutes the prime and most distinguishing character of good. What perfects the faculties is good not immediately, but with relation to that happiness which we are hereby rendered more capable of enjoying.

joying. It is certain, that nothing which any way injures the faculties can be good, because in so doing, it lessens our capacity for the fruition of the proper happiness of our Being. Nor is this observation of small importance, since it will direct us in judging of a great many things, which though grateful in the present perception, yet being injurious to the noblest powers of our nature are not good but evil. But if these things are evil, the reason must be drawn from the happiness of which they disappoint us, and not directly from the hurt they do our faculties; for faculties raised to the highest perfection, without adequate objects of enjoyment, would be of no value.

11. That may be called good which *removes* or *prevents* misery, though it does not bring with it any happiness. To one who feels, or justly fears, the most dreadful torments, and such as he is never to survive, an utter privation of Being, or of all sensibility, would be a favour. In such circumstances annihilation is desirable, and consequently good; because though it makes not the subject happy, it makes him not to be miserable. I do not say that bare non-existence in misery is good; a meer possibility that never was nor will be is not miserable, notwithstanding which, its non-misery is not to be reckoned a good: but what I assert to be good is, the taking away that Being that

that was, or otherwise would have been, miserable.

SECT. XVI. These are the Propositions by which I choose to express the intire sense of the definition. And the nature of good being thus intelligibly opened and explained, you will the better apprehend the truth of what I asserted in the beginning, that in all their deliberate actions men propose some end, and that this end is good either real or imaginary; *real*, when the definition of good before laid down will agree to it; *imaginary*, when it is only fancied to agree. I shall only further observe, that the common distinction of good is into *bonum utile*, *jucundum*, & *honestum*, or *useful*, *pleasant*, and *virtuous*, all of which are comprehended in the foregoing Propositions. This distinction had I think been never the worse if it had been only into *useful* and *pleasant*, omitting the third member, which is no way necessary to the compleatness of the distinction. For Virtue is a good either considered as ministering pleasure of itself, and then it falls under *pleasant* or *bonum jucundum*; or as it procures other advantages, improves the faculties of the mind, and intitles to the future reward, and then it is *bonum utile*, or *useful*. Cicero¹ distinguishes good into *useful* and *virtuous*, including plea-

¹ De Officiis. L. 1. §. 3.

pleasure under the former; elsewhere he says, there is no real distinction between what is *useful*, and *virtuous*, though Philosophers have separated them in their thoughts.

Books proper to be read on this Chapter,
besides those cited, are

- Aristot.* Eth. ad Nicom. L. 1. C. 1 & 2,
- Mori Encheir.* Eth. L. 1. C. 1, 2, 4,
- Whitbii.* Eth. L. 1. C. 1.
- Wollaston's Religion of Nature.* §. 2.
- Bp. Leng's Sermons at Boyle's Lecture.*
Ser. 3 & 4.
- Nettleton of Virtue and Happiness.* P. I,
§. 1 & 2.
- Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness.* §. 2. C. 8.





C H A P. II.

*Of the necessity of fixing right our
Chief End--Man not his own Chief
Good--nor any Creature--but God
alone.*

SECT. I. **T**HOUGH every particular action has some end to which it is directed, is it necessary that there be a *general* and *chief* end, which shall run through all others, and be a common standard whereby to pronounce of their goodness? After having premised, that I understand the question of actions which proceed from a principle of *self-interest*, or as far forth as they are done with an eye to that, (the reason of which restriction you will know hereafter) and that we are to distinguish between an end that is *confused* and *indeterminate*, and one that is *distinct* and *explicit*; I answer, that there is no person but has some *general* aim which he pursues in all that he does, and that this aim is to be happy. It may very well be stiled a *general* end, being common to all men, and to all those actions of every man, which he does out of regard to

to himself. Particular desires are but limitations of this general one; and for this very reason that we incline towards good, e'er we have singled out any object, we find a tendency towards the object when it appears. The object does not *create* but *direct* the motion. And as it is necessary that we be influenced by some *general* end, so likewise that we propose some *chief* end, that is, some end which is to be the measure of goodness to the rest, though the idea we have of this end be extremely loose and unrestrained. This *chief* end of man is his *chief good* or *happiness*. His *immediate* end, in this or that action, may perhaps be no more than a present gratification; but besides and beyond this there is one more *remote*, and of a *superior* nature, namely the prospect or view of being a *happy man*; not pleased in a lower degree only, or in a particular instance or two, but that he may enjoy a happy Being, and the greatest pleasure for which his nature is contrived. To this chief end all others must submit; as a proof of which if you can but convince a man, that this or that particular indulgence is inconsistent with his main happiness, he must immediately quit it, or suspend the actual compliance with his inclination, 'till he hath introduced a contrary persuasion; or by inconsideration or forgetfulness hath destroyed the energy of this.

SECT. II. And yet notwithstanding all that has been said, that men do govern themselves by a confused aim at some universal and chief end, and are guilty of no mistake in the abstracted notion of it, we see the greater part of the world live to none, or to a bad purpose, for want of *fixing* a clear and precise idea of this great end, or through their taking up with a *wrong* one. To neglect the *first* is much like setting out on a journey, with a design to visit the pleasantest part of the Kingdom, and there to settle, without either knowing ourselves, or troubling ourselves to inquire of others, which way and in what County it lies; though if we are ignorant of this, our general design must be useless. We are all in the quality of *Travellers*, our intention is to find out the abode of true happiness, but too often we intend this, without taking the least care to inform ourselves in what enjoyments this happiness is lodged. The unavoidable consequence of this is, that we act at *random*, and every object which offers itself to sense or fancy, and promises a present satisfaction, has power to make us follow it. We are pushed on by appetite, and leave that to carry us, just as that itself is carried by the various temptations that come across our view; much like travellers, who at all adventures give the reins

reins to the beasts they ride on, and let them choose the way which they happen to like best.

SECT. III. Hence proceeds that *inconsistency* which every one can observe, but of which so few are willing to know the true reason. Hence it is that men are not more different from others, than they are from themselves, and their lives which should be throughout of *one colour*, as Seneca^a ingeniously expresses himself, are so full of inconsistencies. The root of this dissimilitude is; that men do not well know what they would have, or if they erect a scheme, they quickly change it for some other. Nor do they barely change, but return again upon their own steps, and are brought back to the very place which they left. This one of the *Satirists*^b calls living *ex tempore*, and the *Greeks*^c stiled this kind of life *Kαθ' ημεραν*, *living by the day*, and the men who gave themselves up to it *Kαθ' ημερας*; whereas true wisdom consists in always choosing and rejecting the *same* things, which cannot be without some immutable rule of judging; as neither can such a rule be settled, unless we first fix our eye upon some general and uniform purpose of life. There

is

^a Epist. 20.

^b Persii. Sat. 3.

^c Antonin. L. 2. §. 7. Hom. Odyss. L. 21.

Hor. Epist. 1. —quid, mea cum pugnat sententia secum?

is no need, says Seneca^d, of adding that restriction, *ut rectum sit quod velis*, "that what you will be right," because it is not possible the same thing should always please, if it be not right. This is a most judicious reflection. The same Author^e exposes this changeable humour in a very agreeable manner. "They who leap from one design to another, or, to speak more properly, are carried by mere chance, being themselves fickle and fluctuating, can never possess any thing that is certain. Some there are, but the number is exceeding small, who manage themselves and their actions by mature council; but for others, like those things that float upon a river, they do not go but are carried. Some are borne along upon a gentle stream, others by one that is more rapid. The stream fails, and leaves one on the next bank, while another by the violence of the torrent is hurried into the sea." Would we establish some chief end, and often ask ourselves, how our several actions correspond with this end, we should not be liable to so many errors. It is justly observed by Cicero^f, *Summum bonum si ignoretur, vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est*, &c. "If we know not our chief good, we must necessarily

^d Epist. 20.

^e Epist. 23.

^f De Finibus. L. 5.

“ necessarily be ignorant how to direct the
“ course of our lives. It is as fatal an ig-
“ norance, as for a mariner to put to sea
“ without knowing what port he is to make.
“ But when we know the great end of life,
“ what is the chief good, and what the
“ greatest evil, we then know the right
“ way of living, and how to go through
“ all the duties of life, so as to arrive at
“ happiness.”

SECT. IV. Setting up a false notion of our principal end is just as if *Paradise* being planted in the *East*, we should have a desire to see it, but imagine it to lie *Westward*; the more haste we make, and the nearer we fancy ourselves to be to this delightful scene, it is certain the farther we are from it in reality. You and I would fain be happy, and perhaps entertain a strong imagination, that happiness is placed in the enjoyments of the world; which in truth are as distant from it, as the *West* is from the *East*. And what must be the consequence? What, but that pursuing false goods, we wander farther and farther from the true. An error here is of the most extensive influence, and like poisoning a fountain, whose streams spread into all the country around. A false end corrupts all the duties of Morality. For an example of which kind we may instance the *Epicureans*,

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reans, who placing the supreme good in *sensual pleasure*, deserved the censure cast upon them by Cicero^s. *Sunt nonnullæ disciplinæ, quæ propositis bonorum & malorum finibus, officium omne pervertunt. &c.* “ There are
 “ some sects of *Philosophers*, who by the
 “ account they give of what is chiefly to be
 “ pursued or avoided by us, pervert all the
 “ duties of life. He who describes the
 “ chief happiness of man, so as to separate
 “ it from Virtue, and estimate the happiness
 “ of life by private gratifications, not
 “ by virtuous dispositions and actions, if
 “ this person pursued his principles, and
 “ their influence was not overcome by a
 “ good natural disposition, he could neither
 “ be a friend, nor a just or generous man.
 “ What shall inspire him with fortitude,
 “ who looks on pain as the greatest evil;
 “ or how can he be temperate, who regards
 “ bodily pleasures as the chief happiness of
 “ man? ”

SECT. V. These considerations duly reflected on are enough to persuade us, that we ought above all things to settle a *determinate* idea of happiness, and to be sure of its being *true*, or exactly conformable to right Reason. If we thus specify our end, and steadily pursue it, we cannot miss of being happy. And this leads me directly to that

that celebrated *Inquiry*, What is the *Summum Bonum*, or chief good of man? St. *Austin*^h from *Varro* reckons up no less than two hundred and eighty eight different opinions of Philosophers upon this head. *Non quæ jam essent, sed quæ esse possint*. Not that there actually were so many, but so many might be made to arise from the various combinations of their opinions, and be supported by as good reasons as those which flourished. I confess it looks at first very strange, that there should be so great a diversity; and this possibly may tempt some to slight an endeavour to fix the notion of happiness, as a fruitless and chimerical attempt. Is it not as so many to one odds, that we shall be mistaken, as there have been sentiments of mankind about it? This objection would admit of an easy dispatch, by saying, that the advantage of *Revelation* is ours; and that whatever loss the *Pagan* was at in this search after happiness, the *Christian*, to whom there is a plain discovery of it made, is to blame if he be not more sure. But waving this answer, I fancy the *variety* of opinions in relation to the *chief good*, may be shown to proceed from another cause, than the *necessary* obscurity of the subject; and if this be done, the ground of the objection will be removed. But to advance to the question, I shall for the greater

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distinct-

^h De Civitate Dei. L. 19. C. 1.

distinctness branch the *Inquiry* into these *three* heads.

I. What is the greatest happiness, that it is *possible* for man to enjoy?

II. What is the greatest happiness, which Reason can demonstrate to be actually designed for man?

III. What is the *Summum Bonum*, or highest happiness attainable in the present life?

SECT. VI. I. What is the highest happiness which it is *possible* for man to enjoy? Whatever it be, it must have these *two* characteristicks.

I. It is to be referred to no other, but all others must be embraced for the sake of this. ⁱ *Querimus igitur, quid sit extremum, quid ultimum bonorum; quod omnium Philosophorum sententia tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam.*
 “ We are inquiring, what is the *ultimate*
 “ good of man, what in the judgment of
 “ Philosophers ought to be chosen as such;
 “ so that every thing else should be referred
 “ to this, but this to nothing higher.” For
 if it be the highest and noblest good, it is on account of the pleasure which it gives forth from itself; and not because I consider it as a step to some further good, which will afford more pleasure; that I covet it when absent, and rejoice in the fruition.
 And

And this alone is sufficient to vindicate its claim to the name of the *chief good*, and less than this will not serve. Whatever object I pursue, as believing it will conduct me to another, and this consideration is the main spring of my motion; it is plain I do not look upon it as my *chief good*, for this very obvious reason, that I make it subordinate to another, which consequently I esteem to be better; unless you are disposed to affirm, that the *means* are more excellent than the *end*, when nevertheless the measure of their excellency is taken from their fitness to promote that end.

2. It must be sufficient to furnish out an happiness adequate to the capacities of human nature, and of equal duration; that is, not only *perfect* while it lasts, but *everlasting*. The whole of man must be happy, there must be no *intervals* of pain or weariness, which would be so many breaches in our felicity, and hinder its being one intire flow and tenor of delight. And it must be known, or thought to be without end, were it for no other reason, than that it may be satisfying while it continues. And therefore says *Velleius* ^k in *Cicero*, speaking of the nature and blessedness of the gods, *Habet exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis, tum in æternis voluptatibus*. “ They have
“ the utmost assurance, that their pleasures

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“ will

^k De Nat. Deorum. L. 1. §. 19.

“will never fail them.” And where this is the case a Being may indulge its repose, and give up itself whole to the enjoyment.

SECT. VII. By these two *criteria* then let us examine the pretensions of all things, that may claim to be man's *chief good*.

I. Can man be his own happiness? *Quid opus est votis?* “What need of Prayers?” saith the haughty *Stoic*¹. *Fac te ipse felicem, vel bonum*, “make yourself happy or good;” for to the *Stoic* there was no difference between Virtue and happiness. Hear how he goes on, *Hoc est Summum Bonum, quod si occupas, incipis Decrum esse socius, non supplex*. “This is the chief good, of which when you have once possessed yourself, you are no longer a *suppliant*, but a *companion* of the gods.” Very fine! In the conceit of these Philosophers, we need not go out of ourselves in quest of the supreme good. But I fear this will be found to be only the ravings of pride; for if I mistake not, neither of the characters before mentioned will at all agree to man.

I. He is not, I am sure ought not to be, his own end. This were to set himself up in the room of *God*; and it looks as if the *Stoics* thought the place well enough became him. None of the embellishments of his Being, not his Virtues themselves, may be

¹ Seneca. Epist. 31.

be delighted in purely for their own sake. The principal pleasure he derives from them ought to arise from the reflection, that they came from God, bear some impression of his beauty, qualify us for his favour, and conduct us to him. It has been reckoned heroic to choose Virtue for *Virtue's sake*; and so perhaps it is, if meant only in contradiction to worldly views; but if understood strictly, and without any limitation, it is arrogant and sinful, and discovers our Virtue to be a spurious production; forasmuch as no Virtue can be genuine, that has its foundation in pride. Nor

SECT. VIII. 2. Will the other character fit this indigent creature. Man wants a fund to supply his own wants. He a self-sufficient Being! The many restless desires he carries about him, effectually confute any such vain imagination. Man his own happiness! What then makes his desires to stray abroad? These are so many symptoms of our poverty. Ay, but says the *Stoic*, these desires are not necessary appendages of our nature, they are introduced by custom and example, and the wise man will rid his hands of them with the first opportunity. A foolish evasion truly. How could desires be brought into the soul, and grow there, if the soil did not agree with them, and there was no stock upon which to graft them? Was there ever

a man without his desires? If foreign, why is it not an easy task to root them out, at least a possible one? Were man a self-sufficient Being, how comes it to pass, that he cannot subsist without contributions from the creation around him? Not to speak of the necessities of the *body*, which in the account of some men is no essential part in the composition, but rather the prison, in which the soul is shut up for a little while; let us suppose a *separate* state to be the natural state of the soul, and that the soul being disengaged from its clog, hath nothing else to do, but to contemplate its own furniture, and to fold itself up in itself. Are there no errors in the Understanding? No clouds of ignorance, no irregular tendencies in the Will? Are its Virtues all compleat? It is well if they are; and so they must be, e'er the soul can be an entertainment to itself. Yet with this concession, I fancy a man would not indure to be long tied up to his own company. Consider the prospect is but narrow; and to be always confined to the same little scene, what can be more tedious? “^m Neither were
 “ it a happiness worth the having, for a
 “ mind like an Hermit, sequestered from
 “ all things else, by a recession into itself, to
 “ spend an eternity in self-converse, and the
 “ injoyment of such a diminutive superficial
 “ nothing as itself is, and must needs be to
 “ itself.”

“ itself.” No *finite* injoyment can bear endless repetitions ; without some diversions every now and then intermixed, the pleasure will languish, and after a while the whole entertainment become insipid and heavy.

SECT. IX. Man naturally seeks society and friendship ; and this is so manifest, that in answer to *Epicurus*, who presses *Stilpo* with this objection against the saying of the *Stoics*, “ that their wise man was contented with himself, *se ipso contentus*,” *Seneca* “ fairly acknowledges, “ that though “ self-contented, their wise man was yet desirous of a friend, a neighbour, a companion. He loses not his tranquility with the loss of his friend, because he has it in his power quickly to repair his loss, by substituting another in his room.” Wherein he compares him to *Phidias* a famous artist, who if he had the misfortune to lose a statue, could with his chissel soon make another. Now this is not to defend, but give up the cause. It is confessing, that man is not fit for a state of solitude ; as this aversion in man to solitude, which he startles at as a kind of annihilation, is a full confutation of their flattery, who compliment him with a self-sufficiency and independence. *Cicero* ° represents, in a very strong

° Epist. 9.

° *Cic. de Offic. L. 1. §. 43, 44. ad fin.*

strong and beautiful manner, this unconquerable tendency in human nature to friendship and society. *Placet igitur, aptiora esse naturæ ea officia, quæ ex communitate, &c.* "We think therefore those exercises more suitable to nature, which are of the social, than those which are wholly of the speculative kind. This is evident from the following argument, that if you suppose a wise man placed amidst the affluence of all things, and in a capacity of studying and contemplating all truths worthy of his knowledge, yet if his solitude was such that he was never to see or converse with another, he would choose death before such a life." This is not talking like a *Stoic*. Such is the mighty power of truth, that these men themselves are sometimes forced to do homage to it, and to talk modestly. *¶ Bonus vir sine Deo nemo est. &c.* "No man is good without divine influence. Can any man rise above fortune unless aided by God? He inspires great and noble purposes. In every good man some God resides. The strength which renders a man superior to all those things, which the vulgar either hope or dread, descends into him. So lofty a structure cannot stand unsupported by a Deity." There is sense and gratitude in this, without in-
inqui-

inquiring how it can be reconciled with the common strain of this sort of Philosophers.

SECT. X. 2. No creature, not the whole universe together, can be the *chief good* of man. We will suppose a virtuous man to have a grant of the whole creation made to him, and his confirmed by the unchangeable Word of God; yet that it cannot be his *chief good* is proved, by showing that neither of the characteristicks before mentioned can be applied to it.

1. We may not acquiesce in a created enjoyment for its *own sake*. We have not the allowance of our Maker for this, who cannot act so unwisely, as to design one creature for the ultimate end of another. The satisfaction therefore which a reasonable Being takes, in the society or enjoyment of his fellow-creatures, ought to be founded in the footsteps or the image which they exhibit of the divine perfections, and their being the effects of his love, and only a taste of that more consummate happiness, which God designs for him, and which is to be enjoyed in him alone.

2. The whole of created good united cannot render a man compleatly happy, for these reasons.

1. It is impossible that he should avoid this thought, or that the thought should

not

not disturb him, that if the *Creature* contain so much of goodness, what must be the fulness of the *infinite Creator*! For as long as he has his eye upon something that is more excellent, than the good of which he is in possession, how is it conceivable he should be perfectly satisfied therewith?

2. The universe is finite, and because finite not proportioned to the Understanding and Will of man, the two principles of fruition; and where there is no proportion, there can be no compleat happiness. As well may perfect music result from sounds disagreeable to the organ of hearing, for which they are either too high, or too low, as perfect happiness from an imperfect harmony between the object and the faculties of injoyment. There are two desires interwoven in the frame of our Being, the desire of *truth* and the desire of *happiness*, in both which there is a kind of *infinity*, which arises after this manner. By the contemplation of my own soul I gain the ideas of several perfections, with which I perceive it to be adorned. Following therefore the impulse of my own mind, I enlarge the prospect, and widen my ideas more and more, till lost in the conception of a Being, who possesses all these perfections, and very probably many more, with the additional characteristicks of *infinite* and *eternal*. Now
it

it is of the nature of the Understanding, and of the Will, to pursue the supreme truth, and the supreme good; and consequently while I have a Being in view, in whose idea is lodged both *infinite Truth* and *infinite Good*, which alone are able to answer that something like *infinity* that is in our desires, I shall never rest satisfied in any allotment among the creatures, though in the finest apartment of the universe, and accommodated with every good, short of a correspondence and intercourse with the Deity.

3. As a person must be virtuous to have a true enjoyment of any thing, so the more virtuous he is, the greater must be his resemblance and love to the Deity; and consequently the more earnest his endeavours to unite with the original and center of his Being, in contemplating and enjoying whom he shall be perfectly transformed into his likeness, and be at once an image of his perfection and of his blessedness. No *Creature* then can be my *chief good*. It is not in these rivulets to quench my vast and eager thirst of happiness; from whence it follows, that *God alone* is the *Summum Bonum* of man, that boundless good after which I am seeking.

SECT. XI. If some *Critics* are not so sharp-sighted, as to see more in the writings
of

of a *Philosopher*^a than is really there, we are able also to produce a testimony to the same truth from among the *Pagans*. My opinion of this matter is, that whether by the contemplation of the idea of the *universal good*, which is *Plato's* definition of the *chief good*, he meant the contemplation of *God*, who contains in himself the ideas or exemplars of all things, and their several perfections in an infinite degree, and unmixed with any alloy of imperfection; or understood the term in the *absurd* sense which *Aristotle* endeavours to fasten upon him, of an *universal good*, or *abstracted idea* existing without all *singulars*, in the nature of a *genus* to the rest; or designed no more than the contemplation of *necessary* and *eternal truths*; whether I say he intended one or other, or neither of these, he talks too *obscurely* on the subject, for any great stress to be laid upon his opinion. However, to gratify the curious, I will add in the margin, what a *Commentator*^r upon *Aristotle* says

^a See *Stanley's* Life of *Plato*.

^r *Talens* in *Arist.* *Eth.* ad *Nicom.* L. 1. E. 6. *Platonis* sententia fuit, divinam quandam, & humanam idæam esse; & divinam quidem sapientiam Dei, & exemplar Deo propositum appellat, quo cuncta creata, factaque sunt. Humanam vero idæam vocat speciem & notionem in mente hominis impressam, quæ primum confusior & obscurior est, paulatim vero una cum ætate clarior & illustrior efficitur. Hominis autem felicitatem definit, vera & perfecta sapientia Dei, quam nemo in mortali hac vita consequitur, sed post mortem; cum fruatur præsentis ex explicata cognitione, &, ut *Theologi* loquantur, visione Dei.

says in relation to *Plato's* sentiments on this subject.

SECT. XII. But whether we have *Plato's* authority or not for making this conclusion, that *God is the chief happiness of man*, there is a great deal of reason to justify it. *God made all things for himself*, and more especially *intelligent Beings*, and ought therefore to be the terminating object of their view. He is the author of our faculties, and to be sure is able to match the faculties which he has made. As for my *body*, the most unlikely part to receive its happiness from a *spiritual Being*, I consider, that the satisfaction and pleasure which come in this way, flow not *properly* from the objects without, but are the *immediate* production of God; and therefore think I, he can raise in me the very same pleasure in the absence of the object; and even when it is present ought to be accounted my *chief* good; for as much as to him I am indebted for all the pleasing sensations which I enjoy. My senses are but the channels, or *conditions* rather, and external objects no more than *occasional causes*, at the presence of which God variously impresses my mind. This you will see proved in *Pneumatology*. So that in truth God is the author of all *sensible* pleasure; and not only the author but the object too of the nobler pleasures of the mind. Of the

the *mind* I say, which when restored to its proper perfection, has a direct analogy to the Eternal Spirit. Besides which I also reason, that *God is his own happiness*, and if there be in him good sufficient to satisfy an *infinite* Being, there is undoubtedly enough to fill all *created* minds, whose capacities are limited. It is a glorious idea of the Supreme Being, to conceive of him as that *Universal Sun* which inlightens the intellectual world; that *Interminable Ocean* of good at which they all drink and are satisfied. Here then our wanderings are over, the thoughts find here their *ne plus ultra*, their utmost bounds, beyond this we cannot form a conception, a wish, and it is a laudable ambition to be contented with nothing below it.

Books proper to be read on this Chapter, besides those cited, are

Arist. Eth. ad Nicom. L. 1. C. 4—6.

Grove's Sermons. Vol. 6. Ser. 2 & 3. on *Matt.* v. 8.

Duchal's Three Sermons.

Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness. §. 3. C. 1, 2, 3.

Grove's Spectator. Vol. 8. N^o 635.

Rowe's Letters, Moral and Entertaining. P. 1. Let. 4, 6, 11. P. 3. Let. 6 & 11.

C H A P.



C H A P. III.

Of the Chief Good which Reason can prove to be designed for Man, and the Characteristicks of it.

SECT. I. **O**UR next inquiry is concerning the *Summum Bonum*, or highest happiness, which *Reason* can demonstrate to be actually designed for man. It is known by these *three* properties. It is something which all men, if not wanting to themselves, may be possessed of — It is one and the same to all mankind — And while in itself fitted to make the possessor happy, is not prevented in its operation by some other thing, which keeps him from relishing it.

I. It is something which all men, if not wanting to themselves, may be possessed of.
^a *Nilne esse proprium cuicumque?* Saith the ingenious Poet. *Summum Bonum esse Heræ putabam hunc Pamphilum.* And in another place, *Ego vitam Deorum propterea sempiternam esse arbitror, quod voluptates eorum propriæ sunt.* Two things are intimated by
H these

^a *Terent. Andria. A. 4. S. 3. A. 5. S. 5.*

these passages, that it is *pleasure* which makes life deserve its name, and that this *pleasure* must be something that we can call *our own, quid proprium*; for which reason he makes happiness to be the peculiar attribute of the Gods, the most exalted of all Beings. Happiness must certainly be among the *τα ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, the things in our power, and depending upon our choice; for the Author and Governor of the universe always acting with the most perfect wisdom, and having made man a reasonable and active Being, cannot without a contradiction be supposed to bestow happiness, the best of his gifts, after such a manner, that it should rather seem scattered by *Chance* or *Humour*, than conferred on man by their common Lord, as the *reward* of the right use of their intellectual powers. "It would be the greatest absurdity, says *Aristotle*^b, to ascribe happiness, the best thing in the world, to Fortune." And in this sense the proverbial expression has a great deal of truth in it, *Unusquisque suæ fortunæ faber est*, "every man has the framing of his own lot."

SECT. II. This demonstrates that no advantages or endowments of body can be the proper happiness of man, because these are not things about which the free election of the

^b Eth. ad Nicom. L. 1. C. 9.

the Will is at all conversant: nor the enjoyments of this world, of whatever kind they are, both because we have no *secure property*^c in them, and because, that while they are the portion of the lazy and undeserving, who often stumble upon them without seeking after them, they are withheld from the industrious, and those who have the best claim to them, know best how to enjoy them, and who would improve them most to the common benefit of mankind. The *Heathen* therefore made *Fortune* or *Chance* the disposer of these things, describing her as the patroness of fools, rather than of wise men; for they saw that they were not divided according to mens *moral* qualities. From whence they ought to have inferred, not that worldly affluence and prosperity came from *Chance*, but that they cannot be the *proper* felicity of rational creatures. This, I say, is the inference which they ought to have drawn from hence, as without doubt it is the instruction designed by Providence. "The^d nature of
" the universe would never have admitted
" of such an error, that good and evil
" things should without any difference fall
" to good men and bad. But life and
H 2 " death,

^c ————— tanquam

Sit proprium cuiquam, puncto quod mobilis horæ,

Nunc prece, nunc pretio, nunc vi, nunc sorte suprema,
Permutet Dominos, & cedat in altera jura. *Hor. L. 2. Ep 2.*

^d Antonin. L. 2. §. 11.

“ death, honour and disgrace, pleasure and
 “ pain, wealth and poverty, happen alike
 “ to men of the most opposite characters,
 “ therefore these things are *neither good nor*
 “ *evil.*” This reasoning is fallacious and
 will not hold; for let the *Stoics* harangue
 as long as they please, they will never be
 able to persuade us, that *ease* is not a *good*,
 and *pain* an *evil*. But with a little altera-
 tion the argument becomes conclusive. The
 nature which presides in the universe can
 never be supposed to dispense happiness and
 misery, without respect to the moral quali-
 ties of the persons to whom they are assign-
 ed; yet life and death, riches and poverty,
 are thus dispensed in the present state,
 therefore those things as at present dispensed
 do not constitute the *happiness* or *misery* of
 man.

SECT. III. 2. The true happiness of
 mankind is one and the same to all^e. This I
 gather from the *sameness* of their natures; for
 as *Cicero*^f well observes, *Nihil est enim unum*
uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nos-
metipfos sumus. &c. “ There is not any
 “ thing so much alike, and so equal to an-
 “ other, as we all are alike one another.
 “ So that if corrupt customs, and false opi-
 “ nions,

^e Quodcunque est Summum Bonum, necesse est omnibus
 esse propositum. *Lactant.* De falsa Sapientia. L. 3. C. 11.

^f De Legibus. L. 1. §. 10.

“ nions, did not pervert our tender minds,
 “ and turn them every way, no man would
 “ be more like himself, than every man to
 “ all others; hence whatever is the true de-
 “ finition of one man, includes all men.”
 This is a good indication of the happiness
 for which they are designed. The bodies
 of men are formed alike, the faculties of
 their souls are the same, they agree in the
 same general wants and desires. Now if
 we make observation of inferior creatures
 we shall find, that those of the same kind
 have one uniform bent of nature, and pur-
 sue the same way of life. Their food, their
 pleasures, their diversions, in one word,
 their happiness, are the same. And if there
 be a greater diversity in the particular incli-
 nations of mankind, besides the use this is
 of to hold men in society, it was probably
 intended to signify, that the *body*, in which
 this diversity of tempers is founded, is not
 the *man*, his principal and nobler part; that
 this variety was calculated for the *present*
state, in which it serves many excellent
 ends; and that none of those things about
 which men so disagree are the *real* felicity
 of man. Do what we will we shall *differ*

H 3

about

* *Horace* expresses this diversity of tastes and inclinations
 with his usual spirit.

Cur alter fratrum cessare & ludere & ungi,
 Præferat Herodis palmatis pinguibus; alter
 Dives & importunus, ad umbram lucis ab ortu
 Silvestrem flammis, & ferro mitiget agrum. &c.

L. 2. Ep. 2. ad finem.

about these things, one man's inclination leading him to the *Camp*, another's to the *Court*, another's to the *Bar*, another's to the *Exchange*, and another's into *Retirement*; one man's palate standing to this dish, another's to that; one man highly pleased with that which is extremely distasteful to another. Whereas if they exercise their Reason, they must all unite in their apprehensions of true happiness, which must be the same to all partaking of the same nature. To which I may add, that these things are of a *scanty* nature, and cannot be enjoyed without being *parted*; from whence must proceed endless competitions and animosities, if men have not more understanding than to place their happiness in such narrow enjoyments.

SECT. IV. 3. The chief good of man must be something which while fitted to make the possessor happy, is not prevented in its operation by some other thing, which keeps him from relishing it.

— *valeat possessor oportet,
Si comportatis rebus bene cogitet uti.*

“ Health must smile on a man, or he cannot enjoy the riches which he has gathered.” To one in the *gout* or *stone*, how little

little would it signify to have those things in his custody, which would very much delight him, if his body were at ease. Not only bodily pain and bodily pleasure, but bodily pain and mental pleasure cannot subsist together, if the former be any thing violent. All the advantage which a man can receive from a *good conscience* in this case, is only to be less miserable. Or let us suppose him to be under a prevailing *melancholy*, which is the frequent infelicity of the best men, though such a one may have the clearest right of any man living to be cheerful, he is not capable of being so, the cloud upon his mind darkening his prospect, and casting a gloom upon all the objects around him. What can be plainer than the conclusion from all this, that the happiness designed for man, whatever it be, is not to be enjoyed in this world? A man may be virtuous in spite of the world, he may obtain the favour of God, though he be not the favourite of the world; yet while his mind hath its attention ingrossed by pain, or is oppressed by melancholy, or distracted with cares, he may have things of infinite value in his custody, but will not be able to enjoy them.

There is a great deal of reason for that distinction of the *Pythagoreans*, between perfection as to *nature*, and perfection as to *life*; a like distinction to which you have

in *Aristotle*ⁱ, between *Ἀρετὴ τελεία*, and *βίος τελείος*, both which he makes to conspire in the idea of happiness. And this may answer what the Emperor *Antoninus*^k alleges to prove, that nothing which befalls a man can make him unhappy, viz. that it cannot hinder him from being *just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, &c.* with which qualities being endowed, human nature *ἀπεχει τὰ ἴδια*, “has all that belongs to it.” Nothing is wanting to the perfection of the *man*, but a great deal to his happiness. Virtue rightly understood is the perfection of human nature, but this alone will not make a man happy, in order to this it is further necessary, that he be perfect as to life, or happy in the circumstances of his Being. There must therefore be another world, where the virtuous man shall have an untroubled fruition of his proper good, and not be liable to such frequent separations from it as he now is. Upon the whole, natural Reason demonstrates this, that the injoyment of God in a future state is the *bighest happiness* designed for man. This all may injoy, who aspire to the injoyment. Though he contains *all*, and his fulness is adapted to *all*, yet he is but *one* object, and so corresponds to that excellent character of the *supreme good* given by *Cicero*^l. *Finis bonorum, qui simplex*

ⁱ Eth. ad Nicom. L. 1. §. 9.

^k Lib. 4. §. 49.

^l De Offic. L. 3. §. 33.

*simplex esse debet, ex dissimilibus rebus misceri
& temperari non potest.* “The supreme
“good is one simple thing, and cannot be
“made up of objects various and unlike.”
Finally—In a future state God will be injoy-
ed by good men to greater advantage than
this world will admit, where there are so
many things to disturb and break in upon
the injoyment.

Books proper to be read on this Chapter,
besides those cited, are

Cicero De Finibus.

Mori Encheir. L. 3. C. 9 & 10.

Tillotson. Vol. 1. Ser. 40. on Psalm 73. 25.

Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness. P. 2.
C. 4, 6, 7, 8.

Prior's Solomon,





C H A P. IV.

Of the highest Happiness attainable in the present life. The opinions of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics examined; and the favour of God, and an intercourse with him, proved to constitute the highest Happiness of this life.

SECT. I. **O**F three inquiries concerning the *Summum Bonum*, or highest happiness of man, the last only remains to be pursued, *viz.* What is the greatest happiness attainable in the present life? The good things which fall within the compass of this question are usually divided into the following classes, the good things of the *Mind*, such as Knowledge and Virtue; of the *Body*, as Health, Strength or Beauty; and of *Fortune*, as Honours, Riches, Pleasures, &c. Cicero's ^a distinction (he does not say *bonorum* of goods, because according to the *Stoics*, whose opinion he espouses, there is but one good all, but *rerum expendarum*)

^a De Oratore. L. 3. §. 29.

tendarum) of things *desirable* is, of those that are seated in the *Body* or the *Mind*, or are *without* us, or things *external*, which last I reckon a much better name for them, than that which they commonly pass under, of the *goods of Fortune*. *Epicurus*, if we follow the *Stoics* in their account of him, or *Cicero*^b or *Horace*, or almost all the *Fathers*, advanced *sensual pleasures* into the seat of the *Summum Bonum*, supporting his opinion with this reason^c, “that every animal “by a natural instinct seeks pleasure, and “rejoices in it, as its chief good.” But this reason if intended to prove, not *pleasure in general*, but the *pleasures of sense*, to be the principal happiness of mankind, is most unluckily chosen, serving to demonstrate the direct contrary. For man, because he is of a nobler species than brute creatures, must be made for a nobler kind of happiness; and his^d *mind* or intellectual part being his distinctive character, the pleasure of the mind must be his proper, and therefore his best pleasure, not the pleasures of sense. If in these man were to look for his

^b De Nat. Deorum. L. 1. §. 40.

^c Cic. De Finibus. L. 1. §. 9.

^d The subordination of the Senses to Reason is happily expressed by *Cicero* De Leg. L. 1. §. 9. *Ipsam autem hominem eadem natura non solum celeritate mentis ornavit, sed etiam sensus, tanquam satellites, attribuit ac nuntios.* The Senses are but attendants and ministers to the mind, which ought accordingly to use them as Servants, not be governed by them as Masters.

his happiness, it is certain that brutes would have the pre-eminence, who can indulge to the gratification of their senses without any such troublesome check, as men receive from their Reason: which brings to my mind an observation of the great *Roman Moralist*, “A person addicted to a life of
 “ pleasure, if he be not quite sunk into the
 “ *beast* (for it must be confessed that some
 “ have nothing of men but the *name*) if he
 “ be but a degree more erect than his brethren of the field, though he be captivated
 “ by pleasure, yet out of a natural modesty
 “ or shame he conceals or dissembles his
 “ inclination to it; a plain intimation that
 “ bodily pleasure is unbecoming the dignity
 “ of human nature.”

SECT. II. As a further objection to *sensual* pleasures I might take notice, that they are too few and transient, and the intervals between them too long, to deserve the name of happiness. “Pleasure, says *Seneca* excellently well, stands on a precipice, and if
 “ not kept within bounds, soon sinks into
 “ sorrow and regret; and how difficult is it
 “ to observe any bounds in that which we
 “ have accustomed ourselves to esteem as
 “ our felicity. In the desire of true good
 “ there is no danger of excess.” The narrowness

* De Offic. L. 1.

† Epist. 23.

towness of the senses is another argument that the pleasures of sense are not those for which man was designed. The author of nature would have better matched these with the capacities of the soul, if happiness had been to be conveyed by them. How wide and deep are the one, how stinted and shallow the other ! He that thinks to fill his soul by the application of his senses to external objects, does more absurdly than a man who should attempt to quench his thirst by sucking through a *tube*, whose hollow was imperceptible. In a word, there cannot be *happiness* were there is not *satisfaction* ; but now between *satisfaction*, and what men commonly call *pleasure*, there is a wide difference. *Pleasure* has its abode in the *senses*, or in the fancy, *satisfaction* in the *mind*. *Pleasure* is like a flash of lightning, momentary and pernicious, *satisfaction* is like the light of the day, which though not so dazzling is more steady and reviving. *Pleasure* excites a tumult in the Passions, *satisfaction* governs and regulates them. To add no more. *Pleasure* softens and enervates the soul, and disables it for conflicting with adversity, *satisfaction* strengthens and establishes it.

SECT. III. *Epicurus* has not been without his *advocates*, who explain the pleasure he recommends after such a manner, as to
make

make it no way prejudicial to the interests of Virtue. Yea, they will tell you, that he carried on the same design with the *strictest* of the Philosophers, though in a method at first sight very different from theirs, as it was more accommodate to nature. *Gassendus* is the most remarkable of his champions among the *moderns*, and in *Cicero* a vindicator of his has these words.

“ *Clamat Epicurus is, quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis, non posse jucunde vivi, nisi sapienter, honeste, justeque vivatur.*” “ *Epicurus*, whom you decry so much, as one abandoned to his pleasures, even he loudly declares, that there is no way of living pleasantly, but to live wisely, honestly, and justly.” In answer to this ^h *Cicero* observes, “ *Multa præclare sæpe dicit. &c. Epicurus* often says a great many good things, and which have more reason and truth in them, than consistency with his avowed sentiments. He praises an abstemious diet; this would be like a Philosopher if spoken by *Socrates* or *Antisthenes*, but ill becomes his mouth who pronounces sensual pleasure the chief good. By such declarations the injudicious are drawn in, and his sect grows so numerous.” If I might be allowed to take the part of a *moderator* in this

^g De Finibus. L. 1. §. 18.

^h Tusc. Quæst. L. 5. §. 9 & 10.

this dispute I would say, that as on the one hand I hardly believe *Epicurus* to have been a *Debauchee*, so on the other I cannot persuade myself, that he who believed not a *Providence*, nor the *immateriality* and *immortality* of the soul, could be a *great* admirer of *Virtue*. *Epicurus* was a friend to bodily pleasures, but to those only which were consistent with health; and accordingly it was a maxim in his School, *Sic præsentibus voluptatibus fruaris, ut futuris non noceas*. “So to regulate our indulgence to
“ present pleasures, as not to prejudice future enjoyments.” A most excellent saying if understood in the best sense that the words will bear; but in the meaning of *Epicurus* no more than a dictate of sensual prudence. As according to his principles, all those fine sayings of his can be no better, with which *Seneca* embellishes his writings. Pleasure may be often consistent with *health*, when it is not with *strict Virtue*. *Epicurus* would talk frequently of tranquility of mind, but mistake him not, the tranquility he so much extols is not the peace of a *good conscience*, but of a mind undisturbed with the ⁱ *cares* of the world; of which indolent state he was so fond, as to describe the *happiness* of his *Gods*, by a retirement
from

¹ Nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate, & in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus. *Velleius* in *Cic. de Nat. Deorum*.

from the affairs of the universe; and the *Gardens* of *Epicurus* are become proverbial. In short, a ^k *Gentleman* of an elegant taste in these things, but of little Religion, in giving us his own character, hath fortunately hit that of *Epicurus*, “a *Voluptuary* whose aversion to *Debauchery* was not less than his inclination for *Pleasure*.” To proceed.

SECT. IV. If *Epicurus*, as some have represented him, was in one extreme, the *Stoics*, in supposing Virtue of itself, and unendowed with any other good things, sufficient to make a man happy, were in another. Both forgot they were *men*, the notion of whose happiness they were settling; one levelling them with beasts, the other raising them to an equality with the Gods. ^l *Summum Bonum Stoicis dicitur convenienter naturæ vivere.* “Man’s chief happiness, according to the *Stoics*, was to live according to nature;” which phrase with them was but a periphrasis for Virtue. To the same purpose the ^m *philosophical* Emperor. “You have tried several experiments, and could never yet light upon an happy life. You have not met with it in *argumentation*, nor in *riches*, nor in *glory*, nor in *pleasure*. Where then is it
“ to

^k St. Evremont.

^l Cic. de Offic. L. 3

^m Antoninus Imper. Sev. L. 8. §. 1.

“ to be found? In doing those things which
 “ human nature demands from you.” By
 human nature he means right and unbiaſſed
 Reason, for ſo he explains what nature re-
 quires, by *temperance, fortitude, liberality,*
 and the like. Thus high do theſe men
 carry their commendations of Virtue, and
 even higher, to ⁿ *extravagance*. But with-
 out any reflection upon Virtue, which if
 genuine is too humble to accept ſuch idola-
 trous incenſe, I muſt be bold to ſay, that
 Virtue itſelf is not the chief happineſs of
 man in this life. Let it be content with
 the honour of being the inſtrument of ob-
 taining it. For what men call Virtue is
 either a ſhoot from Religion, being directed
 by the Will of the Supreme Cauſe as its
 rule and meaſure, and animated by his favour
 as its ultimate reward, or grows upon other
 principles, and is nourished by other views.
 If this latter be underſtood, it is the ſhadow
 of Virtue, not the vital ſubſtance, it is va-
 nity, or intereſt, or at beſt a natural gene-
 roſity of temper. And ſuch as the Virtue
 is itſelf, ſuch is the pleaſure it beſtows up-
 on its votaries, falſe and counterfeit, or of
 too low a kind to be worth much. If it be
 true Virtue, its pleaſures are then like itſelf
 divine, both in their *original*, and in their

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issues;

ⁿ See Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt. L. 5. The main of which is—*Vir-
 tutem ad beatè vivendum ſe ipſa eſſe contentam.* “ That Vir-
 tue is *ſelf-ſufficient* for happineſs.”

issues; they begin and end in God. Inasmuch that Virtue itself, and its delights too, are derivative and dependent, and resembling the light, which loses its lustre and its very being, when separated from the glorious fountain that feeds it.

SECT. V. This error of the *Stoics* was founded on a mistaken truth, that of the several things reducible to the two heads of *Τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν* and *Τὰ ἔξω ἐν ἡμῖν*, “of things *in our power*, and things *not in our power*,” happiness must be among the former. Thus far they were in the right, as likewise for discarding for this reason external advantages from the notion of the chief good. *Non est tuum, Fortuna quod facit tuum. Seneca.* “That is not *your own*, for which you are “obliged to *Fortune*.” They were further justified in placing Virtue among the things *in our own power*, provided their meaning was not hereby to exclude the divine assistance. And if Virtue had been the only thing *in our power* they would justly have given it the title of the *supreme good*. But are not the favour and approbation of God, the certain consequences of a course of real Virtue, and therefore to be numbered among the things *in our own power*, as well as Virtue? And how then come these to be forgotten? I doubt from the same gigantick pride, which made *Mexentius* in
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the ° Poet say, *Dextra mihi Deus*— “ This
“ right hand is my God.”

SECT. VI. As for the *Peripatetics*, they were not so widely distant in their notions from the *Stoics* as some have imagined. They both agreed in this, that *Virtue* is the *Summum Bonum*; the *difference* between them lay here, that the *Stoics* not contented with saying that *Virtue* is the *chief good*, proceeded further to assert, that it was the *only good*. This was the *ἡγεμονικὸν ἁγνός*, “ their
“ first and leading error,” into which they fell for want of distinguishing between *physical* and *moral* good and evil. That *Virtue* is the only moral *good*, and *Vice* the only moral *evil* is very true, but not so simply speaking; because there are other things *physically good* besides *Virtue*, and *physically evil* besides *Sin*. But as I observed before, this, however ^p *absurd*, was the doctrine of the *Stoics*; and accordingly we find ^q *Cicero*, after having divided good into *useful* and *virtuous*, *utile* & *honestum*, in the *first* Book of his *Offices*, in the progress of the work, and especially in the *third* Book, he drops the *first* and contracts the whole idea of good to the good of *Virtue*. His chief rea-

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° *Virgil's* *Æneid*. B. 10.

^p *Nil est, inquit, (sc. Zeno) malum, nisi quod turpe, & vitiosum est. Ad ineptias redis. Illud enim, quod me angebat, non eximis. Scio dolorem non esse nequitiam. &c.*

^q *Tusc. Quæst.* L. 2. §. 12.

son for which seems to be, that he knew not any other way but upon this principle, to evince the obligation mankind are under to sacrifice their own private ease or pleasure, or advantage, or life itself, to the good of the society. Ignorant I say of the true principles upon which this is founded, *viz.* a regard to the Author of human nature and human society, and the consistency at least of sacrificing this mortal life with the hope of a more glorious felicity in an after state, he endeavoured to make this false principle serve instead of the true. The ^a *Peripatetics* on the contrary denied with reason, *ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτάρκης πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν*, "that Virtue was *self-sufficient*," and therefore required several other things as *auxiliaries*, such as *health, prosperity, friends*, and the like, which are to the virtuous man in the nature of instruments or ornaments to his felicity. But then all these things put into the scale against Virtue, ^r *vix minimi momenti*, "were scarce of any weight or consideration at all."

SECT. VII. Having thus given you a view of the sentiments of the *three* principal *sects* among the Philosophers concerning human happiness, I should now, did I think it necessary; examine the preten-

^a *Arist. Eth. Nicom. L. 1. C. 9.*

^r *Cic. De Offic. L. 3.*

pretensions of *riches, honours, learning, friendship*, and the other blessings of life, to this title. But as every man's reflections or experience will enable him to disprove their several claims, I shall without entering into them take a shorter way, and show *what is the chief happiness of this life*, in doing which I shall at the same time make it evident what *is not so*. An interest in God then, and a constant intercourse with him, maintained by *contemplation, faith, love and hope*, are what every wise man, when he is forming a scheme for a *happy* life, will fix both as the *foundation and supreme point* of it too. A few considerations briefly hinted at will put this beyond dispute. From hence results the divinest pleasure and satisfaction. For what more god-like pleasure than to survey infinite fulness and perfection? What more satisfying than to be able to add, *all this is mine*, for my benefit? What so pleasing as the exercise of a warm and rational devotion, towards the Author of my Being? Or so delightful as to feel his presence enlightening and actuating whole intellectual nature? If this imperfect state will not admit the good man to be in transports,

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^f See *Juvenal's* Tenth Satire, where he proves at large, that neither riches, honours, power, eloquence, fame, long-life, beauty or learning, can make men happy; and therefore gives men this good advice, "to leave it to the gods to grant these or not, as they saw best."

Permittes ipsis expendere numinibus —

he yet enjoys a repose, a peace, a sweet and gentle delectation, which far exceed all other pleasures.

SECT. VIII. Again, he that makes sure his title to the divine favour, takes the most compendious method of securing all other good things, having infinite love engaged to imploy unbounded power, and the most perfect wisdom for his supply. And then further, this good is of such a nature, as, wherever it is enjoyed, to communicate a virtue to other things, and to fill them with pleasure which they have not of their own. It refines *friendship* and exalts *learning*, and at the same time that it regulates, improves the most common entertainments of life. Is a man devoted to a contemplative life? This furnishes him with new scenes, and sheds a more lovely and beautiful light upon every object; while in the man himself it produces a no less remarkable change, invigorating his faculties, and preparing them for the most divine employments. Is he engaged in a life of action? This raises his views, and spurs him on to generous designs and enterprizes for the good of mankind, whom he would rejoice to further in their way to immortality. The love of God is the *best seasoning* to all human delights, and that which most of all heightens their relish. Shall I likewise demand

mand what *one* good thing can satisfy for the want of all the rest, as this can? That person surely hath no great reason to be concerned at the drying up of the stream, who has the fountain nigh at hand. What is there, finally, that can support the mind in the prospect or suffering of the various evils of this mortal life, excepting a sense of the divine favour? He that has this, is clad in armour of a celestial temper, through which no arrow can penetrate, and may meet death itself not only undaunted, but with an air of triumph. Death, which for ever banishes the *sensualist* from his paradise, puts the *good man* into sure and everlasting possession of his.

SECT. IX. But it may be now asked, if upon the whole it be so evident, that the favour of God is the *chief happiness* of man, as I have shown in this and the former Chapters, whence proceeds it, that so few agree in thinking him their *chief good*? That there is so great a *variance* among mankind in the choice of objects? Or, lastly, so general a consent in pursuing the pleasures of sense of one kind or another? To each of these Questions I shall answer distinctly and briefly.

I. Whence can it proceed, that so few agree in seeking after God as their *chief good*? The *corruption* of the heart is the

main reason of this. The mind hath its taste as well as the body, this is extremely vitiated, and set quite wrong for those things which are the proper objects of its felicity, by the early influence of *sense*, and sensual appetites and passions, by bad education, and bad example. Besides which there is an *error* also in the *judgment*, arising principally from these *two* causes.

1. That men are not so apprehensive, and so well persuaded as they should be, of the *distinction* between the *soul* and the *body*. Either they think not at all of it, that they have a soul, or are ready to fancy, that the soul is only a *finer part* of the body, which serves to move and actuate the rest, and which when taken from the *outward case*, will be scattered and lost in the air; not as a spiritual substance, distinct in its being and operations, capable of subsisting out of the body, and of being happy or miserable when the body is no more. Beings of a separate nature must have their separate wants, their separate happiness, and their separate state. But once men come to believe, that soul and body are of the same substance and nature, the next step is to conclude, that their happiness is the same too.

2. From

* See this ill influence of Sense, &c. finely illustrated in *Cebes's Table*.

2. From the *infelicity* which attends the soul in its present union with the body, which though quick to perceive the necessities of its *companion*, is insensible of its own. The body cannot be destitute of things needful, but the soul is immediately advertised of it by some painful sensation, and in haste to have it supplied; whereas it can want what is essential to its own happiness and hardly know it. Certainly God has thus framed us for wise ends, and probably one chief reason of it is, that we could not otherwise be informed of the wants of the body, than by the pain which they give us; and if we were not excited to it by the pressing appetites of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of gratifying them, we should not take the care necessary for the preservation of our bodies. But as by consideration and reflection we may inform ourselves of the wants of our better part, God expects that the care we take of that should be the effect of such thought and consideration. If we were pushed on to provide for our souls, as we are for our bodies, by certain irresistible appetites, where would be the virtue, where the praise, of being concerned for their welfare? God has therefore so framed our Beings, that we must exercise our Reason and Understanding, in order fully to apprehend the necessity of injoying God to make us happy. But, alas, how
few

few will be at the trouble of this! And their neglect of this is the root of all their errors.

SECT. X. 2. How shall we account for that great *diversity* among mankind in their choice and pursuit of particular objects? I answer, that if we consider them as having lost the idea of the *true good*, this is no way wonderful. Truth is *one*, but error *infinite*. There is a consciousness that they are not right, and so every man beats out a path for himself as his fancy leads him. I had occasion to take notice before, that there is a discernable variety in the genius and tempers of men, from whence it unavoidably follows, that in case they take not Reason for their guide, they will differ in their *notions* of happiness, as much as they do in their *inclinations*. There is need of a great number of arts and professions, for the support and defence, and convenience, and embellishment of human life. And that there might not be wanting a sufficient number of persons to manage and excel in each, men have different turns given to their minds by their wise Creator; which have a further use, to keep up a good understanding and correspondence amongst men, by being mutually assisting to each other. Not to mention that by this means they are all employed, and even they who have no
work

work to do with their *hands*, are not suffered to let their *brains* lie idle. The consequence of this diversity in mens inclinations, as I just observed, if Reason be not consulted, will be, that every man will be apt to think, that happiness is to be found in the way of life to which the bent of his genius most strongly carries him.

SECT. XI. 3. How comes there to be so general a consent of mankind, in pursuing the pleasures of sense of one kind or other, as their *chief good*? It is in short because they judge of them by wrong measures, such as the *violence* of their *inclination*. They are powerfully inclined to such pleasures, therefore they are good for them. Their inclination this way is much more forcible than to any thing else, therefore they are the best mark they can propose, and contain their chief good or felicity. Every creature naturally tends to that which is its proper happiness — But why must the *body* have the reins given to it, any more than the *beast* a man rides upon? They are both alike senseless and furious. Does the *horse* need a bridle? So does the *appetite*. Would it be dangerous to give a loose to the one? The danger is more than equal as to the other. And Reason too is as capable of managing appetite, as a skilful rider is to guide the motions of the creature under

under him. The beasts were made to be governed by man; why? but because he hath Reason and they have none. And this argument is as strong for the subjection of the body of man to his Reason, as of other things to man. Another thing that makes men propose to meet with happiness in the gratification of the senses is, that they judge of it by the flattering representations of *fancy*. We may compare fancy to an ingenious Painter, whose pencil produces more lively pictures of things than are to be found in nature; and being nearly related to sense it is prejudiced in its favour, and shews its delights as far more sweet and inviting than really they are. But shall a creature that hath the privilege of a *diviner* faculty yield himself up to the delusions of imagination? This is much such another absurdity, as it would be to govern ourselves in our *waking* moments by our *dreams*.

SECT. XII. To conclude. We are too apt to judge of things by sensible impressions. Nothing but what strikes the senses, and excites a lively emotion in them, is supposed to have any reality in it. The pleasures of sense stir the passions most, and agitate the soul, and put the spirits in motion. But let us hear what ^u *Cicero* says on this

^u De Oratore. L. 3.

this head. *Difficile dictu est, &c.* "It is
 " hard to assign the cause of it, but so it is,
 " that those things which most strongly
 " impel the senses, and at first trial pro-
 " duce the quickest sensations of plea-
 " sure, are soonest followed with loath-
 " ing and satiety." And a little after,
 " the pleasures which move the senses af-
 " ter the gentlest manner are least liable
 " to breed satiety ; so that it seems, distaste
 " of them is always closely connected with
 " the most violent pleasures." The reason
 of this, for which *Cicero* was at a loss, is
 as evident as the thing itself. It is the voice
 of nature telling us, as often as we are sur-
 feited of any delight, *that our happiness lies*
not in these things. The pleasures of Reli-
 gion, though less violent than those of sense,
 are more durable. It is as much as can be
 looked for in this world, if we enjoy a
 calm and serenity of soul ; transports are re-
 served for the other life, where every good
 man will feel such, as if granted to him
 now would make him despise all other de-
 lights as spiritless, and by their vehemence
 even dissolve the union between soul and
 body. May we but pass this life in peace
 and tranquility, we have abundant reason to
 wait contentedly, till we come where we
 shall spend eternity in raptures and extasies
 of joy.

Read on this Chapter,

Cicero De Finibus.

Seneca De Tranquillitate.

Gassendus's Morals.

Stubbs's Dialogue on Pleasure.

Guardian. Vol. I. N^o. 31.

Nettleton of Virtue and Happiness.

P. 2 & 3.

Lucas's Inquiry after Happiness.

S. 3. P. 2. Of Human Life.

Duchal's Sermons.

The End of the First Part.



INTRO.



INTRODUCTION.

SECT. I.



THE great end of Morality, which is Happiness, being sufficiently explained, and established, my method leads me to the consideration of Virtue, as the way or means of arriving at this end. Virtue sincerely practised in all its parts, according to the measure of light that is imparted, together with repentance for all known faults, there wants not reason to believe will be accepted in a ^a *Heathen*, and receive a suitable reward. Not that I would be thought to level *revealed* with *natural* Religion, or to affirm, that the *Christian* is upon no better terms for happiness than the *Pagan*. I am free to say, that the *Heathen* being a person of integrity shall *probably*

^a See St. *Paul's* Epistle to the *Romans*. C. 2. v. 6—16.

probably be rewarded in another life; but I am far from saying, that his reward will be conferred *merely* out of regard to his *own* Virtues, without respect had to the *obedience* and *mediation* of the *only Saviour* of mankind. From ^b *Revelation* we learn that there will be a resurrection of *all* men, as well *Pagans* as *Christians*, and that they will owe their resurrection to *Jesus Christ*, therefore called the *second Adam*, as they derive their mortality from the *first*. And if *Christ* be the author of a future life to all mankind, it is likewise reasonable to suppose him, under God, the author of whatever degree of happiness any part of mankind shall enjoy in a future state.

SECT. II. I declare myself therefore inclined to believe, that the honest *Heathen* hath a felicity reserved for him hereafter; but for the opinion of those, if there be any such, who make his happiness the *same* with that of the *Christian*, either as to *kind*, *place*, or *degree*, I beg leave to enter my protest against it. As to the *kind* of their happiness, though the *object* will be the *same*, the ever blessed God, yet the *manner* of enjoyment may be widely different, agreeable to the different ways of God's discovering himself in the present state, by Reason and by Revelation. For as these two differ

^b *Rom. C. 5. and 1 Cor. C. 15.*

differ after the rate of *natural* from *super-natural*, so for ought I know may the happiness of *Christians* and *Pagans*; one being more the result of the natural faculties of human minds, than the other. As to the *place* or *scene* of their happiness, our blessed *Master* in telling us, that he is *gone before to prepare a place*, for those who shall be found worthy the name of his disciples, has given us to understand, that they shall have a peculiar abode, and more exalted *mansions* of bliss. And then as to the *degree* of happiness, forasmuch as *Christians* are by their Religion obliged to sublimer Virtues, to higher measures of the same Virtues, and to the practice of Virtue upon *nobler principles*, and to this end have a *greater* effusion of light and strength afforded them, there can be little doubt that the *degree* of their happiness will be answerable. *Faith* is as much an *evangelical Virtue*, or branch of christian Morality, as *Justice* is a duty incumbent upon all mankind; and this by necessary consequence from the Law of Reason, which obliges men to conform themselves to the Will of their Creator, however discovered, and as far forth as he is pleased to discover it.

I shall divide this part of Ethicks into three Sections.

K

I. Of

c John xiv. 1—3.

- I. Of the Objects of Virtue.
- II. Of the Rules and Measures of it.
- III. Of Virtue itself, and its several Kinds and Distinctions.

On the subject of the *Introduction* consult further,

Grove's Thoughts on the Proof of a Future State from Reason. C. 8 & 9.

Whiston's Sermon on Philip. iii. 7, 8.





PART II.

SECT. I.

Of the Objects of Virtue.

CHAP. I.

Of the Objects of Virtue, and particularly of Inclination, and of Habit.

SECT. I.



Y the Objects of Virtue are not meant those which are remote and less proper, in which sense the good and evil things of this life, and the Beings to whom our actions have a regard, whether God, our Neighbour or Ourselves, are the Objects of Virtue, (of these I shall have occasion

to discourse under the Third Head) but such as Virtue is *immediately* imployed about. These are *two, human actions and passions*, upon each of which I shall be obliged to enlarge. The actions which it is the office of Virtue to regulate, are such only which we term *human*, that is, such as proceed from men as rational and free agents, or, in one word, considered as *Men*. "These, says ^a *Andronicus Rhodius*, are *human actions*, of which a man is properly *master*." The actions of a *fool* or *lunatick* are *actiones hominis, non humanæ*, actions of the *natural*, not of the *moral* man, as Mr. *Locke* somewhere calls him. To which let me add all those actions that are done by persons having their Reason, but unknowingly, and without observing that they do them. We rank not these among *human* actions, in regard there is no use made of *Thought* and *Reason*, the *distinctive* characters of mankind.

On this head we have these things before us to be distinctly examined.

- I. The Principles.
- II. The Ends. And
- III. The Species of human actions.

SECT. II. I. To begin with the Principles, these are either *internal* or *external*. The *internal* Principles are so named, because

cause seated within, and are *three* in number, Inclination, Reason or Understanding, and Will.

I. By Inclination is intended a kind of bias upon nature, by the force of which it is carried towards certain actions, *previously* to the exercise of *Thought* and *Reasoning* about the nature and consequences of them, whether they are good or evil, beneficial or hurtful; whether they are one or the other, the man finds his Inclination drawing him that way. The ^b *Stoics* reckon *three* parts belonging to the human composition, Σωμα, Ψυχη, and Νους, *Body, Soul, and Mind*. To the *Body* they ascribed Αισθησεις *Senses*, to the *Soul* Ορμαι *Appetites* or *Inclinations*, to the *Mind* Δεσμοι the *Decrees*, by which the man ought to be determined or governed in all his actions. For it is one of the first things to be settled now we are upon this subject, that *Inclination*, though it be a principle, is never to be made the *immediate rule* of action. The meaning of which moral Axiom is this, that in order to be ascertained of the nature and expedience of actions, it is not enough for a person to consult his Inclination, nor from the bent of this can he justly infer the allowableness of taking the course to which his Inclination prompts him. This compendious method may indeed be granted to creatures whose

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nature

^b Antonin. L. 3. §. 16.

nature is not corrupted; *Beasts* which *cannot* sin, and perhaps *Angels* who *never did*, may have nothing to do, but to follow the impulse of their respective natures, but it is otherwise with *Man*, whose animal nature is vitiated. Besides that it is not with *Man*, as it is with *Angels* and *Beasts*, who have each of them but a single nature; whereas *Man* hath as it were *two* natures, an *animal* and a *rational*, a *corporeal* and a *spiritual* part; in one of which he agrees with the *Beasts*, in the other with the *Angels*. And since *Man* is made up of *two* parts, can it be reasonable, that the appetites and inclinations of the ignoble part should prescribe to the other, which has vastly the pre-eminence, both in respect of *faculties*, and of *duration*? We ought on the contrary to reflect, that these inclinations were designed as the matter of our trial, not as the rule and standard of our actions; to be governed, not to be indulged without controul. The *Heathen* were better acquainted with the dignity of human nature, than to suppose that the *Body* was the *Man*; or that *Reason* was to lacquey it after *Inclination*. *Duplex est enim vis animorum, &c.* “The human nature is possessed of two different powers, the one is *Appetite*, by the *Greeks* called *Opus*, which rashly hurries a man this way or that; the other is *Reason*,
“ *son*,

“ *son*, which informs and directs what is to
 “ be done and what avoided. So that by
 “ the constitution of our nature, *Reason* is
 “ formed to rule, *Appetite* to obey.”

SECT. III. When *Reason* has given sentence concerning a particular action, or course of action, and pronounced it *lawful*, then I confess *Inclination* deserves to be considered, and is oftentimes necessary in concurrence with Reason, to direct after what manner we are to shape our lives; applying to this purpose the excellent words of the great Roman Orator and Moralist. ^d *Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa, &c.* which we may render to this sense, “ That every man ought to pursue his
 “ *proper bent*, provided it be not vicious;
 “ the more easily to preserve that *decorum*,
 “ which is the beauty of human life. Not
 “ that we are ever at liberty to oppose *universal nature*, i. e. the Reason we have
 “ in common with all mankind; but this
 “ being preserved inviolable, every one is
 “ to be led by his own proper genius. So
 “ that notwithstanding other methods of
 “ life may *in themselves* be more eligible,
 “ we are to measure our own conduct by
 “ that which is *proper* and *peculiar* to our
 “ nature. It is heartless to attempt things in
 “ spite of nature, and to follow what can-

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“ not

^d Cicero De Offic. L. 1. §. 31.

“not be overtaken. According to the Pro-
 “verb, *Nothing is becoming which is at-*
 “*tempted against our genius.*” By our *pro-*
per nature Cicero understands, not only
 what we express by the word *Inclinations*,
 but every thing that enters into a man’s *di-*
stinguishing character. Upon this difference
 of nature he lays so much stress as to say,
 “that one man has not only a *right*, but is
 “under a kind of *obligation* to kill himself,
 “while the same is forbidden to another.”
 For an instance of which he mentions *Cato*,
 who having received from nature an *invari-*
able severity of temper, which he had im-
 proved by a tenacious adherence to the reso-
 lutions he at any time formed, was con-
 cerned as he would be *Cato* still, to die by
 his own hands, rather than owe his life as
 a gift to *Cæsar*, or even to see the face of
 that tyrant. This certainly is a wrong ap-
 plication of a rule in the general very
 good.

SECT. IV. Inclinations are of *two* kinds,
 natural or acquired.

I. That there are *natural* inclinations
 every one must grant, who makes the least
 reflection. Thus in Children it is easy to
 observe, how from their earliest years they
 differ in their tempers and dispositions.
 In one you see with pleasure the dawnings
 of a liberal diffusive soul, another gives us
 cause

cause to fear he will be altogether as narrow and sordid. Of one we may say he is naturally *revengeful*, of another that he is *patient* and *forgiving*. It is not improbable that this variety of inclinations has its foundation in different temperaments and complexions of body; according to that maxim of Galen, *Mores animæ sequuntur temperamentum corporis*. "The dispositions of the soul follow the temperament of the body." Of these inclinations I have two or three things to remark.

1. If the inclination lie towards that which is *good*, as far as it is *purely natural*, there is nothing of *moral goodness* in it, nor is commendation due to the possessor of it, any more than to the fire for warming you, by a quality given it by the author of nature. And consequently an action, that is purely the effect of such an inclination, is in a moral account no better than an indifferent action. And so, *vice versa*, that an inclination to what, in some circumstances, is *evil*, as far as it is *strictly natural* cannot be accounted criminal, seems a dictate of Reason. But

2. An action done in pursuance of this inclination, by a person come to the exercise of his Understanding, may undoubtedly be *sinful*. You will be ready to object, that if an action cannot therefore be good, because it is only the result of natural inclina-

inclination, neither can it be evil when owing merely to the same cause, viz. to a *natural principle*. But there is no parallel in the two cases. To render an action morally good, it is not enough that nakedly considered it be conformable to the Law of Righteousness, but the *motives* and *ends* of the action are to be weighed; so that the *principle* being no other than *mechanical*, the action for certain is too low to be placed in the order of actions morally good. But to make an action sinful, which in itself was disconformable to the Law of Reason, no more is required, than that the Being have a capacity of knowing it to be so, and a power to forbear it. That is in short, an action *materially* good may become *indifferent*, because the sole effect of a natural inclination; and an action proceeding from natural inclination may be vicious, because prohibited by the Law. The whole turns upon this, that a propensity to evil does not lay any man under a *necessity* of acting it. He may prevent the *effect*, when unable to extinguish the *cause*. Nay, I must needs believe it possible for a person to do more than barely *suspend* the action, even to *stifle*, or at least *tame* the inclination itself; as I shall show you in the close of this Chapter.

SECT. V. This deserves to be considered, seeing that it will from hence follow, that a corrupt desire, though natural, and supposed to have no more strength than what it derives from nature, may yet pass under the notion of *sinful*; because had we taken the care we ought to have done, it might in some measure have been weakened and overcome. Nor does this contradict a former concession, that no inclination as far as it is purely natural can be culpable. For an inclination which in its first years, and during the minority of Reason, was strictly natural, and consequently free from blame, not being severely dealt with as we grow up to Reason, becomes our *choice*. Its first existence was the effect of nature, but that it is *equally* strong now, as it was *originally*, the fault rests wholly upon my own negligence.

SECT. VI. 2. There are inclinations superinduced by custom, which are called *Habits*, and these are either *good* or *evil*. An evil habit is an inclination to evil, begotten and nursed up by a repetition of evil actions. It is irrational to think, that the depravity of some mens tempers, which is so great, as to hurry them into the most abominable crimes, is all *original*. How many may we have observed, whose natural disposition was

was *neutral*, or lay on the side of some *Virtue*, by frequenting bad company, and conforming to it, grow to be extremely loose and corrupt, even in those very instances to which at first they had some kind of aversion. Let us not therefore to excuse ourselves be unjust to nature, and lay the fault upon that of all that is *vicious* in us. Concerning *evil* habits the following Propositions are evident.

I. A man is answerable for his *evil* habits, so far as that he may be punished on the account of them. The reason is, that they are the product of actions which he ought to have forborn, and the rather because of the tendency which he knew them to have to produce corrupt habits. "A man must be extremely stupid not to know, that a course of action will issue in a habit, either of Vice or Virtue. And in regard men know what they do, it is of choice that they are good men or bad." It is altogether as proper to call an *habit* sinful, as an *action*. The outward action, though in itself necessary is esteemed good or evil, because free in its principles; and by parity of reason habits are denominated good or evil; because though the necessary effects of a course of preceding actions, yet are *free* in the next remove but one, I mean in the *Will*, which freely determined the being

* *Arist. Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 5. Andron. Rhod. L. 3. C. 6.*

being of those actions, which gave existence to the habits. All the difference is, that the act is directly voluntary, the habit indirectly; but neither one or the other is *immediately* free. Or if you will keep to the exactness of Philosophy, there is no guilt immediately or distinctly inherent in the action or habit; and that a man is reckoned more criminal when he proceeds to the outward act, is only from hence, that the consent of the Will is hereby known to be more intire, and consequently to have more guilt cleaving to it. As because every sinful action is known to contribute to the production of a sinful habit, every such action becomes on that score the more criminal.

SECT. VII. 2. Not only the first existence, and gradual increase of an evil habit will be placed to account, (because arising from acts of sin, from which we might have abstained) but the continuance also of the habit in the same degree of strength. So that every moment an evil habit remains, the guilt of the person is on the growing hand. To conquer a bad habit *all at once* is, I confess, in no one's power; but as some part of the prevalency which an evil habit has to day, is to be attributed to the neglect of doing all that might have been done for its removal yesterday, so consequently I stand chargeable with the strength of the evil habit to day;

day; as I shall for that to morrow, if I indulge myself in the same negligence to day.

SECT. VIII. 3. The actions occasioned by a sinful habit are all imputable: The same reason holding here, but more strongly, as in natural inclinations, that a habit may *incline*, but cannot *irresistibly* sway the Will. I confess a very great *Master* in this way of thinking seems to resolve the imputableness of such actions, not into this, that they may be forborn, but into this, that the habits they flow from might have been prevented. And so says a *Commentator* upon *Epictetus*. “If the soul be the
“ cause of its own habits, both good and
“ bad, through a right or wrong use of its
“ liberty, then is likewise the original cause
“ of those actions, which flow from the re-
“ spective habits to be ascribed to it.” But as the *French* Annotator upon *Puffendorf* well observes, “the possibility of con-
“ quering an evil habit *all at once* (he must
“ mean ceasing to act as that prompts us) is
“ manifest. If a Drunkard, under the temp-
“ tation of good company and liquor, can
“ notwithstanding deny himself, when a
“ wager is depending or the like, why can
“ he

^f *Puffendorf* De Jure N. & G. L. I. C. 5. §. 13.

^g *Simplic.* C. 1.

^h *Barbeyrac.*

“ he not do the same from more noble
 “ motives? It is even certain, that if a
 “ Prince should but make a severe edict
 “ against Drunkenness, and see it well exe-
 “ cuted, it would in a little time put an end
 “ to this absurd vice; as the late King of
 “ *France* by his edicts was able to abolish
 “ the humour of *Dueling*, which prevailed
 “ before.”

SECT. IX. For the cure of an evil inclination, whether natural or acquired, these two rules may be of use. 1. To be as *early* as we can in our application. *Principiis obsta.* Inclination is like a plant, pliable at first, but more stubborn after it hath fixed its roots, and is become the growth of a great number of years. 2. To cross and mortify the inclination, by a frequent and obstinate practice of the *contrary Virtue*. The oftner a man exercises himself in that Virtue, the more he will perceive his reluctance to it to abate; till at last he will experience a pleasure accompanying the practice of it, which in time will grow up into an inclination; an inclination, which as it gathers strength, will insensibly subdue, or rather counterwork the contrary evil propensity. ⁱ *Aristotle* advises to bend nature to the other extreme, as if the effect of this violent distortion would be, its returning

ⁱ *Eth. ad Nicom. L. 2. C. 8.*

ing part of its way again, and settling in the middle; which he illustrates by the instance of a crooked stick, which we bow the quite contrary way, in order to make it exactly strait. This expedient is not only *unwarrantable*, but exceeding *dangerous*. For either we shall *rest* in this last extreme, a thing, which as odd as it may appear, is more certain and natural, than it is to fix in the middle; or we shall take such a *distaste* at the new extreme, as to swing back to the old, and ever after to think ourselves justified in it.

SECT. X. Before I leave this head of habits, I would take notice of one thing in relation to *good* habits, which at first sight may be mistaken for a discouragement against endeavouring to fix them. The main thing that inhances the price of Virtue, being the *difficulty* in the way to it, and he who has attained to an habitual love of goodness, finding it no manner of violence to his nature to do well, his Virtue seems to be of less value, than while he was yet in a state of imperfection, struggling with his Passions. * Mr. Norris having owned, that this objection did once mightily embarrass him, tells us afterward what method he took to answer it. But instead of admiring that he surmounted it at last, I wonder that it could ever

* See his Miscellanies.

ever give him any disturbance. For in short, it is not the *difficulty* of an action, *simply* considered, that exalts it to the degree of heroic Virtue, but the *strength* of the good principles from which it proceeds; and that these good principles were either acquired, or maintained, and improved by our own care and industry. It is true, when a person forces his way through a great deal of opposition to perform a good action, his Virtue is concluded to be sincere and prevailing; not purely because of the difficulties attending the action, but because the mastering of these difficulties proves him to be possesst of a more than ordinary strength of mind. Consequently whoever he be, that has attained to such a perfect habit of Virtue, that he no longer feels in himself any considerable reluctance to his duty, he demonstrates his Virtue to be above the common size, in that it has not barely conquered, but well nigh rooted out the difficulties which opposed it. The habit renders the practice of Virtue much easier; but then it was not without continued vigilance and repeated efforts, that he possessed himself of the habit; and therefore the more perfect the habit, the more perfect his Virtue.

The result of the whole is, that *Inclination*, though too frequently a governing principle of action, has not that force as to

induce a necessity, unless the Will second it; and as for this concurrent operation of the Will, it is in a man's power to with-hold it, as I shall show in its proper place.

You may consult on the subject of this Chapter, besides the Books cited,

Tillotson Vol. 1. Ser. 29.

Hutcheson on our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. Tr. 1. §. 1. Tr. 2. §. 1 & 2.

Spectator Vol. 6. N°. 447.

Cockbourn's Reflection on Man, &c, p. 98. &c.

Turnbull's Principles of Moral Philosophy. P. 1. C. 2 & 3.

— His Translation of *Heineccius* of the Law of Nature. B. 1. C. 2. §. 24—30.





C H A P. II.

*Of Reason, and particularly as it is
a Principle of Human Actions.*

SECT. I. **T**HE second principle of human actions is *Understanding* or *Reason*. Reason is that faculty of the soul, whereby a person is enabled to judge of the natures, relations, and uses of things, of the fitnesses of actions, and of the truth or falshood of Propositions, particularly those of a *moral nature*. E. G. That in the present occurrence it is best to act after this manner, and that it is not best so to act, are contradictory Propositions; both of which our Reason tells us cannot be true, as upon examination it will discover which of the two is so. Reason is a much nobler principle than Inclination, being a *rule* as well as a *principle*; and where this is wanting, I do not say where it is not actually and properly exercised, a man's actions cannot be termed *human*, as I observed before.

SECT. II. There may perhaps be some ground for distinguishing between *Reason*
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and *Reasoning*. The knowledge of the truth of Propositions, whether *self-evident*, or *evident to us* only by the mediation of others, whether at one view, or at several, may in a larger sense be stiled *Reason*; as Dr. ^a *Cumberland* observes, "All men acknowledge the most evident principles to be the dictates of *Reason*, no less than those which need proof. *Reasoning* denotes the action of the mind in finding out of truth, and must therefore be employed about Propositions, which on account of their being at some distance from things already known, we arrive at by one or more steps. ^b *Cicero* acknowledges *Reason* to be common to Gods and men; and further saith, that the wisdom universally ascribed to God, is nothing else but *Reason* in its highest perfection." We shall not dishonour God by attributing *Reason* to him in its most exalted notion, as it is manifest we should if we supposed him to have any occasion for *Reasoning*. He hath the ideas of all things in his own mind, and with one all comprehending view beholds the infinite relations which they bear to one another; so that he at once possesses all possible knowledge. There is therefore in this case no room for *Reasoning*, which always argues imperfection; and yet there is what answers to

^a De Legibus Naturæ. p. 82.

^b De Legibus. L. 1.

to *Reasoning* in finite understandings, and differs from it no otherwise, than as *one perfect act* does from *several imperfect ones* in the same kind. God sees how one truth follows from another, and how the remotest ideas may be shewn to agree by the intervention of a great number of others; but then he sees at *once*, what angelical and human minds perceive not but *successively*; and *infinitely more* than they will perceive after the longest exercise of their reasoning faculty. Provided then we only remove these two degrading qualities of the knowledge of creatures, that it hath *bounds*, and that it is *progressive*, we need not scruple to discourse of the knowledge of God, under the name and character of *Eternal Reason*.

SECT. III. Reason being the power which the mind has of discerning the fitness or unfitness of actions, may be considered as a *principle* or a *rule* of action. As a *principle* it excites to action. That there is such an exciting power in Reason I should have thought it unnecessary to prove, because of the evidence of the thing, if it had not been denied. An explanation of the *manner* in which this *is* done, will contain a very good proof that it *may* be done. The mind by its faculty of Reason discerning and contemplating the fitness, congruity, or beauty of actions, has a pleasure in that discovery and

contemplation — a still greater pleasure in apprehending that it has a *power* to do such actions — greater still in a supposed *resolution* to do them — yet greater in the thought of *doing* or *having done* them — the result of all which is a lively conviction of its *obligation* to do them — as the effect of this is a constant uneasiness, as long as this obligation is not complied with. Sometimes the pleasure alone, sometimes the uneasiness, sometimes both together, flowing from and attended with the conviction of the obligation to such actions, produce a resolution to do them; and the pleasure there is in such a resolution actually formed, and the uneasiness while the execution of it is needlessly delayed, strongly prompt to the action itself. In this way I should think all will allow of the *efficacy* of Reason; nor will this manner of explaining it at all prejudice the notion of acting upon *moral fitnesses*.

SECT. IV. He that acts only from *Inclination* is like a vessel without a pilot on board, which wanders on the wide ocean, till driven by a tempest on rocks and quicksands, it miserably perishes. While the man who makes a due use of his *Reason*, resembles a vessel richly freighted, which the skill of the pilot directs through the dangers of the treacherous deep to its intended haven. One exerts the force of nature

ture blindly; the other guides it with his eye, so as to make it serve to its own welfare and the good of the community. The fable of *Prometheus*, who stole fire from heaven to actuate his man of clay, may be fitly applied here. For Reason is a lamp or torch kindled at the fountain of light, a beam from that unfading sun; and therefore mindful of its original should be perpetually ascending to him, acting worthy of him, and pursuing his interest and glory. To this faculty the *Stoics* give the honourable title of the *το ηγεμονικον* the *supream* and *governing* power, for such it is in some respects, though the whole commanding and executive power be properly in the Will. With respect to the same the modern *Platonists* defined a man *ζῷον λογικόν* a *rational Being*; to which, because of his body, they add, and *mortel καὶ θνητόν*; *rational* to distinguish him from the brutes, *mortal* because they would not be thought to equal him with the immortal Gods; restraining however this degrading epithet to his gross and corruptible part.

SECT. V. The Propositions that fall under the judgment of Reason being of *two* sorts, from hence arises a distinction of Reason into *speculative* and *practical*; the latter having a regard to Propositions in which the

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happiness, and by consequence the *behaviour* and *ends* of life are concerned. Here Reason has a double office assigned it, of a guardian to the body, and the directress of moral life. As a guardian to the body, it supplies the place of those weapons with which nature has furnished other creatures for their defence. These it has diversly armed, giving *horns* to one, *hoofs* to another, *swiftness* to another, *fierceness* and *strength* to another, τοῖς Ἀνδράσι σπουδαία, (*Ancr. Ode 2.*) to *men* she has given *wisdom*, which is more than equivalent to all the advantages of his fellow-creatures, whether for conquest, resistance, or flight. In the same capacity Reason is to man, what these ^d *instincts* are to other creatures, by which they are taught the art of *self-preservation*, both as to the individuals and the species. From whence there is this useful instruction to be drawn, that in every thing, even in the most common instances, and where instinct serves the brute, man is to imploy his Reason. For it is with this view, that wise and provident nature hath put him under a necessity of doing this with regard to the body itself, or of being miserable. The other and higher office of Reason is to be the directress of moral life. *Ne quid temerè, fortuitò, inconsideratè, negligenterque agamus.* "That

^d Dente Lupus, cornu Taurus petit.
Monstratum? —

Undè, nisi intus
Hor. L. 2. Sa. 1.

“That we may not at any time act precipitantly, negligently, and at random.” For as ^o Cicero adds, *Generati sumus a natura ad quædam studia graviora atque majora.*

“We are formed by nature for greater and more important things.” Had man been designed for no more than the beasts, for none but an animal life like them, the author of his Being would accordingly have indowed him with mechanical force and instincts, and withheld Reason; which on supposition it be of no further use, than to answer to instinct in brutes, is clearly thrown away, and not so much a *privilege* as a *burthen*. A supposition not to be made concerning nature, or rather the God of nature, who never does any thing in vain; but in all other cases, and therefore in this too, hath suited the *means* to the *end*.

SECT. VI. In discharging this part Reason is principally concerned about *two* things, *fixing right principles*, and *framing just deductions* from principles thus fixed. For the *settling* of its principles, it either consults its own light, or the light of Revelation; for the truth of the Revelation being once well established, what it manifestly dictates is to be received with the same veneration and regard, as the *first principles of nature*. The principles discoverable by the light of Reason

Reason are called *Apriori* *poenai* *natural principles*, *Konlas* *Evantai* *common notions*, innate to the soul, *Hypotais* *anticipations*, to signify that they were originally in the mind, not instilled by Education, nor gotten by Reasoning, but the immediate gift of the Creator. Be this opinion true or false, it is of no importance to Morality; the principles of which have the very same degree of authority, by whatever way they are derived into the mind, whether by immediate implantation, or the right use of that Reason with which the human soul is indowed. The same Proposition may be both a *principle*, and a *deduction*; a *principle* with respect to those moral rules that follow from it, and a *deduction* from some prior principles which are of a greater extent than itself. Those that have none prior to them, at least not in the same science, are stiled *general* and *first principles*.

SECT. VII. I shall conclude with observing, that there is greater danger of mens taking up with wrong principles, than of arguing wrong from the principles which they have taken up; and many more miscarry by the former way, than by the latter. *Antiquity*, *Education*, *Numbers*, *Authority*, *Learning*, are not principles to be relied on; and yet what more manifest, than that these are the principles by which whole nations

tions are governed in the weightiest affairs of human life? For at the bottom, the greater part of mankind have little more to say for their being of the Religion and Way they profess, rather than any other, "than that it was the Religion of their *Fathers*," "and is so still of the *Country* where they live, and of the *Government* they live under; they know *learned men* that are of it," "and it hath a great *number* of followers." It is to no purpose to go about to expose the folly of their proceeding after this manner; they have neither patience to hear you, nor openness of mind to be convinced by any thing that you can offer; having laid down this for a *first principle*, never to dispute what hath long past under that *sacred name*. Every man's *Reason* guided and perfected by *Revelation*, where it is to be had; or *Revelation* interpreted by right *Reason*, is after all the *ultimate* appeal in moral matters. But then he who is *sincere*, to avoid mistakes, will be careful to guard against *precipitancy*, will not refuse any *helps* necessary to correct and improve his Reason, or to assist him in understanding of Scripture; and having furnished himself with time and advantages will endeavour to lay aside all *prepossessions*, and to shake off every bias, that he may determine himself on the side of the *greatest evidence*; and proportion the degree of his assent to the degree of the evidence

dence respectively attending every subject.

I say no more here, having more largely treated the subject of this Chapter in the *Essay on Reason*; and because the fuller consideration of some parts of it will naturally fall in, as we go along, under other parts of this Science, particularly the Chapters about *Conscience* and *Sincerity*.

Consult on the subject of this Chapter.

Puffendorf De Officio Hom. & Civ. L. I. C. I.

— De Jure Naturæ & Gent. L. I. C. 3.

Mori Encheir. Eth. L. I. C. 3.

Grove's Essay on Reason. Vol. 4.

— Spectators. Vol. 8. N°. 588, 601.

Wollaston's Religion of Nature. Sect. 1.

Hutcheson's Inquiry &c. Tr. 2. Sect. 3, 6.

Letters between *Hutcheson* and *Burnet*.

Balguy's Inquiry into the Foundation of Moral Virtue, — His further Inquiry.





C H A P. III.

Of the Will.

P. I. *Of the Nature of the Will, and
of voluntary and involuntary
Actions.*

SECT. I. **I**T is a happy similitude which
^a *Aristotle* makes use of, to
illustrate the order of the faculties, and the
regular progress of every human action,
taken from those antient Governments de-
scribed by *Homer* in his Poems; wherein
the *Kings* after having held a *Council* of the
wisest heads concerning any enterprize, if
they approved the design, ordered the execu-
tion of it by the people under their com-
mand. Thus the Will ought to consult
with Reason, and then to proceed to action;
though after all the *supreme* authority and
final resort be in the Will. *Nestor* may
have the reputation of an *Oracle* for wis-
dom, but *Agamemnon* is the fountain of
power. Reason can only propose what the
Will is at liberty to reject or follow. The
Will

^a *Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 3.*

Will sometimes is taken more *generally*, for that faculty of the soul which carries it in pursuit of good. This is much the same with ^b *Aristotle's* *Excursion* *Spontaneity*, and comprehends under it all the *desires*, *inclinations*, and *volitions* of the soul. Sometimes more *strictly*, either for that tendency of the soul which regards the end, by the same ^c *Moralist* termed *Beatus* the *Will*; or for that which terminates on the action, which he calls *Προσπορεσις* *Preference*, or *Election*. *Volition* has its principal reference to the end, *Election* to the means. And again *Election* is wholly conversant about things *in our power*. It is chiefly in this latter sense the word is understood, when we speak of the Will in *Morality*, not altogether excluding the former. Thus understood it may be defined, *That power in every man which orders the doing or forbearing of actions*—and this with such efficacy, as in all actions within our power to render a *compliance* unavoidable.

SECT. II. This faculty is distinguished by two characters, it is the *only necessitating*, and the *chief denominating* principle. It is the *only necessitating* principle. Though a man's inclinations may strongly dispose and urge him to action, yet still he has a power of stopping short; and though Reason be necessary

^b *Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 1.*

^c *Ibid. C. 2.*

necessary to direct, whether and how a thing ought to be done, yet whether it shall be done or not rests in the Will; and once this has determined the action, if supposed in his power, *immediately and necessarily* follows. A person may be inclined to move, and in his judgment persuaded that it is best for him to move, and yet, if there should be no further act of the mind, must for ever sit still. A meer inclination or judgment has no effect; but let the Will exert its authority, and the executive power cannot but obey. The *sovereignty* of the Will is the same in all human actions. For what is it makes the man act at any time, but the command of the Will? Now for the same reason that the Will necessitates any one action, it must necessarily produce every action, that is the object of it, and at the same time in the man's power. It is moreover the *chief denominating* principle. In all inquiries concerning the actions of men, capable of acting rationally, the whole turns upon the *intention*, not the *end intended*; but whether the action was intended, or voluntary. "For by these two names *voluntary and involuntary*, we judge of all actions, says ^d *Andronicus Rhodius*; and accordingly pronounce that some are commendable, others pardonable, others worthy of blame." And to the same effect

^d L. 3. C. 1.

effect * *Simplicius*. "God and man have
 " always a regard to the Will, and by that
 " determine what is well or ill done."

This is the fountain of moral good and evil,
 that which lends *virtue* to the acts of the
 Understanding, Imagination, and Memory,
 as well as to our outward bodily actions, or
 infuses a *malignity* into them. Separate
 from the Will, nothing done by us can be
 good or evil, just or unjust; and where the
 Will is fully bent, and issues not into action,
 merely for want of power, the person
 deserves the praise or blame belonging to
 the actions, as much as if he did them.

† *Nam hoc ipsum ita justum est, quod rectè fit,
 si est voluntarium.* "An action in itself just
 " is rightly done, if done voluntarily,"
 saith *Cicero*. And it is the universal opinion,

Si desint vires, tamen est laudanda Voluntas.

"Though an ability to execute may be
 " wanting, yet a good intention deserves
 " praise."

SECT. III. I distinguished the Will above
 as regarding the *end*, or the *means*; but this
 general distinction does not content ‡ *Puffen-*
dorf;

* In *Epictet.* C. 1.

† *Cic. de Offic. L. 1. §. 9.*

‡ De *Jure Naturæ. L. 1. C. 4. §. 12.*

dorf, who further subdivides these *two* acts of the Will into *six*, three relating to the end, and three to the means. The acts of the Will relating to the end are *volition*, *intention* and *delight*. When the Will is inclined towards an end, without our considering it as *present* or *absent*, it is called *volition*, or according to others the Will of *simple approbation*; because in this case the Will stops at the esteem of things, without determining itself efficaciously to produce or acquire them. *Intention* or design is an efficacious desire to obtain the end. *Delight* is that tranquility or pleasure which the soul perceives from the acquisition of its end. The acts of the Will referring to the means, are *consent*, *choice*, and *execution*. *Consent* is a simple approbation of the means, as conducing to the end proposed. Where these means are in our power we single them out by *choice*, and apply them by *use* or *execution* towards obtaining the end. Though perhaps this distinction is not altogether exact, particularly because those which *Puffendorf* calls *volition* and *consent* are more properly acts of the Judgment than of the Will yet not knowing but it might help you in framing a clearer idea of the steps which the mind takes in advancing to action, I thought it not unuseful to mention it.

SECT. IV. An action or thing is *voluntary* directly or indirectly, *Directly* when it is the *immediate* object of the Will. Thus a man's swallowing a certain quantity of liquor, no one forcing him to it, is *directly* voluntary. *Indirectly* these two ways.

I. When its the effect of his *voluntarily* doing something, which he ought not to have done, either upon its own account, or because of the effects, which he knew, or might have known, would follow his doing it. Thus the disorder of Reason occasioned by a person's drinking to excess, and all the mischief he does during this suspension of his Reason, are *indirectly* voluntary, because of his willing to drink that quantity of liquor which brought it on; which he was obliged not to have done, both in regard such intemperate drinking, being the abuse of a pleasure, that ought to be enjoyed within the bounds of moderation, is in itself sinful; and much more as he foresaw that drunkenness would probably be the consequence. " ^h In like manner, he that " from his licentious way of living injures " his sight, or contracts any other distemper, is not so much *pitied* as *blamed*, for " what is not reckoned his *misfortune*, but " his *fault*." To add no more. The scandals

^h *Arist. Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C 5:*

dals occasioned by a *Christian's* taking some liberties, in themselves innocent, but which without any inconveniency might be forborn, are *indirectly* voluntary; because attending an action, which though perhaps in other circumstances warrantable, he should left undone, in consideration of the ill use which he knew would be made of it.

2. An action or thing is *indirectly* voluntary, when it is the effect of a person's not willing to do what he might and ought to have done. "i This is the case of one " through *negligence* ignorant of a Law, of " which it was easy for him to be informed." A consideration which leaves the ignorance of one injoying a plain Revelation without excuse, seeing no such person could labour under gross ignorance of the things revealed, who was sincerely desirous of knowledge. In, short to be guilty of an action or omission, and then plead that we are sorry for the event, is no more than *protestatio contra factum*, " protesting against " fact;" which was never yet admitted for an apology. These are the several respects in which an action or event may be reckoned *voluntary*, and in these are contained all the grounds of *imputation*. Whatever flows from the Will as its *cause*, whether *directly* or *indirectly*, being *imputable* to a person;

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and

i Andron. Rhod. L. 3. C. 6.

and of this he is to be esteemed the *author*, and of nothing else.

SECT. V. To the *two* ways of an action's becoming *indirectly* voluntary, which have been just explained, some add a *third*, *ex post facto*, from an *after-approbation* of an action done *undesignedly*. For instance, a man in hunting shoots at a *Deer*, and by meer chance kills his *King*; the thing was done *accidentally*, but being done is reflected on with a secret satisfaction; and this criminal satisfaction it is imagined converts a *casual* event into a *voluntary* one. But I would gladly learn, how a thing comes to be voluntary from its relation to an act of the Will, which exists not till that thing is past; or how this can be shown to be better sense than calling a man *Son* to one of his *Posterity*, or making the *effect* to be older than the *cause*. That which has betrayed any into this impropriety of speaking, I apprehend must be the guilt arising from the pleasure a person takes in unhappy accidents. I readily own it to be a *guilty pleasure*, but admire that this should make any one to think the preceding action therefore voluntary; since nothing can be plainer, than that it is not the *action* which is chargeable in this case, that having been past, and so for ever immutable, but the *approbation* of the action, which

which *approbation* proceeds from the Will, and is therefore faulty. ^k *Aristotle* decides this matter with a great deal of judgment.

“ A person who through ignorance did,
 “ what he is not displeased at when it comes
 “ to be known, cannot be said to have done
 “ it *voluntarily*, because he did it out of ig-
 “ norance; nor on the other hand, *against*
 “ his Will, because he is no way concerned
 “ for it, when he perceives what he has
 “ done.”

SECT. VI. An action is involuntary when it is the effect of *constraint*; of which ^l *Puffendorf* reckons *two* sorts, *external force*, and the *threatening* of some very terrible evil. The *first* I grant to be a proper instance. A man whose hand is violently made to serve a wicked purpose, being every whit as guiltless as the *instrument* with which the murder is committed. The action as to him is involuntary, and indeed is no action of his at all. The *constraint*, by *fear* cannot properly be called *constraint* nor the action involuntary that is done in compliance with it; it is a *mixed* action, as I shall show presently. Again, an action is involuntary that owes its being to a *faultless ignorance*. *Oedipus* returning into his own

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country

^k *Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 1.*

^l *De Jure Naturæ. L. C. 5. §. 9.*

country in quest of his Parents who were unknown to him, in a fray happened to kill his Father, and afterwards married his own Mother. All that can be said is, that he was *unfortunate*, but properly speaking neither a *Parricide*, nor *Incestuous*.^m *Aristotle* instances in one who divulges the *mysteries*, not knowing them to be such. The nearest parallel to which, that I can readily think of, is delivering the most trivial things, and even our *jest*s in *scripture* language, but inadvertently. This which would be a great fault in one that did it professedly, in the person ignorant of what he does is no more than an accident. But asⁿ *Aristotle* observes, those actions are not to be numbered among involuntary ones, which are done out of *anger* or *concupiscence*. *Ignorance* may change the whole species of an action, but the *Passions* do not.

SECT. VII. There are some actions *compounded* of the *two* former, voluntary in part, and in part involuntary, and these we call *mixed* actions. Of this kind is the action of *Achilles's* Son in *Euripides*, who being about to sacrifice *Polyxena*, Queen *Hecuba's* Daughter, at his Father's Tomb, the Poet says, Ο, ο, ου δέλω τε καὶ δέλω &c. "He through
" pity

^m Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3 C. 1.

ⁿ Ibid.

“pity *both unwilling, and willing*, cut in
 “funder the channels of the blood with his
 “sword.”^o None but a madman would
 cast his goods into the sea in calm weather;
 but in a storm, where there is an apparent
 necessity of lightening the ship to preserve
 it, the master does this without reflection
 on his prudence, urged by fear, a man
 does that which is against both his consci-
 ence and his inclination. *Pro hic & nunc*,
 οὐκ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦδε. These actions are voluntary,
 but not *wholly* so, seeing they are involun-
 tary in their cause; the cause which
 makes a man so to act being disliked. I
 say involuntary in their cause; for as to acti-
 ons *immediately* voluntary, and involuntary
 only *upon supposition*, they are not actually
 involuntary at all, and for that reason are to
 be accounted *purely* voluntary and not *mix-
 ed*. Which makes ^p *Aristotle* himself ac-
 knowledge, that such actions are rather
 voluntary than involuntary. He says *rather*,
 I say *wholly* voluntary; because, though if
 offered to my choice attended with their
 common circumstances, I should reject
 them; yet in the *present* situation of the
 actions, and of my mind, I do them with-
 out any reluctance of my Will. One man
 steals a bag of money, which he would not
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^o *Arist.* Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 1.

^p *Ibid.*

have done, had the opportunity been less favourable, or the sum not so tempting. Another having a proposal made to him in his unguarded moments, and the heat of his imagination, which he would have withstood at another time, listens and is overcome. A third in his anger speaks very ill things, and is guilty of very ill actions, nor does his Will make any present resistance. Who will say that these actions are actually involuntary in part? Though it must be owned there is not so much of a criminal Will in them, as where the temptation is less pressing.

SECT. VIII. If it be asked, whether, and how far, such *mixed* actions deserve praise or censure? I shall lay down these following rules, by which we may the better judge of them.

1. Where the action is *lawful*, and the not doing it would probably be of much worse consequence than doing it, though the action in such cases be not strictly *commendable*, yet the *omission* would ordinarily carry guilt in it. He who to save the ship disburthens it of its freight, must not be said to do a thing worthy of praise; but would justly incur the name of a *miser*, one too well affected to the things of the world, if he should choose to hazard life and all, rather

ther than submit to such an ungrateful expedient. The same may be applied to him, who consents to the amputation of a limb, rather than the whole body should be in manifest danger of perishing. Every one is bound to seek the preservation of his bodily life, by all lawful and warrantable ways; he sins against nature if he does not; but does not therefore merit reward for taking care of himself in a case of imminent danger; because he is carried to this, much after the same manner as brutes are, by a natural instinct.

SECT. IX. 2. When the action is *moral-ly* evil, no mixture of involuntariness will *intirely* justify it. A person threatened with death, or some other very dreadful evil, is by *fear* prevailed on to do an action, to which he has otherwise an aversion. ⁹ *Puf-sendorf* thinks this takes away all ground of imputation, as much as downright *force*; and he gives an example in an Officer, who receives an order, on pain of his life, to execute one whom he knows to be innocent. And in ^r another book he maintains, that the actions done in such a strait, are not to be imputed to the *person* doing them; more reasonably than to the *Sword* or *Ax-*
im-

⁹ De Jure Naturæ. L. 1. C. 5. §. 9.

^r De Offic. Hom. &c. L. 1. C. 5. §. 24.

employed to take away a man's life. But this is a loose and dangerous decision. It is I think a first principle in Morality, that nothing but *ignorance*, or *proper compulsion*, will exempt a person from the guilt of an ill action, neither of which can be pretended here. The *Passions* do not deprive men of their Understanding, or of their Liberty. The *beaten* Moralist delivers sounder doctrine than this. "There are some actions," says he, which call for *pity* and *forgiveness*, rather than *praise* or *blame*; as when "for *fear* of evils, such as even exceed the ordinary strength of human nature to bear, a man does what he ought not, *A μὴ δεῖ*;" an expression of the softer kind, which is not to be stretched to include the greatest crimes. which is the reason that he adds, "but some things are *so foul*, that a man will rather suffer *death*, than be compelled to them." *Andronicus Rhodius* in paraphrasing this passage explains it of death, ushered in with the most exquisite torments; and a little after has these excellent words. "That it is the part of a noble mind, bravely to undergo the most grievous things, rather than purchase ease and safety by acting any thing that is base, *Τὸ αἰσχρὸν*." Yea, such vile actions are not to be done by a person threatened never so highly, let there

there be the greatest reason to believe they will be done notwithstanding our refusal by some other hand. For at worst, there is a *possibility* that they may not; and though we were able certainly to foresee that they would, it will not justify us in doing an ill thing, that it will be done though we refuse it.

SECT. X. 3. As to *sinful* actions, the more there is in them of the *involuntary* the better title have they to pardon; and so *e contra*. A mixture of involuntariness, though it does not annihilate, yet extenuates the fault; and this more or less, as there is more or less of this ingredient in the action. This is too plain to need illustration.

4. In *good* actions the less there is of *mixture* the better. The greatest excellency of good actions is, when they are wholly voluntary; and when they are not altogether unmixed, they are so much the more valuable, as they approach nearer to it. A rich man relieves a person in great want, not without a secret wish, that this miserable object had not fallen in his way, that he might not have been under any obligation to give. This is a *mixed* action, and loses much of its virtue by being so.

Consult on this part of the Chapter the Books cited, and particularly,

Puffendorf De Jure Naturæ, &c. L. 1. C. 4.

— De Officio Hominis & Civis. *Sparran's* Translation, or the Latin Edition with *Titius's* Observations.

Whitbii Eth. L. 1. C. 10.

Turnbull's Principles of Moral Philosophy, P. 1. C. 1.

— Translation of *Heineccius*. B 1. C. 2. S. 51. C. 4 & 6. S. 155.





CHAP. III.

P. 2. *Of the Freedom of the Will--
Free Agency explained-- And
Man proved to be a free
Agent.*

SECT. I. **T**HE freedom of the Will, or human Liberty, has been a controversy in all ages; as well they who have opposed it, as they who have contended most earnestly for it, being sensible, that the *morality*, or *imputableness* of actions *wholly* depends upon their being free. And it is no breach of charity to believe, that such as have held the *negative* of the question, have generally been induced to do it from this very consideration, that a man is

^a *Epietetus*, speaking of *Liberty*, has this expression. "The Gods, as was fit, have put this, which is the most excellent of all things, and most kingly, in our power, *viz.* the right use of appearances; as for a power over other things, this they have not given us," which he reckons is because they could not give it. And a little after, "Discover the secret intrusted with you — I will not, for this is in my power. But I will throw you into chains if you don't. Man! What is that you say? Me will you fetter? My feet you may, but my purpose not *Jupiter* himself can overcome." *Epiet.* L. 1. C. 1.

is *not* accountable for what he *cannot* help; and on supposition he has no *Liberty*, will have the *more Licence*. ^b *Aristotle's* Προαιρεσις or Ορεξις βουλευτική *deliberative appetite*, the το Αυτεξεουσιον or *self-determining power* of the *Greek Fathers*, ^c *Simplicius's* το Αυτοκινητον or *principle of self-motion*, the ^d *Stoics* το εν ημιν or *things in our power*, ^e *Cicero's libera voluntas*, or *free Will*, and the *liberum arbitrium* of the *Schoolmen*, have all of them much the same signification, and denote that *self-determining principle* which we find in human nature. And here, that I may set this subject in the clearest light I am able, I shall,

- I. State the notion of *Liberty*.
- II. Prove man to be a free Agent.
- III. Show that man *is free as willing*, from this very manifest argument, that if he *is not free as willing* he is not free at all; and under this head I shall have occasion to examine Mr. *Locke's* notion of *Liberty*.
- IV. Fairly consider the chief difficulties and objections which cloud this subject.

SECT.

^b *Eth. ad Nicom. L. i. C. 3.*

^c *In Epist. C. i.*

^d *Epist. Ench. C. i.* By the way, this alone shews, that when the *Stoics* talk of *Fate*, they mean no more than a necessity of outward events, not of human actions. See the account given of this matter by *Wollaston's Religion of Nature*, p. 105. Unless with others we choose to distinguish between the *antient* and *modern Stoics*, of whom the *first* have been thought *Fatalists*, the others not.

^e *Cicero De Fato.*

SECT. II. 1. I shall endeavour to state the true notion of Liberty. And omitting those distinctions of it which are nothing to our present purpose, such as *gospel* Liberty, which stands in opposition to the *bondage* of the *ceremonial* Law, *religious* Liberty to the *dominion* of sin, and *civil* Liberty to *slavery*, with many other such like, I shall only take notice of *two* famous acceptations of this word, Liberty of *Spontaneity*, and Liberty of *Indifference*. Liberty of *Spontaneity* stands opposed to *external compulsion*; and accordingly a Being is then said to *act spontaneously*, when it is not *forced* upon action, contrary to the bent and inclination of its Will, at the time when the action is done. This is *all* the Liberty which some will allow to man. Whether they have any reason to be thus illiberal, or whether their's be the right notion of *Spontaneity*, will be seen presently. Liberty of *Indifference* is opposed to *Necessity*, and is usually distinguished into Liberty of *Contradiction*, and Liberty of *Contrariety*. Liberty of *Contradiction*, or *quo ad exercitium actus*, in the School language, is a power to act, or not to act, this or that particular way. Liberty of *Contrariety*, or *quo ad specificationem actus*, is a power to act this way or another. The first takes place where a *single* action, this latter where *two* or *more* actions are proposed

posed. Being at the entrance of a room, I am desired to advance to the other end of it, and have it in my power to go or not to go, this is an instance of Liberty of *Contradiction*. Being in the middle of a room, it is in my choice to go to one end or the other; or when several things are offered to my election, I can pitch on this or that as I see fit; these two are instances of a Liberty of *Contrariety*. Though by the way, it is not very proper to explain *Contrariety* in so large a sense, as to comprehend instances of the same kind with this last; for when two actions are proposed, both of them good, or bad, or indifferent, as there is no *specific* difference in the actions, so no *Contrariety* in a man's choosing one preferably to the other. And therefore I see not how it can be called Liberty of *Contrariety*, or as to the specification of the act. But to let that pass, it is well observed by ^f *Le Clerc*, that this distinction is perfectly needless, seeing Liberty of *Contrariety* is no more than repeating the Liberty of *Contradiction* upon different objects. For instance, when a person who is advised to ride for his health, chooses a journey to *London* rather than to *Exeter*; here is first a Liberty of *Contradiction* with respect to *Exeter*, the man has a power to go to *Exeter* or not, and he chooses not to go; then there is the same Liberty
in

^f *Pneumatol.* §. 1. C. 3. §. 12.

in regard of *London*, he has a power to go to *London* or not, and he chooses to go. Upon the whole, Liberty of *Indifference* is a power to act or not to act in any given instance. I cannot say that this distinction of Liberty absolutely pleases me, I shall therefore represent the matter a little differently.

SECT. III. Liberty is opposed to Necessity, and varies according to the Necessity to which it is opposed. The common distinction of Necessity is into *physical* and *moral*, which I do not so well approve for several reasons; the terms *internal* and *external* do I think convey the same ideas with much more advantage. *External* Necessity is a Necessity imposed by some external cause. Such is the Necessity which a *body* is under of moving, when impelled by a superior force. In opposition to which Necessity, a Being is then *free* in its motion, when it is *not* moved by itself, not by the impulse of some other Being. This alone deserves the name of *Spontaneity*; for as *Aristotle* justly observes, "that is necessitated which comes from a foreign principle; that on

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"the

* Audiamus enim Platonem, quasi quendam Deum Philosophorum: cui duo placet esse motus, unum suum, alterum externum: esse autem divinius, quod ipsum ex se sua sponte moveatur, quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. Hunc autem motum in solis animis esse ponit, ab hisque principium motus esse ductum putat. Cic. De Nat. Deor. L. 2. §. 12.

^b Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 1.

“ the contrary is *spontaneous*, the whole
 “ principle or efficient cause whereof is in
 “ *the agent himself.*” For though we call
 those machines *Autopala self moved*, which
 contain within themselves the immediate
 springs of their motion, yet it is not properly
 or philosophically the *immediate* spring
 that is *internal*, but the *moving* cause is
without. Thus the true reason why a Watch
 moves, is not the frame and structure of its
 parts, but the *hand* which winds it up.
 And it would be exactly the same as to the
 Will of man, if that like the wheels of the
 Watch moved not, till it was first pushed on
 by some *external* cause, or by some other
 thing in the man which was so. It might
 perhaps be said in this case, that the man
 was not under a *compulsion*, because the Will
 was carried along by the stream; but if he
 acted *voluntarily*, it is certain his actions
 would be nevertheless *necessary*, and consequently
 not *spontaneous*. The addition of
 Reason makes no difference, any more than
 it would in a Clock, all whose motions, after
 it was endowed with a perceptive power,
 would be the effect of the weights hanging
 upon it, as much as before. The *concomi-*
tancy of perception or understanding alters
 nothing in the *physical* or *efficient* cause of
 action.

SECT.

SECT. IV. It is the opinion of ^k Dr. Clarke, that the actions not of Children only, but of every living creature, are in this sense all of them essentially free; wherein he follows ^l Aristotle, whose words are, "that Spontaneity is common to Children, and all sorts of animal Beings, but without a power of judging and deliberating." This is the foundation of what he says in another place, "that beasts though they have sense are not capable of action, for as much according to him election is the principle or fountain of proper action. *ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸν ἡποασπορίας.*" That there must be such a thing somewhere as Liberty of action, in opposition to external, by others called physical Necessity, by ^m Cicero *Necessitas Fati, aut Causarum Series Sempiterna*, may be demonstrated *ab absurdo*, that otherwise there would be no agent or first mover in the universe, but an eternal progression or chain of effects, without any first cause of motion, which is a manifest contradiction. For if there be a first mover, he must have the original of his activity in himself, and consequently be unsubject to any fatal or proper Necessity; the supposition of which

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would

^k Remarks on Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty.

^l Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 2. L. 6. C. 2.

^m De Fato.

would place the *original* or *physical* cause of its motion or action, *not in itself*, but in *that* which laid it under the necessity of moving or acting. That position of ⁿ *Plato* is certainly true, "that the *beginning* of " *motion* must be from something that is " *self moved*, since otherwise all nature " must stand still, without any force or " energy to put it in motion." There is at least therefore *one free agent* in the universe, or one Being exempt from the laws of *external* Necessity or Fate. A *necessary agent* (meaning an agent under an *external* Necessity) is an expression, which however ornamental some men may reckon it to their file, is made up of two ideas that mutually destroy each other. I cannot better conclude this than in the words of ^a *Simplicius*. "They who deny to man a principle " of Liberty, betray their ignorance of the " nature of a human soul, by taking away " its self moving power, in which consists " the principal part of its essence."

SECT. V. *Internal* Necessity is in the same place not illy defined by *Simplicius*. "That " which obliges all Beings to act according " to their nature;" which he adds, "establishes Liberty instead of overthrowing " it. *φυλάττει το Αὐτεξούριον.*" Opposite to this Necessity

ⁿ *Phædon*. See also *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. L. 1. §. 23.*

[•] *Comment. in Epictet. C. 1.*

Necessity is a *power* indifferently of acting, or not acting, *unforced* by the weight of *nature*. Not a *bare possibility* or physical power of acting or not acting, for that is inseparable from the first kind of Liberty, but a *moral power*, that *may* be, and *often* is reduced into act. This is true Liberty of *Indifference*; the Liberty which I assert as belonging to man. My meaning is, that he who tells a *lye* is not under the *same* Necessity of doing it, that *God* is of observing the laws of *truth*. A self-murderer is not obliged to that unnatural act by the *same* Necessity, which makes a man in full possession of his Senses and Reason, and who has no temptation to put an end to his Being, to seek his own preservation. The man who robs on the highway is not necessitated thereto in the *same* sense, that a *savage beast* is when hungry to devour the harmless prey. If we compare *man* with the *beasts*, which are governed by their appetites, and under an inward impossibility of acting in any one instance otherwise than they do, this Liberty is a privilege and a perfection, as it requires a good measure of Reason. Compare him with the *Supreme Being*, who by the infinite perfection of his essence is perpetually determined to act conformably to the rules of the most consummate wisdom, holiness, and goodness, it must be confessed an imperfection, and to

argue the weakness of human Reason. The proof of this Liberty is the business of the next head, to which I now advance.

SECT. VI. 2. Man is a free agent, so free as to be able to do many of the actions he forbears, and to forbear many of the actions he does; not only *physically* but *morally* able, being privileged from the sway of an *internal* as well as *external* Necessity. It is very remarkable that the ^p *Epicureans* themselves, they who resolved all the actions of men into the laws of local motion, overpowered by the evidence of this truth, had not the confidence to deny human Liberty, though the concession of it be inevitably destructive of their whole scheme.

Unde est hæc, inquam, Fatis avulsa Voluntas?

saith ^q *Lucretius*. “Whence is this Will, “which we experience to be privileged “from the empire of Fate?” For this he endeavours to account by a *Clinamen Principiorum*, a declination of atoms; the most ridiculous and unphilosophical imagination that ever entered into a man’s head. Had we not a power over our own actions, it would follow, saith *Cicero*, “that neither “commendations, nor reproaches, nor re- “wards,

^p *Cicero* De Fato. §. 10.

^q De Rerum Natura. L. 2.

“wards, nor punishments, would have any
 “just foundation.” But in regard a plausible reply may be made to this argument, and we want not for others which are more unexceptionable, I shall not insist upon it; for as to the wisdom of human rewards and punishments it may be said that they answer their ends, if they work necessarily as much as they would if men were free agents. *Rorarius*^r tells us, he saw two wolves hanging on a gibbet in the Dutchy of *Juliers*; and observes, that it made a greater impression on the other wolves, than the mark of a red-hot iron to deter thieves from stealing. He likewise saith, that in *Africa* it is usual to nail lions to a cross, in order to terrify those of the same species. And what more common than for a dog to leave faults for which he is beaten? So that these methods are made use of as weights in a balance, to turn it this way or that. And what *Myfis* saith in *Terence*^s, is literally true of man in case he be only a piece of corporeal or intellectual *mechanism*. “While the mind
 “is in doubt, the most inconsiderable addi-

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“tion

^r *Bayle's Dictionary*, Article *Rorarius*. I find the Author of the *Philosophical Inquiry* applies the same observation to the same purpose; but this I did not know till some years after I noted it, and put it to this use in reading the article *Rorarius* in *Bayle's Dictionary*; from whence accordingly I quote it, and not from *Rorarius* himself, as the Inquirer does.

^s *Andria*. Act. 1. Sc. 5. Dum in dubio est animus, paulo momento huc illuc impellitur.

"tion of weight inclines it to either side." And as to the *justice* of punishments, on supposition of the Necessity of human actions, it is easily accounted for, by saying, that the same Necessity that is pleaded by the criminal for committing a fault, the magistrate, or any one else, hath a right to plead for punishing it. He that judges, and he that is judged, are alike the servants of *Fate*^t. Therefore *Zeno*, when his slave was caught in a piece of theft, and argued *ad hominem*, "that it was his *fate* to steal," without going off from his own principles, replies, "Very true, thou wast *fated* to play the rogue, "and I am *fated* to see thee whipped for "it". To prevent all cavils therefore, I shall argue from two considerations which cannot be so easily evaded; one of them taken from the *Perfections* of *God*, the other from every man's own *Conscience*.

SECT. VII. I. *GOD* being infinitely *just*, cannot punish actions which are not *deserving* of punishment; as it is certain none of those actions can be which proceed from Necessity. Being infinitely *wise* and *good*, if he interwove in the contexture of human nature a Necessity of acting one way, it would be that way which is most agreeable to Reason, most for the benefit of mankind, and

^t Tatian Orat. ad Græc. §. 11.

^u Diog. Laert. Vit. Zen.

and most consonant to his own Will. That mankind act irregularly in a thousand instances, or so as to violate the laws of Reason, Religion, and the Civil Society, is a matter of fact not to be disputed. The only question is, whether they can *avoid* acting in this manner? Grant me that they can, and I have gained my point; since they will then do what they have a power to forbear: deny it, and you are obliged to hold, that the *first* cause is the *source* of all evil, *i. e.* that sin and folly are the *necessary* productions of infinite goodness and wisdom, which is a manifest contradiction. “The whole
“system of the universe, says a late^w Writer,
“is the care of God; and all other inferior
“Beings must be subordinate to the interest
“of this great one; and all contribute, in
“their several stations and actions, to bring
“about at last the grand purposes of his
“Providence.” But will he pretend to say, that lying, fraud, intemperance, inhumanity, oppression, and the like practices, have in their nature a tendency to promote the good of intelligent Beings; and cannot therefore, in the order of causes, be dispensed with by him who guides the whole design? This were to make these things *good*, and not *evil*, in opposition to universal Reason and Experience. Or will any one contend, that

^w The Author of the *British Journal* in 1722. under the Name of *Diogenes*.

that particular societies, and consequently the general system which comprehends them all, would not enjoy more harmony, peace and happiness, if they who compose them were universally just, temperate, grateful, kind, and beneficent? And why then are they not all these, but too often the direct contrary? The common answer, that man being at present in a state of trial for the happiness of a future life, is therefore left to his Liberty to do good or evil, is a plain and rational solution of the difficulty; whereas the opinion that men are *inevitably* betrayed into all these mischiefs by a concatenation of causes, overthrows at once the idea of an *eternal mind*, and of *moral* perfections, establishing in their stead a blind unintelligent *matter*, as the original of all things. Did we see an *universal* regularity, and consistency in the actions of rational creatures; were they *all* uniformly virtuous, conducted by Reason, and levelled at one certain end, the common interest and welfare of the whole, there might be then some little colour for doubt, whether they were not under a Necessity, like that which retains the heavenly bodies in their several courses, which they perform with an amazing order and constancy, one age after another. But, for certain, *wisdom* cannot be the spring of an *unequal*, *freakish*, and *contradictory* conduct; the origin of all good can never *necessitate* his creatures

tures to do *evil*. Nor can the patrons of this opinion escape by saying, that God himself is a *necessary* agent; that he could not but create man with an invincible bias to transgress his laws, and cannot but punish him for transgressing them, though without any fault of his. For whence should this Necessity arise? Not from any thing *without* him, because he would not be then the *first* and *independent* Being; not from his *own nature*, which, containing in itself the most perfect wisdom, justice, and goodness, cannot, without the most evident absurdity, be supposed forcing him to act in direct opposition to all these perfections.

SECT. VIII. 2. There is that in every man which we call * *Conscience*, which *approves* him for having done an honest, generous, or benevolent action, and which *checks* him in the commission of an ill action, *reproaches* him having done it, fills him with secret *shame*, with *bitter* reflections, with smarting *anguish*, and foreboding *fears*: this Conscience, *natural* to all, is an incontestible argument of the same Liberty; for what does all this signify less than a sense or consciousness not to be suppressed, of his being the *free author* of his actions, and justly *accountable* for the good or evil which is in them? This *judgment* we pass upon our

* Vid. Clement. Homil. 14 §. 4. Et reveris est. &c.

our own actions, and the actions of others, is *natural* and *unavoidable*; 'tis therefore the *voice* of the Author of our frame, by which he tells us we are free and accountable, proper subjects of praise or blame, and consequently of reward or punishment. When we have resisted a strong temptation of interest or pleasure, which would have seduced us to fraud or injustice, we *naturally* approve ourselves, and look upon ourselves as approved of God, and qualified for his favour; but were we not free, we could no more reasonably thus approve ourselves, or esteem ourselves as approved of God, for being in this good temper, and acting with integrity and benevolence, than for being, without any care of our own, in a good state of health, and endowed with a happy vigour of mind and body. We should be delighted with it as a happiness, and are hereby qualified to do more good; but do not approve ourselves for it, or think ourselves ever the more qualified for the approbation or reward of the Deity. Do not mankind agree in distinguishing between *natural* endowments, and *acquired moral* excellencies? But what room for this distinction, and the different regards paid to these, if both were alike the *necessary* result of our constitution, and the circumstances wherein God hath placed us; and justice, mercy, or piety were as *intirely* the gifts of God, as strength of body, or

pene-

penetration of mind? On the other hand, when we have been guilty of actions of *known* falshood, ingratitude, treachery, inhumanity, profaneness, and the like, and coolly reflect upon them, we *naturally* and *necessarily* reproach and condemn ourselves, and apprehend a wise and righteous God will condemn us; we wish we had not done these actions, and resolve for the future to forbear them. These are the *natural* sentiments of every mind not abandoned to vice, coolly reflecting on actions of this kind; but were we conscious to ourselves, and were this the real truth, that in such circumstances we could not avoid thinking and acting as we did, and could not before avoid these circumstances, any more than a mad man in the height of distraction, who would condemn himself for any thing he had thought or done; and who reasonably fear the displeasure and condemnation of a wise and just God, who knew our frame, and who knew himself to be the real author of all the dispositions and actions *necessarily* arising out of the constitution he had formed us with, and the circumstances wherein he had placed us? *Repentance* and *self-condemnation* evidently and necessarily suppose we *could* have acted otherwise. Since therefore these are the *natural* sentiments and judgments of our minds upon our own actions, and we thus *naturally* judge of the actions
and

and characters of others; since these sentiments and these judgments are in a greater or less degree *natural* to mankind, and unavoidably formed and entertained by them; either the author of the human frame, by our make, *necessarily* determines us to judge *falsely* of actions and characters, and then farewell to all *certainty* in *speculative* truths, as well as *moral*; or we are *free*, capable of omitting the good actions we practise, of doing the ill actions we forbear, or abstaining from the vices we indulge. We as *naturally approve* and *condemn* ourselves as the proper authors of our good or ill actions, as we assent to the proportions of numbers, or of lines and figures. Could mankind be *universally* deceived in this *natural, universal, moral* judgment of themselves and their actions, they might be deceived in the *clear-est* determinations of their Reason in all other cases. It is no more unworthy our Maker, or inconsistent with his perfections, to determine us to judge *falsely* in *speculative*, than in *moral* Propositions; and all truth and certainty must then be given up for a gloomy restless scepticism.

If it should be said, that there is no need of granting more than a *freedom* of the *first* kind, or a *self-motive* power, to take away the force of these arguments; I answer, this is evidently a mistake; since, upon this supposition, the continued aversion of the mind

mind from God and goodness, in the worst of mankind, would be as innocent as the desire of happiness, because equally *necessary*. Yea, this notion would throw the blame of all the evil which is done in the world on God, who in the constitution of men has made it morally impossible, and could therefore never design they should act otherwise than they do. Let ten thousand Beings be framed exactly alike, and be put into the same circumstances, both inward and outward, if they have no more than a Liberty of *Spontaneity*, it is certain they will all act after the same manner. Blame not therefore a thief for taking away your money, accuse him not of injustice, for he may say, that he has done no more than you yourself, than any man, than any Being in the universe, if framed as he was by God, by nature, and education, and situated like him, would have done.

SECT. IX. This being so, I know not how to subscribe to what ^y Dr. *Clarke* says, " That
" the difference between men and beasts is
" only this, that in man *physical* Liberty is
" joined with a sense, or consciousness, of
" *moral* good and evil, and is therefore
" eminently called Liberty. In beasts the
" same *physical* Liberty, or self-moving
" power, is wholly separate from a sense,

or

^y Remarks on Philosophical Inquiry, &c. pag. 27, 28.

“or consciousness, or capacity of judging
“of *moral* good or evil, and is vulgarly
“called *Spontaneity*. In Children the same
“*physical* Liberty always is from the very
“beginning; and in proportion as they in-
“crease in age, and in capacity of judging,
“they grow continually in degree not more
“free, but *moral* agents.” On the contra-
ry, I beg leave to say, that the *whole* differ-
ence between men and beasts is not a mere
consciousness of *moral* good and evil, which
these latter want, and the other have; but
that the chief difference lies herein, that the
Will being joined in men with a *reasoning fa-*
culty, is capable hereby of determining it-
self different ways in every circumstance of
life, which it is morally impossible for the
soul of a brute (if brutes have souls) to do.
The only difference between Children, and
those come to years of understanding, is
not, that these last have a better capacity of
judging than the former, but they are like-
wise *more free*; I mean in opposition to *in-*
ternal Necessity. This Liberty increases in
proportion to the capacity of judging for
some time; but as this capacity approaches
to perfection, supposing the virtuous disposi-
tion of the mind to improve with its know-
ledge, this Liberty lessens again; the degree
of it being mostly regulated by the propor-
tion there is between the *Reason* and the *In-*
clinations of the soul.

Books proper to be consulted on this part of the third Chapter are, besides the Books cited,

Mori Encheir. Eth. L. 3. C. 1.

Grove's Essay on Human Liberty. Vol. 4. of his Works.

Cheyne's Philosoph. Principles of Religion.

Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Prop. 9. & 10.

— His Remarks on *Collins* of Liberty and Necessity.

Jackson on Liberty.

Dr. Watts of Freedom of Will in God, and in Creatures.

An Anonymous Essay on the Immateriality and Liberty of the Soul. C. 9.





C H A P. III.

P. 3. *That the Will is free---And an examination of Mr. Locke's notion of Liberty.*

SECT. I. III. **H**AVING proved man to be a free agent, I now proceed to prove, that the Will is free; or because this expression is scrupled by some (and I have no inclination to contend about words) that man is free as willing; which I prove by this very manifest reason, that if a man be not free as willing, he is not free at all. Liberty is *radically* in the Will, and not in the Understanding, according to the opinion and language of the *Schools*. That I reckon to be the *root* of Liberty, in which it has its first and immediate residence. Now it is certain, that all the operations of the Understanding are *necessary*, by means either of the object, or of the Will. The object or idea being presented, perception, the act of the Understanding, is as inevitable as vision is when the eye is open, and nothing requisite to sight wanting. A man may wink his

his eyes, or turn them off to some other object, and so the soul has a power of refusing or diverting its attention; but then this power is not in the Understanding itself, but in that faculty which commands its attention to this or another idea; with which command the Understanding cannot but comply, unless where the object is too hard for the Will, and by raising the passions to a great height, chains down the attention of the mind to itself. Too hard, I say, for the Will; for what is it but the Will that commands the doing or forbearing of actions, both mental and bodily?

SECT. II. The Will, as has been shown before, is the *necessitating*, and *denominating* principle of action, that which makes an action to *exist* that is in our power, and that which gives to every action its *moral* tincture and quality. Reason indeed is necessary to the imputableness of an action, *Causa sine qua non*, but no more. The bare perception or knowledge of good and evil has nothing in it either laudable or criminal; but where Reason is not, no action in a proper or moral sense may be said to be voluntary. A *Fool* in his anger kills a man, the *natural* action in this case he wills, but not the *moral*, which alone is forbidden by the Law. For what the Law forbids and will punish is, a man's killing another without a suffici-

ent cause, who knows, or might have known, the Law forbidding such actions. To which I might add, that without Reason the Will has not its moral Liberty, but is under a kind of necessity of determining itself by the sensations, passions, and inclinations of the soul. So that after all, the Will is the *prime principle* of moral actions.

SECT. III. Upon which I proceed to argue thus, that if the Will be the principle of moral actions, it is free; or the man is free as willing. For 1. It is undeniable that Liberty alone makes an action *imputable*, or worthy of reward or punishment. The consequence of this is, that if the Will be not free, it is quite absurd to denominate actions from the Will. It differs little from a contradiction to say, that an action is therefore good or bad because free, and it is good or bad because voluntary, and yet as voluntary it is not free. And again, if Liberty be what qualifies an action, and a man is not free in the acts of his Will, a meer act of the Will must always be *indifferent*; and it would be the greatest nonsense to commend a person because he would have done well, or to censure him, because had he been able he would have proved himself a villain. 2. If the principle be not free, neither are the actions free that flow from that principle; and so nothing

thing of Liberty will be left to human actions. For if they are free, it must be *absolutely*, or *relatively*, in themselves, or with relation to their principle. *Absolutely* or in themselves considered they cannot, because *necessarily* determined to exist by the Will. Inquiry being made, why a person does not effect this or that, it is always answered, either because he *could not*, or because he *would not*; between these two there is no medium. If he *could*, and did it *not*, all mankind agree that he did not *will* it. If he *would* have done it, but did *not*, that it was because he *could not*. So that all our actions, excepting those of the Will itself, are not free absolutely and in themselves; and if the opinion of certain Gentlemen be admitted, they are not more free in the Will than their principle; and when neither free in themselves nor in their principle, it is utterly impossible they should be free at all. This, I say, is the consequence if man be not free as willing; but that he is free has been demonstrated, therefore as willing he is free.

SECT. IV. ^a Mr. *Locke* treats the Liberty of the Will as a *solecism* and *absurdity*; but let us try whether his notion of freedom be more consistent and rational. "Liberty,

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"not

^a Human Understanding. B. 2. C. 21. §. 8.

“not to act, according to the preference of
 “the mind,” or Will. Thus also ^b *Hobbs*.
 “The question is not, whether man be a
 “free agent, that is to say, whether he can
 “write or forbear, speak or be silent, ac-
 “cording to his Will.” ^c *Tully*’s reflection
 upon *Epicurus*’s Philosophy concerning the
 Gods, is justly applicable to this account of
 Liberty; *Verbis ponit, re tollit*; “it allows
 “it in words, but really takes it away.”
 “Liberty is a power to act or not to act.”
 Had Mr. *Locke* stopped here, the definition
 would have been tolerable; but it follows,
 “according to the preference of the mind,”
 or Will. In respect of which preference he
 says more than once or twice, “that a *man*
 “*is not free*.” Of this notion of Liberty I
 have the following things to remark.

SECT. V. 1. He that affirms the Will
 not to be free, but only the actions flowing
 from it, must confine rewards and punish-
 ments to these; insomuch that though a
 man hath a Will to be charitable, and is
 not of ability; or to commit a murther, for
 which he wants opportunity, he is neither
 to be praised or blamed, because here is
 nothing of Liberty. A preference of the
 Will there is, but that signifies nothing at
 all, as long as Liberty lies not in that, but

^b *Tripos*. P. 2. p. 274.

^c *De Fato*.

in a power to act or not to act according to that preference^d. “ Suppose a man to be
 “ carried while fast asleep into a room,
 “ where is a person he longs to see and
 “ speak with, and be there locked fast in,
 “ beyond his power to get out; he awakes,
 “ and is glad to find himself in so desirable
 “ company, in which he stays willingly,
 “ *i. e.* prefers his stay to going away.” This
 stay is *voluntary*, says Mr. Locke, and yet it
 is *not free*. Yes, I answer, it may be free
 in its *principle*, by which I mean, that a
 man may be *free to will* or *not to will* his
 stay. For a little to change the instance,
 let us suppose a man locked into a room in
 company with a tempting Harlot, who im-
 ploys all her charms and cunning to draw
 him into sin; and that he *prefers* to stay
 there. I ask, whether he be free in this
 preference or not? If not, he is guilty of no
 fault therein, since no action can be culpa-
 ble that is not free. If he be free, then it
 follows, that he has a *power to will* or *not*
to will his stay; in other words, that he is
 free as willing.

SECT. VI. 2. There is a notorious falla-
 cy in the words. “ A power to act or not
 “ to act, according to the preference of the
 “ mind,” or Will, seems to imply a Liber-
 ty of *Indifference*; but supposing withal that

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^d Mr. Locke of Human Understanding. B. 2. C. 21. §. 10.

the Will is not free, there is nothing less. Whatever is the *necessary effect* of a *necessary principle* must itself be *necessary*. This to me is self-evident. There may it is true be a kind of *conditional* Indifference, but the condition on which it is suspended being an *impossible* one, it ought not to be accounted a *proper* Indifference. I take up Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, and read therein, with a power at the same time not to have read him; supposing I had *willed* not to have read him. You see here a *conditional* Indifference, a power not to have done the action I did, on condition I had *willed* not to have done it; which in the conclusion is no better than trifling with words, since if I am not *free to will* the not reading him, I am not free not to read him, but must *necessarily* read him, as the unavoidable effect of my *necessarily willing* or preferring to read him.

SECT. VII. 3. Allowing this *conditional Indifference* the name of a *Liberty of Indifference*, it belongs to a man *as willing*, no less than as *considering* or *moving*. That which determines the Will in its choice, Mr. Locke thinks, is the greatest uneasiness it lies under. Be it so; I have then a power to will or not to will an action, according as the uneasiness I am under determines my Will one way or the other. Ay—but the uneasi-

uneasiness *irresistibly* carries the Will one way—Let it be granted; yet still I had a power not to have willed this, or to have willed the contrary, in case the uneasiness had lain on that side. So that if a *conditional* Indifference must pass for a *proper* Indifference, the actions of the Will must have their share of it, as well as other actions. Upon the whole, you may judge whither Mr. *Locke's* definition of Liberty leads, it evidently concludes all mankind under an inflexible Fate. This, I say, is the *natural* consequence of Mr. *Locke's* notion of Freedom; though I will not say that Mr. *Locke* himself was a Fatalist. At first sight one would take him to be altogether orthodox; for in one place he says, “A man has a power to consider, or not to consider;” and in another, “that he has a power to suspend his judgment;” and herein he makes the true Liberty of man to consist. These are fair concessions, but will not stand with his denial of Liberty to the Will. “Rational Liberty is a power to consider or not to consider;” this definition being imperfect, I shall fill it up out of his general definition of Liberty; *a power to consider or not to consider, according to the preference of the Will*; as indeed that which orders that a thing shall be considered or not, is nothing else but the Will. And would Mr. *Locke* allow this preference
of

of the Will to be free, we should ask no more; but what he says is, that the Will is not free, that is, a man is not free to will, or prefer to consider, or not to consider. Upon the whole, it appears, from a Letter of Mr. *Locke* to his Friend^c Mr. *Molyneux*, some passages of which I shall subjoin, that Mr. *Locke* believed the *free-agency* of man, but being mistaken as to the *principle* of Liberty in man, he was unable to satisfy himself when he endeavoured to explain or account for it. His words are. “But if
 “you will argue for or against Liberty from
 “consequences, I will not undertake to an-
 “swer you, for I own freely to you the
 “weakness of my Understanding; that
 “though it be unquestionable that there is
 “Omnipotence and Omniscience in God
 “our Maker, and I cannot have a clearer
 “perception of any thing, than that I am
 “free, yet I cannot make Freedom in men
 “consistent with Omnipotence and Omni-
 “science in God, though I am as fully per-
 “suaded of both, as of any truths I most
 “firmly assent to. And therefore I have
 “long since given off the consideration of
 “that question, resolving all into this short
 “conclusion—That if it be possible for God
 “to make a free agent, then man is free,
 “though I see not the way of it.”

^c Dated Jan. 20. 1692². See his Collection of Letters.



C H A P. III.

P. 4. *The principal Objections against the Liberty of the Will represented and answered.*

SECT. I. **H**AVING finished three of the Inquiries relating to the Will, according to my method, I am

IV. To consider the principal objections and difficulties attending this subject; and the

1st. Is taken from *Hobbs* and *Spinoza*, and affects the *possibility* of Liberty^a. "Every effect is produced by some cause, which for this very reason, that it is sufficient to produce the effect, produces it necessarily; inasmuch as supposing it not actually to have produced it, it would not have been sufficient. Now the Will is determined by some external cause, which cause is sufficient, and does therefore necessarily and inevitably determine it." But if

^a See also a good answer to this objection in an Essay towards demonstrating the immateriality and free agency, &c. C. 11. §. 12, 13, 14.

if this be not *begging the question*, it is impossible there should be any such thing; for who among the asserters of the Freedom of the Will was ever so unadvised as to acknowledge, that the Will is perpetually determined by external causes? On the contrary, ask any of them, and they will tell you, that this faculty determines itself by a power originally inherent in it. With regard to the voluntary motions of the mind, we are not to look for an external cause, it being the nature of these to be in our own power. Nor must it be therefore said that they are without a cause; for the cause is no other than the nature of the agent. These are the words of ^b *Cicero*, who has likewise something relating to the notion of a cause which is well worth quoting. "That is the true cause of a thing, which efficaciously produces it, as a wound of death or indigestion of a disease; and therefore this term is not to be so explained, as if whatever was antecedent to any thing was its cause, *sed quod efficienter antecedit*, but what efficaciously precedes it." It may be previously requisite that there be some circumstances accompanying the action to engage the consent of the Will, notwithstanding which it continues true, that the Will is not *physically* moved by them, but *freely* moves

^b *Cic. De Fato. §. 12, & 15.*

moves itself in view of them. Or in case, for argument's sake, we should grant them, what they will never be able to prove, that the Will is determined by something from without, will it from hence follow, that it is irresistibly determined? Not at all. For though in regard of Beings who have not a *self-motive* power, every cause which is sufficient to impel them, must *necessarily* impel them as often as it is exerted; (as if I had strength to lift any given weight, and made trial of my strength for that very end, the weight will unavoidably be removed out of its place) yet from instances of this nature to infer the *necessity* of the Will's following the impulse of every cause, which is sufficient to put it in action, is not less absurd, than if we should say, that because a weaker man is able to lift or throw a stronger than himself, provided the stronger man will make no resistance, he can therefore do the same, though the stronger made all the opposition in his power. The Will has this *resisting* power, by which it can prevent the efficacy of those causes which (I at present deny not) would determine it, on condition the Will would suffer itself to be determined by them.

SECT. II. 2. It is objected, the Will must yield itself to the greatest appearing good; because otherwise it would embrace *evil* as *evil*,

evil, which is utterly impossible^c: and how an object shall appear, whether good or bad, better or worse, is not at the pleasure of the Will, which must take things just as they are offered by the Understanding: and tho' the^d Poet makes *Medea* say,

— *video meliora, proboque;*

Deteriora sequor —

^e others will tell you, *Omnis peccans est ignorans*, “the sinner is always ignorant of the evil of what he does.” The more common way of expressing the objection is this, that the Will in all its determinations necessarily follows the ultimate dictate of the practical Understanding. To this I shall not answer, by assuming^f Mr. *Locke's* opinion, that the Will is always determined by the *most pressing uneasiness*, and not by the appearance of the greatest good; for did this always hold true, there could be no such thing as *voluntary* martyrdom. The desire of ease, and the uneasiness created by its absence, or rather by the presence of pain, would not fail to determine the Will to whatever expedients would deliver the sufferers from their torments, even though the only method should be

^c See also a good answer to this objection in the Essay just quoted. C. 11. §. 15. &c.

^d Ovid. Met. L. 7.

^e Vid. *Arrian*. Epictet. L. 1. C. 17, & 18.

^f Essay on Human Understanding. B. 2. C. 21. §. 31.

be the abjuration of their Religion. Whereas this is opposed by matter of fact, many having chearfully given their bodies to be burned, and sealed their faith with their blood; in which glorious conflict, that which gave them this courage was not *uneasiness* of any kind, but the *joy* they felt arising in themselves from the assured hope and expectation of a blessed immortality. Neither shall I reply, as some do, that what is usually called the *last dictate* of the Understanding, is in truth no other than an act of the Will, wherein I cannot at present agree with them. There are *three* acts of the mind as conversant about human actions; the *first*, when it pronounces concerning an action that it is a proper means for the attainment of such or such an end; the *next*, that upon the whole it is an action which ought to be done; or *lastly*, it saith, let this action be done. The two former are acts of the Understanding, the last of the Will. What is usually called the *last dictate* of the Understanding, to me appears to be nothing else but *perception*, either distinct or confused, brighter or more obscure, and therefore plainly an operation of the Understanding; though that it is final and directory, or that the mind rests satisfied in it, is generally chargeable on the Will, which has a power to put the Understanding on a closer view of things than men commonly content them-

themselves with. And this indeed seems to be the original cause of mens confounding these two faculties, attributing to one what belongs to the other.

I as little like Bishop ^s King's hypothesis, *Potentia activæ ea natura est quæ objectum actui suo sibi conveniens, i. e. bonum efficiat, &c.* "that the nature of an active power is such, as by singling out any thing for its object, by the very act to make it convenient for it, or good;" for in this case the goodness of the object does not precede the act of election, but the election is the efficient or original of the goodness which is in the object; that is, a thing *pleases*, because it is *chosen*, not *chosen*, because it *pleases*. Not to strike at the foundation of this notion, by shewing, that things are good or evil independently of the Will, its absurdity is from hence apparent, that admitting the truth of the assertion, there can be no such thing as a *wrong* choice; forasmuch as the choice of any thing whatsoever, *creates* a goodness where it was not before. That Author indeed saith, "Whoever knowingly chooses what he cannot enjoy, or what will occasion unnecessary trouble to himself or another, may be reckoned to have made an unwise election." This is very true in itself, because that which cannot be enjoyed, is not good to be chosen; and that which has evil conse-

consequences; which more than ballance the foregoing pleasure, is really evil, and this antecedently to the election of the Will. But though this be true in itself, it is not so upon our Author's supposition, which makes things to be good, not in *themselves*, but because they are *willed*; and when he comes afterwards to assign the causes of improper elections, he manifestly abandons his first position, and brings the matter back to the common way of solution.

SECT. III. Not approving these answers, I shall offer some considerations to remove the difficulty. I say therefore,

I. It is not true, that in every action a man performs he has *two goods* in view, the greatest of which, according to the present appearance, he chooses, and rejects the least. But oftentimes appetite and inclination lead towards a certain particular, and this the man makes choice of without further deliberation; whereas he ought to have compared it with other goods which are greater, and with which it might have been found inconsistent. This it was possible for him to have done, and by this means to have avoided the action. The inclination of the sensualist is to his bottle, and his bottle-companions; and these, without any further thought of the matter, he takes the first opportunity to enjoy, and comes off

with the loss of his senses; when had he duly considered the hazard he ran of depriving himself of far better and more lasting pleasures, he might have prevented this excess. You will be apt to interpose here, that he could not make a comparison of the pleasures of a debauch, with the advantages of sobriety, without thinking of both. He could not think of them but one of these two ways, either by their presenting themselves to his mind, without seeking for them, or by his willing to think of them; the former was not in his power, as every body must own; nor the latter, because he could not will to think of them, but he must have actually thought of them before. I answer, there may be a general reluctance of conscience not grounded in particular thoughts; and were this reluctance more heeded, it would quickly conduct a man into a more close and serious consideration of the matter. And even when a person makes not the least reflection upon the nature of the action, it may be his own fault that he does not. Sometimes, perhaps often in his life, he has had thoughts of God, and of another world, pressing into his mind; which thoughts had he entertained and pursued them as he might have done, would have raised his passions in respect of *moral* good and evil; and the passions once raised, are a mighty help to the memory. Did a man carry about
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with him an awful and habitual sense of God and Eternity, the thought would return upon every occasion and be a restraint from many actions, upon which, for want of this thought, he is not afraid to venture.

2. In actions where a comparison is made between two goods, the Will is not *necessarily* determined to the choice of that which appears be the greater. Either.

1. Because though it has the appearance of the greater good at present, yet my mind tells me, that a further examination of it might possibly discover the contrary; so that the Will is not forced upon it. Or,

2. Because the greater good is absent, and so does not kindle the desire to the same degree as the lesser, which is present, and which the man flatters himself will not interfere with the acquisition of the greater. In short, the inclination to a lesser good because present, and a presumptuous hope that it will not disappoint him of the greater; and at the same time the idea of the greater good, and a consciousness that if the matter were thoroughly searched into, the lesser might prove irreconcilable with the greater; do upon the whole leave the Will a power of declaring on either side; so that, in such instances, there is not what we can properly call an *ultimate dictate* of the Understanding, but rather two cotemporary views, which leave the Will in suspense.

3. Man is made up of *two* parts, an *animal* and a *rational*, each of which has its desires and propensions apart to itself. Those belonging to the former are generally the most vehement and importunate, and frequently prevail with the Will to act in defiance of Reason, which, at the very instant we close with an object, enters its protest against it, and warns us of the ill consequences that will probably attend the choice. I say *probably*; because a *certain* knowledge or persuasion, that misery will *unavoidably* follow that particular choice, seems to put it out of our power to make it. Nor do we thus *will evil as evil*; for though the Will be on the side of the lesser good, yet it is not considered as the lesser good, or for its own sake, but because of the strong and furious inclination which we experience in ourselves towards that good. This inclination is what, *pro hic & nunc*, we are not able to hinder, though it be in our power to refuse the gratification of it. This is much the same with Mr. Locke's *uneasiness*. A man finds himself uneasy in the absence of those sensual objects, to which by nature or habit he is passionately inclined; as there is likewise a great deal of uneasiness in crossing his desires; which is the reason that men are too often governed by lust and appetite, in opposition to the plain dictates of the mind. Yet though *uneasiness* does often influence the Will in its choice,

choice, it has not *always* the same effect; since if this were so, there would be no examples of *action* done counter to inclination; which on the contrary, is the case of every good man; that which puts the emphasis on his Virtue, being the opposition it meets with from his inclinations. And that this *uneasiness* does not always determine the Will, is a good argument, that when it does it is not *necessarily*. Upon the whole, we are capable of two sorts of pleasures, the pleasures of right acting, and the pleasures of indulging to the appetites and passions of the animal life: either of these pleasures are a sufficient motive to action, since the Will can determine itself in favour of either; that when they come in competition, the Will prefers the pleasures of indulged appetite and passion, to the pleasures of right acting, and the reward and happiness consequent upon it, is intirely owing to itself, *because it will*. To ask a good justifying reason for this wrong choice, is to ask what is impossible to be given. The *physical cause* of the wrong choice and action is the Will, the *motive* to it is the sensual pleasure or indulgence. It is our fault when we thus determine and choose wrong; it is a matter of daily experience and observation, that we can, and often do, determine otherwise; and see it done by others in great numbers, by all the wise and good.

SECT. IV. 3. We are called upon to reconcile the *divine Prescience* with *human Liberty*; to get clear of which difficulty, some have disowned one of these, some the other. Some have contended for God's *foreknowledge* of human actions; but at once to obviate all objections have said, that there is nothing of *contingency* in them. Others aver, that the *contingency* of human actions is essential to the *morality* of them; but at the same time judging it a contradiction, that any action should be *free* which God *certainly* foreknows, have therefore denied a *certain foreknowledge* of future *contingencies*. These, to me, seem both of them extremes, and do not untie but cut the knot. The truth lying in the middle between them, involves us in these two difficulties.

1. How the actions of mankind can be free, on supposition God foreknows them?

2. How is it possible God should foreknow them, supposing they are free?

1. How actions certainly foreknown by God can be free? Does not *divine Prescience* *necessitate* the existence of its object? My answer is, that the knowledge of things *future* differs not in this respect from the knowledge of things *past*, or *present*. For as things must be *past*, in order to their being known to be *past*, and *present* e're they can be known to be *present*, so they must be

be *future* before they can be foreknown as such. Things are not *future* because they are foreknown, but foreknown because *future*. Knowledge, which is an *immanent act*, can have no proper direct influence upon things *external* and *future*. And if we narrowly examine the nature of this objection against Liberty, we shall find it to be no way lessened in its force, by laying aside the supposition of any such thing as *Prescience*; as thus, the *action* I did the last minute, or that I shall do the next, was *future* from all eternity; and what was from eternity *future*, seems to be fixed and immutable in the train of events, and is really as much so as if foreknown. The same answer will serve both, that an action being in its nature *contingent*, the *futurity* and *foreknowledge* of it must be conformable to its nature. Knowledge must regard the *real* nature of things known: it has been proved, that human actions are *free*; they must therefore if *foreknown*, be *foreknown* as *free*; for to know an action to be what it is not, is a contradiction, it is not knowledge but mistake; because it is *future* and foreknown, it will be certainly, but not necessarily, because being *contingent*, it might not have been *future*, and consequently not foreknown. It is the free determination of the Will in time, that is the ground of its being future from eternity. The same answer

may be applied to a like way of reasoning quoted from *Chrysippus* by ^h *Cicero*, "that every axiom or proposition relating to the future is true or false; and that whatever is true must be certain; and that whatever is certain must be necessary, which will introduce *Necessity* and *Fate*." This, I say, is but a different representation of the same objection, and is to be answered after the same manner as that before. Let me, however, add, that if *foreknowledge* and *certainty*, in relation to *future* actions, really proved *Necessity*, we must give up *certainty* and *foreknowledge*; and if a *free* action be really impossible to be foreknown, it is no more a diminution of the divine *Omniscience* not to know what is *impossible* to be known, than of his *Omnipotence* not to work *contradictions*, which are in truth nothing, no objects of power.

2. Supposing the freedom of human actions, how can God *certainly foreknow* them? A satisfactory account of this is, I doubt, a thing to be despaired of. The theory seems to exceed the reach of human Understanding, "and therefore *Carneades* would say, that *Apollo* himself could not foretell things *future*, unless they were such whose *causes* were so contained in the nature of things, that it was necessary they should be;"

^h De Fato. §. 10.

ⁱ Ibid. §. 14.

" be; " and he, upon the same account,
 " denied that things *past*, of which there
 " were no signs or footsteps left, were known
 " to this fortune telling god. " Now though
 I can easily consent that *Apollo* should be ex-
 cluded from this super-eminent perfection
 of knowing and predicting future *contingen-*
cies, I must needs assert it as the glory of the
true God whose Understanding being infinite,
 is infinitely above our comprehension, and
 may have ways of knowing things wholly
 inconceivable by us.

SECT. V. I shall close this dissertation of
human Freedom with an observation, that the
 doctrine of *Fate* is commonly the refuge of
 the slothful and the vicious.— To be virtu-
 ous and wise requires no little pains; to save
 which, men have thought of a shorter way,
 and thrown all upon *Fate*; proceeding either
 from a *concatenation* of *causes*, or an *uncon-*
ditional decree of God; and while they swim
 down the lazy stream of ease and pleasure,
 would fain persuade themselves that they
 are carried along by the resistless torrent of
Necessity. The antient ^k *Philosophers* were
 therefore want to call this *αργος λογος* *the idle*
reason: because, if pursued, it would be-
 numb all the faculties, and introduce an
 absolute torpor and indolence into human
 life. But people are wiser than to have any
 regard

^k *Cicer. De Fato. §. 12.*

regard to this *reason* in their common affairs, and when the safety or interest of the body are visibly concerned; and have we not upon this sufficient ground to question them, why they do not plead *Fate* here as well as in other cases, and starve themselves, &c. out of *Necessity*, as well as suffer themselves to be the fools or knaves of *Fate*? *Chrysippus*'s distinction will not save them, of things *simple* and *copulate*, or *confatalia*. They make use of a Physician for their health, because one is as fatal as the other; and so they would have used the means leading to Virtue and Wisdom, if they had been fated to be wise and virtuous. This excuse of theirs is abundantly exposed, by only taking notice of the lucky *concurrence* of their *Fate* and their *Inclination*. Are they threatened with a mortal distemper? The Physician is immediately sent for, and all his prescriptions are submitted to, however nauseous and unacceptable. The health and peace of their minds are in equal danger; and the instruction of good Books, a habit of thinking and meditation, and the exercises of Virtue and Religion, much more infallible cures than any *Recipes* of the *Doctor*, and yet are neglected. Their liquor is poisoned, and they refrain drinking; the pleasures of sin kill as effectually, and more terribly, and yet they will not deny themselves. Their Reason is
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of considerable service to them in the concerns of a corruptible body, and a perishing life, but of none at all to make them mind a more important interest, and to direct them in the management of it. All this shows that their *Fate* is nothing else but their *sloth* and *sensuality*, their love of the body and the world; and that these men might be, if they would, what ^m *Tatian* says concerning the Christians, *ἐμπαρουνὸς ἀνθρώπων*, superior to their *Fate*.

^m Orat. ad Græcos. §. 4.

Consult on this Part of the Chapter, besides the Authors refered to under the second Part,

Cartesii Meditat. 4.

King De Origine Mali.

Lucas of Happiness. S. 2. C. 5.

Papers between *Clarke* and *Leibnitz*; and the Treatise subjoined to them.



CHAP.

C H A P. IV.



*Of the external Principles of human
Actions, God, Angels, and Men.*

SECT. I. **T**HE external principles of human actions, are *God Angels and Men.*

I. *God*, as the supreme and universal cause, has some interest and concern in all the actions of mankind; though wherein it consists, and how far it reaches, be not so well agreed. The causality of God is either *common* or *special*. The *common* or universal causality of God extends to *all* actions alike; the *special* is restrained to *some* certain kinds of actions.

I. The *common* causality of God is either *remote* or *proximate*. The *remote* causality of God consists in his creating, and continually preserving a substance, and its power of acting. *Durandus* and his followers are positive, that this is the only causality *universally* necessary. Perhaps there is no absolute need of supposing all this. For if by the *preservation* of a substance be meant, a kind of *continued* and *successive* creation, a

positive volition that it remain in being, in the absence whereof it would presently fall back into nothing, it is hard to conceive in what the necessity of this should be founded. If there be such a necessity, it must proceed from a supposed tendency of all created Beings to become nothing; which inclination in something to become nothing, is to me, I confess, equally difficult to apprehend, as an inclination in nothing to become something. And then if by preserving the power of action be intended an *express volition* to that purpose, without which this power would immediately cease, my Reason does not instruct me in any absolute necessity there is of this neither in *all* human actions. For instance, in the *illicit acts* of the Will, a power once communicated to a *simple uncompound* substance, as the soul of man is thought to be, must continue in that substance, any created thing notwithstanding, that may threaten its destruction. Nor can it be imagined there should be a natural tendency in it to cease; for whence should such a tendency arise? That there may be need of invigorating and regulating the intellectual powers of human nature, especially as according to the present^a laws of union, they are made dependent on a *compounded animal body*, I readily acknowledge; but withal add, that
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^a See *Baxter* of the Soul. Sect. II.

this is requisite to the soul merely as in union with a body, or to *vivid* and *good* actions only, not simply to *all* actions.

SECT. II. Besides this *remote* causality of God regulating all actions, he may be said to be the remote cause of human actions in another sense, as the *external motives* to action are all from him. Thus he is said to *harden* ^b *Pharaoh's heart*, because the hardness of his heart was the *effect* of those circumstances in which God had placed him, his sending the plagues upon him, and soon after removing them again. Not that it was the *necessary effect*, for then *Pharaoh* had been no way culpable; nor that God put him into those circumstances with a design that they should corrupt him. He knew they would be abused by him, but he did not *will* that abuse.

SECT. III. The *proximate* causality of God is his contributing to the *action* by an *immediate efficiency*, distinct from a bare conservation of the power. This is the causality generally espoused; but, if I may venture to speak my mind freely, is so far from *necessary*, as to intangle the asserters of it in a very manifest blunder. For if the power be preserved in its vigour, what can be imagined further needful to *action*? If a further addi-

^b See *Sherlock* on Providence, C. 6.

additional influence be necessary, it will not be an *active* power, much less a *natural power* of action, which is the name given to it. A *power* to *act*, and cloged with no manner of impediments, yet not able to exert itself, is really a *power* and no *power*, which is a plain contradiction. In behalf of this *proximate* causality an argument is squeezed from that well known maxim, *Modus operandi sequitur modum essendi*, "the manner of acting must be conformable to the manner of existing;" which if true, because the *substance* is immediately from God, must infer the *actions* to be so too. To this I need only say, that the maxim is in the general very true, that the substance being dependent upon God, all its *actions* must of consequence be dependent. But if any one will take this maxim to conclude, that the *manner* of dependence is altogether the same, I make no scruple to deny it. The Being has God for its immediate cause, for this very good reason, that there is no *middle* cause to produce it; whereas no such reason will hold for the *actions* being the immediate effect of the first cause, but the direct contrary, another cause being here pre-existent and presupposed; namely a power of action planted in the substance by God himself,

SECT. IV. The title whereby this *proximate* causality, nay and the *remote* too, is known in the *Schools*, is God's *concurrence* or *co-operation* with his creatures; but you may be easily made sensible, that it is not properly so called, being distinguished into *simultaneous* and *antecedent*, the latter of which can by no means submit to be so termed. God's *simultaneous* causality is his influencing the action in company with the creature, without influencing the creature itself. This influence, as commonly explained, is in itself loose and indifferent, and determined to particular actions by the *second* cause. That God concurs after this manner to the actions of his creatures, was once a pretty general opinion, the patrons of which were not inconsiderable. Of this party I could never make one, were it for nothing else but that I find it impossible so far to abstract the action from the agent, as to conceive, that the one may be influenced without affecting the other. As well may I contribute to the motion of a body, without any way operating upon that body. There can be no action supposed, where there is not some agent; and for the same reason, no one can be the cause of the action, but either by being the agent himself, or by influencing the Being who is so. An action supposed to proceed from a cause that produces

duces it *not*, either *immediately* by effecting the action, or *mediately* by operating on the agent, may with every jot as good sense be supposed to exist without any cause at all. This reasoning seems to be much the same with that of *Durandus*, and if so, I cannot forbear thinking that *Durandus* is wrongly criticised by Mr. *Howe*, whose words are, “*Durandus* flatly in several places denies “ God’s immediate concurrence to the actions of his creatures, and this universally, “ and upon such a ground, as where upon “ the denial must equally extend to good “ as bad, *viz.* that it is impossible the same “ numerical action should be from two, or “ more agents, *immediately* and *perfectly*, “ excepting the same numerical virtue “ should be in each. But he saith, *the “ same numerical* virtue cannot be in God, “ and in the creature.”

SECT. V. God’s *antecedent* or previous causality in reference to human actions is his determining the Will to action, by a positive, immediate, and irresistible influx. It is called *physical premotion* or *predetermination*, in distinction from that which is *moral*, and influences the Will by an address or application to the Understanding. This notion is thought to have been first started by *Tho-*

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† Postscript to a Letter about the Reconcilableness of God’s Prescience with his Wisdom and Sincerity. Vol. 2. p. 528.

mas Aquinas a Schoolman; but says Mr. ^d *Howe*, he and *Scotus* held *immediate* concurrence not *determinate*; for which he appeals to a quotation out of each. But leaving that matter, as of no great importance to be decided, it is certain, that whoever was the author of this ill-favoured opinion, he has had too many followers, as well among the *Protestants* as among the *Romanists*. For having been entertained by certain *Dominicans*, who were apprehended in some things to approach nearer to us, than others of the *Roman Church*, it came to receive countenance from some Divines of our own, of considerable note for piety and learning; whose name and authority cannot but be expected to have much influence on the minds of men. This remark comes from the ingenious Author mentioned above, and is worthy of him. *Physical premotion* labours under the following difficulties.

I. It is perfectly opposite to the nature of man as a *rational agent*. For observe, this determination is, in the words of those who defend it, *physical* and *immediate*; whereas should we allow of an uncontrollable determination, it ought to be by the *mediation* of *Reason*, or by such an overpowering evidence in the mind, that the Will should
not

^d Postscript to a Letter &c. Vol. 2. p. 528.

not be able to resist it. But here the Will is immediately over-ruled; and though a dictate of the Understanding is pretended to go before every volition, yet in truth that is not the *real* inducement to the volition which follows. The best account that can be given of the matter is this, we will a thing because we cannot but will it; and we cannot but will it, not because it is the greater appearing good, but because we are made to will it by an almighty power, which to us is the same as a blind Necessity. If the views of our mind are a reason of any thing, they are only the reason why *God* determines the Will, not the immediate reason of *our* willing.

SECT. VI. 2. *Physical predetermination* is needless, contrary to what is affirmed, of its being absolutely necessary to action. That it is needless can be no longer a doubt, after it is made appear, that a person not only *may* act, but *cannot forbear* acting, though under no predetermining influx. This I prove after the following manner. Whatever Being thinks and reasons cannot but have a power of willing, and this power in certain cases cannot but exert itself. As supposing a thinking Being to have a prospect of the greatest pleasures imaginable, and these pleasures within its reach, if it will but desire and pursue them, can it

otherwise than desire them? Conceive we the same Being to lie under the most violent and excessive pains, is it possible it should not desire ease? Is a particular and irresistible influx from God necessary to raise such a desire? Can a thinking Being remain *indifferent* to its *own happiness or misery*? So it seems it may, if predetermination be necessary; but the thing is in its own nature impossible, therefore *predetermination* is needless.

3. *Physical predetermination* will not consist with human Liberty. E'er such an alliance can be brought about, Liberty and Necessity must be compatible; since it is plain, that an irresistible premotion infers the strongest Necessity. In consequence of this particular,

SECT. VII. 4. It makes God the *Author of sin*. For taking away human freedom, a man ceases to be accountable for any thing he does; and his actions ought not to be imputed to him, but to the Being that lays him under a *necessity* of so acting. An inspired * Writer hath told us, *that God is not tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man*. But if this hypothesis was true, he would more than *tempt* men, he would *compel* them to sin. One would think this to be demonstration; but the *predeterminants*
do

do not want an evasion. They tell us we ought to distinguish between an *action* and the *form* of it, its *physical* goodness and its *moral* evil. The matter or physical goodness of the action is from *God*; the form or moral evil, which is its disconformity to the divine Law, being a mere privation, is the *creature's*. I might answer, that upon the principle of *predetermination*, there can be no disconformity of an action to the Law, for as much as the Law is a measure of action to none, but those who are capable of observing it. But only mentioning this, I say, that whatever disconformity there be in the action to the rule, the proper efficient *cause* of that action is likewise the *cause* of the *disconformity*; for this very obvious reason, that the disconformity has an inseparable connection with the action; and no one can be the author of any relation, unless by giving being to that on which the relation is founded; which foundation supposed, there is nothing further necessary to produce the relation. He who paints two objects black or white, or one of them black and the other white, is the true, the only author of the agreement or disagreement in colour, which is found between them. If therefore the creature be the cause of the disconformity, it must be the cause of the action; but it is not the cause of the action, either *immediately* or *remotely*. Not *immediately* so,

because God is affirmed to be the total cause of it, which certainly must exclude all causality of the creature. We are told indeed that God and the creature are both total causes; the meaning of which is, either that they are both *total efficient* causes, or that God only is the *total efficient* cause, and the creature the *total instrumental* cause. If this latter be the meaning, it will do the hypothesis no service, for an instrumental cause is properly no cause at all; to be sure is not in the least answerable for the action. If two total efficient causes be intended, nothing can be more absurd; for that there should be two total efficient causes to one and the same action is a downright impossibility. If you intirely produce an effect, and I intirely produce an effect also, the same moment, who does not perceive that they must unavoidably be *two* different effects? This to me is as self-evident, as that *one* and *one* make *two*. Or were it possible that there should be two such causes, yet one of them must be needless, either of them alone if total must be sufficient; and consequently, the creature being a total cause of its acting, would be able to act though not predetermined, which must not be allowed of neither.

SECT. VIII. To proceed, the *creature* is not the *remote* cause of its action, before it
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can be so accounted it must be the cause of something, that is the condition or motive on which God predetermines the action. Now this condition is either the Will's disposing itself to the action, as *Bellarmino* supposes, or the corruption of nature. The Will's determining itself, as the *Cardinal* expresses it, is no other than suffering itself to be moved and wrought upon by an object, proposed to it by the Understanding. By which I cannot conceive what he should mean, but an inclination to that object short of an express volition. But if this inclination begin the *first* moment of the object's appearance, a person cannot prevent it, and therefore is not the cause of it, and therefore not the cause neither of the predetermination to the subsequent volition. If it be occasioned by the *continued* contemplation of the object, then indeed a man is in some sense the cause of it, in regard this contemplation is the effect of volition. But then it is natural to demand, what was the cause of this volition? It must be said a predetermining influx. Well—But what was the motive to that influx? It ought not to be answered, the Will's disposing itself to it, because at this rate there will be a necessity of running up the account *in infinitum*. A *corruption* of nature, or a depraved inclination to wicked actions, is therefore the only thing remaining that can be supposed to be the

motive to God's predetermining a bad action; but no man is the cause of this neither, All corruption is *contracted* or *natural*. *Contracted* corruption is the result of repeated actions; and consequently a person is no otherwise the author of this corruption, than as he is the author of the actions from which it flows. But he is not the *immediate* author of these actions, because not in truth the immediate author, according to this scheme, of any action at all, as has been already shown. If therefore he be at all the author of them, it can be only in a *remote* sense, by being the cause of some vicious inclinations, which were prior to them, and therefore natural; with which natural inclinations a man cannot be chargeable, unless guilty of that *first* sin, whereof they are the sad consequences. Now granting the action of eating the forbidden fruit to have been as much *his*, as it was *Adam's*, it will not therefore follow that it was *his*, because rightly considered it will appear not to have been *Adam's*. *Adam* could not act without being predetermined, any more than his posterity; their Will, at least to that which is bad, must have as much power as his. And why was *Adam* predetermined? No recourse can be had here to an antecedent corruption; *Adam* therefore was not guilty of the *first* sin; and if *Adam* was not, much less are *we*; and not being guilty of the *first* sin,

sin, we are not accountable for the corruption which is brought into human nature, nor the cause of God's predetermining us to action on the account of this corruption. The issue this drives us upon is, that *God* is the *only cause* of all the disconformity between human actions and his own Law. The Law is from God as its Author, so likewise is the action, and both the terms proceeding from him, the contrariety between them must be his too. Predetermination therefore, in spite of this pitiful evasion, makes *God the Author of sin*; a worse thing than which I defy any man to say of the *Devil* himself. I might further observe, that predetermination opposes the *moral* perfections of God, his *Sincerity*, his *Holiness*, his *Justice*, and *Goodness*; but these things are too plain to need insisting on. So much then for the *common* or *universal causality* of God, it does not imply a *physical predetermination*, nor any such *general* influence as is directed to particular actions by the creature; it signifies no more than God's creating and maintaining a Being, and its powers of action, and ordaining the objects and circumstances which are the *occasional* causes of action.

SECT. IX. 2, God's *special* causality is restrained to some certain actions; as for instance, to all *good* and *virtuous* actions, and

and to all such other actions as are requisite in the nature of *means*, for the accomplishing some design of Providence; which actions nevertheless would be neglected, did not God interpose with a more than common causality. As for actions *morally good*, the light of nature will inform us, that we are to ascribe them to God, as their prime original. It was a chief principle of the *Socratic Morality*, as we learn from [†] *Plato*, “that Virtue is the gift of God,” *ἡ ἀρετὴ θεοῦ δίδωται*. Nay *Seneca*, who according to the manner of his *Sect* was used to talk so extravagantly, does in some places, which I have before cited, deliver sentiments not unworthy the humility of a *Christian*. His saying, *Nulla sine Deo mens bona*, “No mind is good without the help of God,” is an instance of this, and is much the same with that of *Cicero*, *Nunquam vir magnus sine afflatu divino*, “There was never a man became truly great without divine aid.” The Heathens understood this maxim not only of actions *morally good*, but of all other actions and performances of an *extraordinary* character, as the inventions and works of *Poets*, *Lawgivers*, *Musicians*, and the like; as you may see particularly in *Plutarch’s* Life of *Numa*. Perhaps the notion taken in this latitude is not without its foundation in Reason;

[†] See *Maxim. Tyrii* Dissert. 32. Εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ ἀνθρώπου ἀνεξαρτήτως.

Reason ; without all question it is not when limited to good actions. To these a more particular influence is required ; nor is it improbable, arguing only from the reason of the thing, that God is always ready to communicate this assistance upon the humble application of his creatures to him ; though in what *measure* it shall be vouchsafed, and whether it be ever *irresistible*, is a controversy that falls not within my province to determine.

SECT. X. II. For what relates to the agency of *Angels* whether *good* or *bad*, I shall not anticipate myself in what I have to say concerning this head in *Pneumatology*, where it falls in more naturally. I shall only in general take notice, that their agency is of a *moral* nature by the consent of all sides. They can offer no violence to the Will ; nay, they cannot so much as approach the Will, but by the Understanding ; nor the Understanding but by the mechanism of the Body.

SECT. XI. III. *Men* are either *deficient* or *efficient* causes of each others actions.

i. *Deficient* causes. The propriety of this term I am not solicitous about, so it convey my meaning intelligibly. This happens as often the faulty negligence of one man,

man, or his omitting to do what he ought to have done, is either *really*, or *imputatively*, the occasion of some good omitted, or some evil done by another. *In debitis causa deficiens efficit moraliter*. Thus we are never wanting to instruct, admonish, reprove, dissuade, or encourage others, according to the duty of the relation wherein we stand to them; but we may be reckoned to have contributed by way of *defect* to that corruption of manners which it was our concern to have prevented. *Qui non vetat peccare, cum possit, jubet*, says ^e Seneca. "He who does not restrain another from offending, who is under his authority, in effect commands him to offend." To the same purpose the ^h Civil Law. *Qui prohibere potuit, teneatur, si non fecerit*.

2. Men are *efficient* causes, when by some *act* of theirs they influence the actions of other men; and that either by *disposing*, or *impelling* them. The first by *Education*, *Institution*, *Discipline* and *Example*; the second by *Suasion* or *Dissuasion*, by *Command* or *Prohibition*, by *Advice* or *Reproof*, and the like. For the explanation of these terms I remit you to *Curcellæus's* Compend. Eth. p. 16 & 17. Here the following *Maxims* will not perhaps be without use,

SECT,

^e Troad. l. 289.

^h Digest. L. 9. Tit. 2. ad Leg. Aquil. leg. 45.

SECT. XII. I. Strictly speaking every man is the *sole efficient* cause of his own actions. The *cause* of an action, and the *agent* or doer of it, are *synonymous* terms. Others may supply the *motives* or *grounds* of the action, they may promise, or threaten, or ensnare, &c. but this is all they can do; for the proper and immediate cause of the action rests with the agent, and with no one else.

2. According to the exactness of language, the *same individual* action cannot belong to more than *one* man; or if you will, to every single action there can be but one agent. This is as evident, as that the motion of several distinct bodies cannot be numerically the same. Their conspiring to produce one common effect does not confound their distinctness, so as to make the motion of one the motion of the rest. In like manner, when a number of assassins join in the murder of a person, that person's death is but one effect; but the respective shares of the assassins in compassing it, make so many distinct actions, compleat in themselves, though not as to the effect produced by them in conjunction.

3. The *virtue* or *guilt* of the same numerical action is incommunicable. This is built upon the former Proposition; for the virtue or guilt, the good or evil, is but an
adjunct

adjunct of the action, and *accidentia non possunt migrare a subjecto*, "the individual quality of one action or substance cannot be the individual quality of another," is an *axiom* that needs not the stamp of the *Schools* to make it pass unquestioned. The same crookedness cannot be transferred from one stick to another; the same individual velocity or obliquity cannot be attached successively to motions *numerically* different.

SECT. XIII. 4. When therefore one man's action, whether good or bad, is imputed to another, it is only in a *less proper* sense; for in the eye of the Law no man is answerable for any more than his own actions; for these it is he is rewarded or punished. His actions indeed may have some communion with, or influence upon those of another, and the good or evil of them may be heightened by this relation, which is all that is meant in Morality by the imputation of another's actions. They are imputed to me so as to enhance the good or evil, the reward or punishment, of my own, which concurred to the being of his. In this sense we are accountable for other mens actions, not only when we are the *efficient* cause of them, but *deficient* also. As to our own actions, we are accountable for all those, and only those, whose existence or non-existence has been in our power. And on the contrary,

contrary, that which depends not upon a person, either *immediately*, or in its *cause*, cannot, as *Puffendorf* truly observes, be imputed to him in virtue of any obligation. But as to another's evil actions they shall be imputed to us, or we shall be reckoned the *deficient* causes of them, in case we omit what it is our duty to do to prevent them; even supposing all that we can do would in the event prove ineffectual.

5. In all inquiries concerning the *principal* in an action, or the person to whom the chief part of the praise or blame of it belongs, the question is not really about a single action, but two or more; between which a comparison is made, in order to know the moral quantity of each. For instance, a Servant robs or kills by the command of his Master; to be able to determine who is the *principal* in the crime, we compare the action of the Master and of the Servant together. The Master commanded, the Servant executed that command; and if upon a comparison of these two, it appears more criminal in a superior to command an ill action, than in the inferior to obey such an illegal command, we have nothing remaining but to decide against the Master. In cases where several are involved in the guilt, and their fault is *equal*, all are *principals*, and none accessaries.

Consult

¹ De Jure N. & G. L. 1. C. 5. § 4.

Consult further on this Chapter,

Le Blanc's Theses.

*Howe of the Reconcilableness of God's
Prescience with his Wisdom and Sin-
cerity.*

Sherlock on Providence. C. 2.

Claggett's Sermons. V. 1. Ser. 2. Joh. 12. 37.

Croufaz's Logick. P. 1. §. 2. C. 6. §. 15.





C H A P. V.

Of the Ends of human Actions.

SECT. I. **I** Proceed now to consider the ends of human actions. These in a larger sense may be called *principles*; nor indeed is it unusual for them to pass by that name, as in the question so often asked, What the principles are upon which a man acts? But since they are known by another name, which is more proper and distinguishing, I choose to assign them a separate place. This term is variously distinguished.

I. There is the end of the *action*, and the end of the *agent*. The end of the action, is the event and consequence of that action, whatever it be. The end of the agent is what he proposed to himself in acting. Common to both these is the distinction into *proper* and *accidental*. The *proper* end is that to which the *action* has a natural tendency, or which was expressly in the intention of the agent. An *accidental* end is an event happening contrary to the *nature* of the action, or the *design* of the agent.

2. An *end* is *principal* or *subordinate*. The *principal* end is that by which the agent is chiefly swayed; the *subordinate* that which is governed or overruled by the other. The order of each end is to be fixed according to its *dignity*. It is contrary to Reason that a less noble end should give laws to one of greater importance. Reason is nothing but order, and as often as we neglect that method which Reason has established, we invert nature, and quit judgement to follow fancy and inclination.

3. There is a *necessary* and an *arbitrary* end. The first relates to good or happiness in the general, which we cannot avoid intending; the other to particular goods, in the choice of which we are more at liberty. Or we may understand this distinction in a *moral* sense, and a *necessary* end is that which is *necessary* to render the action conformable to Reason; an *arbitrary*, such an end concerning the *morality* of which our Reason dictates nothing.

4. There is a *good* and a *bad* end, and an end that is neither one nor the other, but *indifferent*. This distinction is too plain to need any more than mentioning. ^a Dr. Taylor quotes this Proverb from the *Arabians*, "that a *good end* is the soul of every action."

SECT.

^a Doctor Debitantium. P. 4. C. 2. Rule 1.

SECT. II. 5. An end is *temporal* or *spiritual*. The first having reference to the welfare of the body, and the enjoynments of the present life; the other to things more immediately adapted to our intellectual nature. I should not have taken notice of this distinction, but upon account of a question which some have started, *viz.* Whether in actions of a *moral* nature it be lawful to propose *temporal* ends? I must confess that it is no question with me, who am persuaded, that the end of the action, (I mean it not of an *accidental* but *proper* end) may justifiably become the end of the agent. Nay, I know no better rule for the agent to proceed by in settling his end, than to determine his end by the end of the action. For what are the ends of actions, but their genuine fruits and consequences, those which their own nature hath fitted, and the Author of nature designed them to produce. In pursuing these therefore we only follow the intention of God and nature. It is certain that Virtue, in a well regulated course of things, is the best and only infallible way to promote our temporal welfare; for this reason it can be no crime to have an eye to our temporal welfare in the practice of Religion and Virtue. All that we are to be careful about is, that we make this but our *subordinate* end, placing it below those which are *spiritual*,

and as much below them in our esteem, as it is beneath them in real worth and excellency. In doing this we only observe the rule before laid down, of conforming our intentions to the ends for which actions themselves were ordained. The *principal* end of Virtue and Religion is a good of a higher order, than falls within the compass of sense and time; which, according to the natural subordination of things, leads us to propose this higher good in the first place. Which of these ends is *predominant* may be often easily known, since every one who abandons Virtue when it lies cross to temporal ends, or puts even Vice in the room of it, if that will better serve a present interest, may be sure he is not influenced by right views. As he likewise may be convinced, the higher end does not weigh with him as much as it ought, who, though he forsakes not the cause of Virtue, yet grows cold in it, if he be not kept in heart by temporal prosperity and success.

SECT. III. 6. There is the *ultimate* and the *intermediate* end. The *ultimate* is that which terminates the view of the agent. An *intermediate* partakes of the nature both of a *means* and an *end*. In reference to something which went before, and had a tendency to promote it, it is an end; as it refers to something beyond, to which it is sub-

subservient, it is in the quality of a *means*. Under this head it may be expected I should speak something in answer to that *grand inquiry*, What is the *chief* and *ultimate end* of man? The difference between this, and the question concerning the *Summum Bonum*, is apparent. The question there was, What among the variety of objects pursued by mankind makes their *chief felicity*? Here that question is supposed to be resolved and another founded upon it succeeds, What is the *chief and ultimate end* of man, his *own happiness*, or the *glory of God*? Before I return a direct answer to this question, I think it necessary to distinguish between a *chief* or *supream*, and an *ultimate* end. I know nothing is more common than to confound these two, though there be evidently a distinction between them. The *ultimate* end is that to which all others are referred; the *chief* that which, supposing a *competition* between them, a man would prefer to the rest. It is possible there may be several ends, which are nothing akin to one another, and so have no subserviency one to another, on which account neither of them can be said to be *ultimate* with regard to the rest; and yet one may be the *chief* end, namely, that which we pursue with the greatest ardor, and for the sake of which we should relinquish the other, in case they should interfere with it.

SECT. IV. This premised, I must make *two* questions of *one*. 1. What is man's *chief end*, the glory of God, or his own happiness? I answer, *both* in different respects.

1. *Absolutely* speaking man's *own happiness* is his *chief end*; for should any end overthrow this he would unavoidably reject it, and abide by this. Thus were it supposeable that the *divine glory* could not be built but upon my *eternal ruin*, it were naturally impossible I should choose that glory for my *chief end*; because no Being whatever can prefer its own misery. And notwithstanding the high, not to say extravagant strain, in which some have talked, as if they could gladly submit to be *damned* for the glory of God, if by *damned* they mean *perpetually miserable*, I will be bold to say that this is a perfect contradiction. For how is *perfect misery* consistent with that mighty *satisfaction*, which they pretend to take in the divine glory? Or the *love* of God, which makes them content to be *damned* for his sake, with that *hatred* of God which is a necessary part of damnation?

2. The glory of God is *suo genere*, in its kind, man's *chief end*; that is, it is the *supream* of those ends which depend upon his choice. As for *happiness*, it is what a
think-

thinking Being cannot but passionately pursue, never intermitting the degree of his motion; and therefore not to be reckoned in the number of those ends, which it is our duty to propose; since nothing is properly a matter of duty, which is not some way or other in our power. Now when we are speaking of man's chief end, the meaning is not, what is *necessarily*, and therefore actually his chief end, but what *ought* to be so. No one saith, that man *ought* to desire happiness; the reason is, that this desire is natural and uncontrollable, and therefore in general not subject to law. The sense of the whole is, in strictness of speech man does not *make* happiness his end, but is rather *carried* towards it by an impetus of nature. In his desire of happiness he is not a free, but a necessary agent; even as necessary as he is in the appetites of hunger and thirst. Consequently, if *next* to his own happiness a person may and ought to aim at the glory of God, the glory of God may well be termed his *chief* end.

SECT. V. 2. If it be inquired, What is man's *ultimate* or last end? I readily answer, the *divine glory*; for to this ought we principally to direct all our actions, at the same time that we are obliged, neither by duty, nor by a necessity of nature, chiefly to design our own happiness in them. For in-

stance, in loving my neighbour as myself, I love him with a love of benevolence, and therefore with an affection as to myself *pure* and *disinterested*. I do not, I ought not, to wish his happiness principally as a means to my own Pleasure, I acknowledge, is the companion of all our volitions, such especially as are rational and generous; but let it be noted, that this pleasure is the *concomitant*, not the *principle* or *end* of our volitions. Consequently, if besides this instantaneous pleasure I have no other in view, and it is very possible I may not, I do not refer the thing desired to my own advantage. Did the satisfaction that goes with a generous inclination make it selfish and mercenary, the most *charitable* persons would be some of the most *selfish*, because they feel the most sensible satisfaction in the kind wishes they bestow upon others. Nay, God himself, whose goodness is the spring of infinite delight, would be a narrow, not a diffusive and beneficent Being. It is not impossible then to wish well to another from a principle of unmixed kindness, making his happiness our end, unconnected with our own; to be sure without permitting our own to fill up the larger part of the prospect. But the *principal* end we look at, through all others, ought to be the glory of God. In loving our neighbour as ourselves, we should have a greater regard to the divine glory arising from

from our obedience, and our neighbour's welfare, than we have to *him*; greater there can be no question than we have to *ourselves*.

To conclude. In relation to the desire of our own happiness, we ought to cherish it from a view of persuasion, that the glory of God never reflects so brightly, as from the happiness of the creatures whom he hath made so. So that, upon the whole, the *divine glory* appears to be the *ultimate* end of human actions.

Books proper to be consulted on the subject of the Chapter are,

Curcellæi Comp. Eth p. 16, 17.

Whitbii Eth. P. 1. C. 3. § 10—14.

Croufæz's Logick. P. 1. §. 2; C. 6. §. 10—14.

Hutcheson's Inquiry of Beauty and Virtue. Treat. 2. §. 1, 2.

Taylor's Duct. Dub. P. 4. C. 2. Rule 1 & 2.

Tillotson's Sermons on the Glory of God, and on God the First Cause and Last End.

Sharp's Sermon on 1 Cor. 10. 31.



CHAP. VI.

Of the several Kinds of human Actions, and particularly of good, evil, and indifferent Actions.

SECT. I. **T**HE next thing to be treated of are the several *species* or *distinctions* of human actions. Some, says ^a *Curcellæus*, are *spontaneous*, others *involuntary*, a third sort of a *mixed* nature, participating of the other two. But observe. 1. The contradiction of making *involuntary* a species of moral actions. A human or moral action is an action done by a person considered as a *rational* and *free* agent, i. e. an action properly imputable. Now of these actions that are *moral* and *imputable*, some are *involuntary*, or which is the the same, *not imputable*. 2. Observe the impropriety of placing *spontaneous* or *voluntary* among the kinds of human actions, when it is acknowledged, that *all* human actions are *voluntary*. Upon this account you must be sensible, that the distinction of actions into *voluntary*, *involuntary*,

^a *Compnd. Eth. p. 20.*

tary and mixed, was not without reason handled in another place, nor without design. To proceed therefore.

SECT. II. 1. Actions are distinguished into *deliberate* and *indeliberate*. A *deliberate* action is, an action done by one, who had time and liberty to weigh its nature and consequences, who *premeditated* it, and came to it with some kind of preparation. The contrary to this makes an action *indeliberate*. Deliberation turns upon the *quality* of an action, whether it be good or bad; upon the *execution*, whether it shall be done or forborn; and the *circumstances*, relating to the manner, and time, and objects of it. Here it may be useful to observe these rules,

1. If the action need examination, and there be leisure for it, he is guilty of a criminal *rashness*, who ventures on it without due *deliberation* and *inquiry*, even though in itself it should be a *good* action. The action is *right*, but not being done with knowledge, is not *done rightly*.^b Cicero's advice will here take place, *Nē incognita pro cognitīs habeamus*, &c. "That we should never determine about subjects we do not well understand, as if we thoroughly understood them, and thus give our assent rashly

^b De Officiis. L. 1. §. 6. See also §. 21.

“ rashly ; which fault he who desires to
 “ avoid, (and we ought all to desire to avoid
 “ it) will allow proper time and diligence
 “ for examining whatever comes before
 “ him.”

2. Though it does not justify an ill action that it was done *indeliberately*, as upon a *surprize*, or through the *violence* of *passion*, yet it may be allowed to *extenuate* it. The *Antients* therefore made a great difference between a fault committed *δια πάθος* through *passion*, and *ἐκ προνοίας* with *deliberation*; as well they might, because in the latter the *intention* is *complete*, in the former *imperfect*. When the evil or hurt of an action is casual it is then *Ἀτυχία* no more than an *infelicity*, or *misfortune*; when it was done *μὴ Παραλογως, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐκ Κανίας*, not contrary to what the agent might reasonably expect would be the consequence, yet without *malice*, and proceeded from *carelessness* and *inadvertency*, it is *Ἀμαρτία* an *error* or *fault*; when it is done *knowingly* but not *deliberately*, from a sudden emotion of the spirits, nor a depraved disposition of the Will, it is *Ἀδίκημα* an *unjust action*; but when it is *deliberate*, and out of *choice*, *ἐκ προαίρετος*, not only the *action* is an instance of *injustice*, but the *person* himself *Ἀδίκος* an *unjust man*.

SECT.

Arist. Eth ad Nicom. L. 5. C. 8.

SECT. III. 3. In actions *apparently* good or evil, to *deliberate* whether we shall do the one, or forbear the other, is a very great fault, and generally the indication of a bad temper of mind. Whether a man shall do his duty or no, maintain or renounce his integrity, ought never to fall under deliberation. Hear the Roman *Moralist*. *Quamobrem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio, &c.* "They are to be intirely
 " rejected, as absolutely impious and wick-
 " ed, who deliberate whether they shall
 " follow what they know to be honest, or
 " knowingly pollute themselves with wick-
 " edness; for the being in suspense in such
 " a case, is being guilty of a crime, though
 " they proceed no further. Those things
 " therefore are not subjects of deliberation,
 " to hesitate about which it is criminal."
Herodotus in his sixth Book has a story to this purpose worth relating, of one *Glaucus* a *Lacedæmonian*, who consulting the Oracle, whether he might not perjure himself, in order to obtain somewhat of considerable value, that had been entrusted with him, was by the *Pythia* threatned with the destruction of his whole family; and when he begged pardon for this offence was told, that his tempting *Apollo* was the same as if he
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^d *Cic. De Offic. L. 3. §. 8.*

had done the crime. * *Juvenal* relates the same story with great spirit. To the same effect † *Mucianus* tells *Vespasian*, when deliberating whether he should submit to *Vitellius* as Emperor, or set up for himself, *Qui deliberant, desciverunt*, "they who deliberate, have begun to rebel."

4. In good actions it may be sometimes necessary to *deliberate* about the *circumstances* of doing them; not whether we shall do them at all, but whether this way or that ought to be chosen, this time or that, this object or another. † *Cicero* having given instructions for the conduct of our liberality, concludes, *Hæc igitur, & talia, circumspicienda sunt in omni officio &c.* "These and the like circumstances are to be taken into the account, in the practice of every Virtue, and we must exercise ourselves in observations of this kind, that we may compute with readiness and exactness in *Morals*; and by making proper allowances and deductions, see what the sum of duty is, upon the whole, owing to every one."

SECT. IV. II. Actions are *internal* or *external*; *internal*, such as are transacted in the *mind*, and pass no further, of which kind are the thoughts and desires of the soul;

* Spartano cuidam respondit Pythia vates, &c. *Stat.* 13.

† De Offic. L. 1. §. 18.

soul; *external*, such as are performed by the instrumentality of the *body*, as speaking, writing, and the like. Somewhat akin to this is the distinction of the *Schools* into *immanent* and *transient*, with this difference however, that in a strict sense an *internal* action is yet transient, if it carry in it an inclination or endeavour to break forth into *act*; and thus all our volitions, which for want of opportunity cannot display themselves in outward acts, are no other than transient actions of the soul.

III. There are *elicit* and *imperate* actions. An *elicit* action flows from the power *immediately*, *non imperante alia facultate*, without the interposition of any other faculty. An *imperate* on the contrary is the effect of a command from some superior faculty. Note, no human actions are *elicit* besides those of the Will; the operations of the Understanding itself are *imperate*, as far forth as they are *human* actions. In *simple* apprehensions, as likewise in the perception of *self-evident* Propositions, it is not subject to the Will, neither in these is a man a free agent. The actions under the command of the Will, and those only, are free, and being under command are *imperate* not *elicit*.

SECT. V. IV. Actions are *good*, *evil*, or *indifferent*. A *good* action is an action *morally necessary* to be done; that is, which a
man

man cannot but do, if he will act agreeably to Reason and duty. An *evil* action is an action *morally necessary* to be forborn; or which a man cannot do without opposing his Reason, and violating his duty. An *indifferent* action leaves a person at liberty to do or forbear it. The *goodness* of an action is either *material* or *formal*. An action for the *matter* of it good is such *naturally* or *adventitiously*. An action *naturally* good obliges the agent antecedently to the consideration of any Law. Of this sort are all natural duties, which, without supposing them enforced by the Will of a supream Lawgiver, every man's own Reason would urge him to perform. The goodness of an action is *adventitious*, when though in its own nature it is *indifferent*, yet being *commanded* it becomes necessary. Actions of this latter sort are good because commanded; of the former are therefore commanded because good. The *formal* goodness of an action is that which added to an action *materially* good renders it compleat in its kind, or such as the Law requires it should be. This *formal* goodness results from a right disposition of mind, and right views, from a love of order, an express or virtual regard to the Law as the measure of human actions, and to the glory of their Creator as their end. I say a *virtual* regard, because it is not absolutely necessary to a good action, that we have

have actual explicit thoughts of the Law enjoining it. It is enough that a person knows the action to be commanded, and that this knowledge is the remote cause of the action, by having been the cause of the prevailing inclination to such sorts of actions, which inclination is their immediate spring or original.

SECT. VI. It is not expected that in every good action the agent have the glory of God directly in his view; all required is, that he be habitually governed by a desire of pleasing and glorifying this most excellent of Beings, and that this desire is the *remote* cause of those actions, which he judges to have a tendency to promote this great end of life. In the *ordinary* course of a man's actions this is all that is needful; in actions of a *religious* nature the glory of God should be more *expresly* designed. It is also highly proper, that at other times we should contemplate the *Author* and *End* of our Beings, in order to revive and increase the influence of our last end, and to prevent our deviation from it. In short then, a *morally* good action may be defined, an action conformable to the Law, which it cannot be, if not possessed of a *formal* as well as a *material* goodness.

It is worth observation, that of some actions the *material* and *formal* goodness are

inseparable. Such are the sincere love of God, reverence of his authority, and zeal for his honour; and these are the actions which mingling with others constitute their *formal* goodness.

SECT. VII. An action *morally* evil is characterized from its *contrariety* to the Law, which is broken when either the *matter* or *form* of the action is evil. The reason is, that the Law equally forbids both. Hence is that well known maxim, *Bonum ex causa integra; Malum ex quolibet defectu*; "A defect in any part makes an action evil; but it must be in every part conformable to the Law to be good." Which we are to understand not of a *gradual*, but *specific* defect. A *gradual* defect is found in actions which have *all* the parts the Law requires, but not in that *perfection* which the Law *rigorously* interpreted demands; and such a defect as this cleaves to the very best actions of the best men. A *specific* defect is a defect in some *essential* part, as in the *matter* or the *form*; and any such defect gives an action the denomination of *evil*; not a *mere* defect neither, but *mixing* with the action something *positively* evil. The reason of this restriction you will see towards the close of this Chapter. It is not the *matter* of an action, though *good*, that can sanctify it, the *form* of it being *evil*;
nor

nor can the *form* of it, though *seemingly good*, refine and sublimate the action, when the *matter* of it is *evil*, and might have been *known* to be such.

SECT. VIII. 1. An action *materially good* is yet *evil*, as often as the *form* of it is so. The giving alms is in itself a good action, but to give alms for *ostentation* sake, or to serve some wicked design, is manifestly *evil*; nay, in one respect to be reckoned *worse* than open injustice, because it is an endeavour to make Virtue assisting to Vice. *Videre etiam licet plerosque non tamen natura liberales, quam quadam gloria ductos, ut benefici videantur facere multa, &c.* "We may observe many, who in their disposition are rather *ambitious* than *generous*, do a great many things that they may appear *benificent*; which evidently proceed more from ostentation, than a desire of doing good. Such an affectation of appearing generous has more of vanity, than either of generosity or honesty."

SECT. IX. The *intention*, in which consists part of the *form* of the action, has not virtue enough to change an action in its nature so *apparently evil*, that no one can mistake it for any other than it is, but through *gross ignorance* or *criminal prejudices*. Be

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the intention what it will, such actions retain a great deal of their own bad nature notwithstanding. *Persecution* on account of Religion is a plain outrage to common Reason and Humanity, and incapable of a transformation into good, even by the strongest persuasion in the world, that the best of ends are answered by it. This was the case of the *Jews* in crucifying our Saviour, and of the Apostle *Paul* in his rage against the Christians before his Conversion^b. They verily thought that herein they did God and Religion good service, and yet were guilty, the *Jews* of a most abominable crime, as may be gathered from the judgments inflicted on them for it; and *Paul* of a great sin, as appears from the sentence which he passeth on himself. And the reason of this is not so hard to assign, as some may imagine. The action it is granted is *materially* evil, neither if strictly examined will it appear to be *formally* good. There is indeed a good end proposed to be served by it, but this good end is not the *true cause* of the action. It is, I acknowledge, the *immediate* cause, but the *remote* or first cause (that is, the occasion of mistaking actions for good which the Law condemns) must needs be some *latent evil*, a defect of love to God

^a John xv. 13, 21. xvi. 2. Acts iii. 17. xxvi. 9.
^b Tim. i. 13, 16. See *Grove's Sermons*. V. 1. Ser. xi.

God or men, or a want of due attention to the divine Law. Were the mind in a right temper it could never give so easily into a belief, that the most *inhuman* methods were proper to carry on the best of causes, and compelling men to be *hypocrites*, the way to render them acceptable to a God of knowledge and truth.

ⁱ The *Jesuits*, by this single art of *directing the intention*, have put their disciples in a way of committing the greatest crimes, without the least danger from them. "An action *known* to be forbidden, but done not as *forbidden*, which is diabolical, but with an *innocent intention*, loses all its malignity. It is unlawful to render evil for evil, notwithstanding which a man may kill another, who hath injured, or but affronted him, provided he does it not out of *revenge*, but for the *reparation* of his *honour*." This notion, if true, will considerably reduce the number of sins, and leave none under the guilt of wicked actions, but those who have not sense enough to direct their intention aright. Before I dismiss this particular I shall likewise animadvert upon a passage of ^k *Aristotle's*, "That every action takes its form, and denomination, and name, from the *end* or intention. Thus he who corrupts

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" his

ⁱ See *Pascal's* Provincial Letters. L. 7.

^k *Andron. Rhod.* L. 5. C. 3.

“ his Neighbour’s Wife, if he does it not
 “ through *intemperance*, but to get money,
 “ is not an *Adulterer*, but *covetous*.” For
 the same reason as the intention cannot
 transmute a bad action into a good one, it
 will not change the *species* of evil actions;
 because every kind of evil actions must be
 denominated from the Law which is viola-
 ted. He who breaks the Law forbidding
 Adultery is an Adulterer, whatever was the
 view he went upon. If he did it out of
 Covetousness or Revenge, he at once broke
 two commands, and was guilty both of Co-
 vetousness and Adultery, or of Adultery and
 Revenge.

SECT. X. Having explained the *general*
 nature of *good* and *evil* actions, I descend to
 consider them in their *degrees*. It is the
 opinion of the ¹ *Stoics*, that whatever differ-
 ence there be between good actions and
 evil, *neither* of these differ among themselves.
 Οτι ισα τα Αμαρτηματα, η τα Κατορθωματα, *all good*
actions are of equal goodness, and all evil acti-
ons equally evil. It might be observed, that
 the *Stoics* in this opinion are not very *con-*
sistent with themselves, for if there be *no de-*
grees in Virtue, how come they to distin-
 guish it into Κατορθωμα or *perfect Virtue*, and
 Καθικον or the Virtue of the *middle kind*? If,
 as *Cicero* says, Virtue be a *right line*, which
 who-

† Cic. Paradoxa.

whoever transgresses is guilty of an error, and all errors or sins are equal, what room is there left for the ^m *medium officium* or middle kind of Virtue? Or for that question, *An officium aliud alio majus sit*, Whether one duty be greater than another? Or with what propriety could he say? *Vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus, pleneque sapientibus, sed cum iis, in quibus præclare agitur, si sunt simulachra Virtutis.* “We live not among
“men perfectly wise and good, but with
“such, among whom it is a great thing if
“Virtue be revered and honoured, or
“they preserve the appearance of it.” And again — ⁿ *In ipsa autem communitate, &c.*
“In social life there are degrees of duties,
“by understanding of which we may know
“what duties are to be preferred, and that
“the first regard is due to the immortal
“Gods, the next to our Country, the next to
“our Parents, and to others in a regular
“descent.” ° *Antoninus* himself allows *Theophrastus* to have philosophically determined the difference in the degrees of wickedness between two ill actions, proceeding one of them from *concupiscence*, the other from *anger*; though at the same time, to save the reputation of his own Sect, he adds this limitation, “judging of things according to
“the common notions of mankind.”

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^m *Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 3 & 15.*
ⁿ *Ibid. L. 1. §. 45.*

° *L. 2. §. 10.*

SECT. XI. That there is an *inequality* between good actions and bad respectively is easily demonstrated.

1. Some are of a higher rank and species than others. *Martyrdom* appears more illustrious than an act of *Temperance*, or *Justice*, which are *Leniores Virtutes*, as ^p *Cicero* calls them, "Virtues of a less exalted kind." And among evil actions, some are in their nature more heinous than others, as *Murder* is more detestable than *Lying*.

2. In the same kind of good and evil actions there is a variety of *degrees*. A kind office done with *freedom* and *cheerfulness* is as much better as it looks, than one performed not without *grudging*. A fault committed through *inadvertence*, or under a *strong temptation*, is more excusable than one which is *deliberate* and *unprovoked*. Nor need we be at a loss as to what makes this inequality, both as to the *kinds* of actions, and the *degrees* in the same kind; for some good actions argue a more perfect habit of *Virtue*, and require a more intense exercise of it than others. As on the contrary, some evil actions discover a greater depravity of nature, a more settled aversion of the heart from goodness, and a higher degree of wilfulness than others do. "In
" all things not capable of an exact and
" mathe

“ mathematical measure, we may, faith
 “ ¹ *Monfieur Titius*, distinguish at least *three*
 “ degrees, viz. *two extremes* and a *middle*,
 “ which sometimes approaches nearer one
 “ extreme, sometimes another. The in-
 “ convenience of admitting a greater num-
 “ ber would be, that we must determine
 “ the precise point, where one degree be-
 “ gins and another ends. But how can this
 “ be done? Or what mark have we by
 “ which to assign this difference? This is
 “ according to the distinction of the *Roman*
 “ Law into *Culpa lata, levis, & levissima*.”

SECT. XII. That which led the *Stoics*
 into this mistaken opinion of the *equality* of
 actions, was a conceit that there must be
 the *same reason* of *moral* good and evil, as
 of *logical* truth and falsehood; now *all true*
Propositions are *equally true*, and *all false*
Propositions *equally false*. ¹ Εἰ Ἀληθὲς Ἀληθὲς
 μαλλον ἢ ἐστὶν, ὅδε Ψεῦδος Ψεῦδες; ὅπως ὅδε Ἀπάλη Ἀπα-
 λης, ὅδε Ἀμαρτημα Ἀμαρτηματος &c. “ As one truth
 “ is not greater than another, or one false-
 “ hood than another, so fraud cannot be
 “ greater than fraud, nor crime than crime.
 “ He that is a hundred furlongs distant
 “ from *Canopus*, is no more in *Canopus*, than
 “ he that is but one furlong distant from
 “ it. So they that offend *more* or *less* are
 “ equally

¹ Observ. in *Puffend. De Jure &c. L.1. C.7. § 16. Not. 8.*

² *Diog. Laert. in Vita Zenonis.*

“equally transgressors.” In answer to this I say,

1. *Allowing* the parallel between truth and goodness to be exact, it will not prove all bad actions to be equally bad, because indeed all false Propositions are not equally false, that is, equally distant from the truth. We will suppose there are *ten* persons in a room, one says there are but *nine*, another there are but *six*, both are out in their guess, but for certain he who affirms there are but *six* is *further* from the truth, than he who says there are *nine*. All truths are *equal*, because truth is in the nature of a right line, and all right lines are equally strait; but *error* being a departure from truth, just as a crooked line deviates from a strait, must be *various*; for the same reason as one line may be more crooked than another, or more removed from the nature of a right line.

2. I deny that there is any such resemblance as is fancied between truth and goodness. Truth consists in the *agreement* of ideas or words with the *reality* of things; but the goodness of an action does not *merely* consist in its *conformity* to the Law, but depends very much on the *difficulty* of performance, and other circumstances. And then every good action is not *exactly* conformable to Law, or in other words, is not *gradually* perfect; no more is required, as
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was observed before, than that there be no *specific* defect. Gradual defects there may and will be in this state of imperfection, whence arises a vast diversity between good actions themselves.

SECT. XIII. The *circumstances* which enhance the good or evil of actions are summed up in this verse,

Quis, Quid, Ubi, quibus Auxiliis, Cur, Quomodo, Quando.

taken from *Aristotle's T₁, T₁, &c. ad Nicom.*
 L. 3. Instead of adding the explanation of these terms, which you will find in the common *Ethicks*, I shall transcribe a passage from *Puffendorf* containing much of their use. "The *relative quantity* of actions, their exceeding one another as to good or evil, is measured. 1. With relation to their *object*. For the more noble the object, the more does a good action terminating on this object excel another; as the evil action on the contrary is the more criminal. 2. With relation to the *estate* and *condition* of the agent. Thus a *benefit* received from an *enemy* passes for more considerable, than one received from a *friend*; on the contrary, an *injury* received from a *friend* is more sensible and aggravated,

vated, than that which proceeds from an enemy 3. With relation to the nature of actions themselves. According as there was more or less trouble and difficulty attending the performance of them. A good action, the more difficult the more laudable, other circumstances being equal. On the contrary, in proportion as an evil action was more easy to be avoided, it is worse than another of the same kind. 4. With regard to the effects and consequences of an action, supposing those consequences might have been foreseen. 5. With relation to the circumstances of time and place. And besides there is this particular in the comparison of good actions, that some are more excellent than others; as the practice of the latter ought to give place to the former, when both cannot be done at the same time." So far Puffendorf. We may add. 6. With relation to the manner of performance. A good action done with hesitation and reluctance, in so much that the scale but just turns on the right side, loses a great deal of its beauty; as by the same circumstance an evil action does of its guilt. 7. With relation to the strength or weakness, the greater or less influence of the principle. A good action must have a good principle, and the more that principle predominates in it, the better is the action. If the principle or end of

of an evil action be bad too, it exceedingly aggravates it, and so much the more as it operates more powerfully.

SECT. XIV. I hasten now to discourse a little of *indifferent* actions, that is, actions neither *morally* good nor evil. And that there are such indifferent actions, not only *secundum genus*, or as to the *kind* of them, which the *Schools* will allow, but *in individuo*, or as *really existing*, cloathed with all their individuating circumstances, may, I think, be decisively proved by this one argument. If there be actions, both the *matter* and *form* of which are neither good nor evil, then there are indifferent actions; but there are actions whose both *matter* and *form* are neither good nor evil. No one, I presume, will quarrel with the *first* Proposition; and in proof of the *second* I will assign some actions, which are *indifferent* both in their *matter* and *form*. Paying a debt in silver or gold coin, dining at twelve or one a clock, wearing leather or wooden heeled shoes, with a thousand such more, are actions in themselves both for the *form* and *matter* of them indifferent; neither is it necessary that the *form* of them be morally good. No one is obliged to have an eye to the glory of God in doing them; for when it is seen that there is no connection between such actions and the glory of God,

God, it would be a foolish superstition to make that the end of them.

SECT. XV. Some of the ^t *Heathen* Philosophers were of opinion, that *no* actions are *indifferent*, but *all* positively either *good* or *evil*. Not that no actions are indifferent in their *own nature*, but that no actions are indifferent in *fact*. For they lay down this as a rule of moral wisdom, that every man ought to fix Προαυρησιν, as they called it, that is, a certain *general purpose* and scope to all his actions. This general purpose they required should be, συμφωνως τω λογω ζην to live *agreeably to right Reason*. And hereupon they further determined, that so long as this purpose was fixed in the mind as a principle, and a man had his eye upon it, so long all his actions, even those that were in themselves indifferent, were made wise and good. But on the contrary, all a man's actions, however indifferent in their own nature, became irrational and evil, where this general right purpose was wanting. This was the doctrine of the *Stoics*. We may grant this to be true in the main, without giving up what has been offered to prove there are in *fact* indifferent actions; since there are a thousand instances occur in life, wherein various actions, in their *own nature* indiffer-

^t See Dean Young's Sermons. V. 2. p. 192.

indifferent, may be *equally consistent* with this *general* plan, and consequently it is a matter morally indifferent in these cases, which of those actions we choose to perform.

SECT. XVI. If it be objected, that every man is obliged to conform his actions to *Reason*, which will suffer none of them to be *indifferent*. To this it is usually answered, that in case an action be *negatively* conformable to Reason, that is, not condemned by it, nothing more is expected. It frequently happens that *Reason* is silent, and leaves us to act this way or that, as fancy or temper lead us, or to give a proof of our liberty. To which I further add, every reasonable action is not morally good, because the reason we proceed upon may be something of very little moment, and yet enough to determine such actions; and therefore where no higher reason is to be produced, sufficient to render the action reasonable, though not morally good. Again, it may be said, every one is bound to make the *glory of God* the *ultimate* end of *all* his actions; now the doing this, though it be only by a *general* dedication, *sanctifies* those of our actions, which are in their own nature most indifferent. My answer is, that an implicit or general aim at the glory of God can affect none but those actions, which

which are adapted to serve that end. Then is an action done to the glory of God, when either *immediately* or *remotely* the divine glory is the reason or motive of its being done. But there are *innumerable* actions which can in no degree be produced by a regard to the glory of God, and which therefore can have no such interest in the general pursuit of that end, as thereby to become *formally* good. To know when an action indifferent in its kind ceases to be so, *pro hic & nunc*, in present circumstances, there is this general rule. Suppose any such action or the omission of it to be necessary, as a *means* of performing an acknowledged duty, or of avoiding something evidently sinful, in these circumstances the doing or forbearing of this action is no longer a matter of indifference. Speaking is in itself equally indifferent with silence, but neither speaking nor silence is indifferent in the publick Congregation; the first being necessary to the *Minister* that he may discharge his duty, and the latter to the *Hearers* that they may acquaint themselves with theirs.

SECT. XVII. Another question still behind, and perhaps of greater importance than the former, is this, Whether those actions, which practised upon the *best principles*, would be virtuous, as acts of Liberality, Justice, Temperance, Chastity, and the

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the like, in a bad man who acts only from a natural generosity of temper, or with a view to his own temporal interest or fame, or to the good of civil society, are to be esteemed *good, evil, or indifferent*? On the one hand these actions labour under an *essential defect*, for want of that which should be the governing principle in all our virtuous actions, the reverence of our supream Lawgiver; so that they cannot be accounted *religious* actions, nor even *morally good*, except in one of the cases mentioned, *viz.* when they proceed from a view to the good of civil society; for this is a *morally good* principle of action, as appears from its being the principle on which God himself, the most benevolent of Beings, constantly acts. And this case excepted, I cannot pronounce the actions proceeding from the other principles to be merely *Splendida Peccata, Splendid Sins.* " *Pagan Virtues*, saith Dr. Waterland, are *mean and low things* in comparison with *Evangelical Virtues*, or *Christian Graces*; and " have indeed, according to the true and " express doctrine of our excellent Church, " *Art. 13. the nature of Sin*, as being defective in principle, and in direction, and " wanting the grace of God." But I can by no means agree with this learned Doctor in reckoning them such. For though a re-

T *gardlesness*

" The Nature and Efficacy of the Christian Sacram. p. 6.

gardlesness of the Sovereign of the world cannot but be sinful, yet these actions of a *Pagan*, or any other man, so disregarding his Maker, are not therefore *evil*, for this evident reason, that this want of respect to a divine Being, and to the divine Law, is not the *principle*, or cause of the actions before mentioned; but on the contrary, where this respect is found, there is an *additional* motive to the performance of these actions. The real principle is a *natural* goodness of disposition, or a *prudent* consideration of the present expediency of things; both which as they are themselves *innocent*, cannot infuse a *malignity* into the actions proceeding from them. It therefore remains, that such actions as these be numbered among actions *physically good*, but *morally indifferent*. From whence, by the way, it appears, that the *form* of an action is *evil*, not from a mere *defect* of a *good* end, but the *presence* of some *evil* end, or principle, which either in whole, or in part, is the cause of the action.

I shall conclude with observing what should have been remarked before, that the term *action* in *Morality* is not always understood after the vulgar manner, for something *done*, but is to be extended even to *omissions* themselves, which pass under the common name of *actions*, because imputable either to our praise, as forbearing

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an action forbidden, *because forbidden*; or to our blame, as the omission of an action commanded, though *known* to be commanded.

Books proper to be read on the subject of this Chapter are,

Puffendorf De Offic. L. 1. C. 2.

— De Jure &c. L. 1. C. 7, 8, 9.

Curcellæi Eth. C. 3.

Ciceronis Paradoxa.

Whitthii Eth. L. 1. C. 2, 3.

Wollaston's Religion of Nature. Sect. 1.

Provincial Letters. Letter Seventh.

Claggett's Sermon. V. 1. 1 Cor. 10. 23. Phil. 3. 26.

Taylor's Ductor Dubitant. about indifferent actions.





C H A P. VII.

Of the Passions in general, their Nature, Objects, Innocence, Usefulness, and Seat, and the Regulation of them.

SECT. I. **T**HE other objects of Virtue are the Passions, in discoursing of which Dr. More will be my principal guide, as *Des Cartes* was his. Not but I shall take the liberty to leave him, as often as I apprehend him to mistake the way, or to go too far about. The Passions are divided into *two* sorts, the *proper* Passions, which by common use have had that name appropriated to them, and the *improper*; for in some sense all the impressions made upon the soul by the mediation of the body, which if not heedfully observed, might be prejudicial to the mind in its judgment of things, are so many Passions. I begin with the *proper* Passions; and here the *Nature*, the *Objects*, the *Innocence*, the *Usefulness*, the *Seat*, and the *Regulation* of the Passions, will comprize all that is necessary to be said concerning them in general.

SECT.

SECT. II. ^a *Passion* is an affection of the soul, attended with a peculiar and extraordinary emotion of the animal spirits. From which definition you may learn, that *Passion* is a kind of *medium* between a simple affection of the mind, and the appetites and sensations of the body. *Passion* is an affection of the mind, which distinguishes it from the appetites of the body, such as *hunger* and *thirst*, and from *bodily sensations*; both which are indeed perceptions of the mind, but however have a more immediate relation to the body, and seemingly their abode in it. *Passion* is attended with a peculiar and extraordinary emotion of the animal spirits, which differences it from pure affection, (for there may be love or hatred that is not a *Passion*,) and from the several

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forts

^a Παθος εστιν αλογος ψυχης κινησις χωρις λογισμυ τε και κρισεως επιελυμενη. *Andron. Rhod. Περὶ Παθων.*
 " *Passion* is a motion of the soul, that takes not its rise from Reason, and that waits not for its determination." When *Cicero*, agreeing with the *Stoics*, declares against the *Passions* under the name of *Perturbations*, he thus defines *Perturbations*, *Adversâ ratione, contra naturam animi commotio, & appetitus qui procul absit a naturæ constantia.* "A commotion opposite to Reason, and to the nature of the mind, and an appetite very inconsistent with the steady regularity of the rational nature." But there was never a man who defended the *Passions* thus explained. The *Κινησις αλογος*, or motion not excited by Reason, of the *Peripatetics*, *sine Ratione*, is very different from the *Stoics adversus Rationem*, in opposition to Reason, contrary to Nature, and to its steady regularity. A thing may be *αλογος* or not excited by Reason, yet very consistent with it.

sorts of sensation, in all which, though there be some motion of the blood and spirits, yet that motion is natural and regular; whereas in the agitation occasioned by the Passions, the spirits are moved after a more vehement and tumultuous manner. The foundation of the Passions is in the body, its natural complection, or some accidental disorder arising from excess in eating and drinking, from the weather, from diseases, and the like. The indications or symptoms of the Passions are likewise in the body; for whether a man consents to it or no, they many times betray themselves by distorted postures, odd motions, or sudden and various alterations in the countenance, so that the look, the posture, the voice, conforms itself to the state of mind into which a man happens to be thrown.

*Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem
Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad
iram,*

*Aut ad humum mærore gravi deducit, & angit;
Post effert animi motus interprete lingua.*

Hor. De Arte Poetica. L. 108.

For Nature forms and softens us within,
And writes our Fortune's changes in our Face.
Pleasure enchants, impetuous Rage transports,
And Grief dejects, and wrings the tortur'd soul,
And these are all interpreted by speech.

Roscommon.

Cicero

^b *Cicero* had made, and well expresses the same observation. *Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum, aut eorum, qui aut libidine aliqua, aut metu commoti sunt, aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium vultus voces, motus, statusque mutantur.* "You may see the prevailing Passion in the countenances of the angry, or of those who are disturbed by eager desires, or by fears of any kind, or who exult in excess of pleasure; their look, their voice, their motions and posture are all changed by it." This is wisely ordered by the Author of nature, both to communicate the Passions, when it is necessary, or to raise correspondent ones, and to put others on their guard, when they are threatened with any danger from them.

SECT. III. According to the *Cartesians* the *body* is likewise the leading cause in all the Passions; the first alarm to which is given by an universal hurry in the animal spirits. But this is certainly a mistake, since a mere thought or imagination may and often does give birth to the most violent Passions. Nay, I am inclined to think, a sensation in the soul generally precedes a change in the spirits; external objects not being able to raise a ferment in the spirits, till they have first struck the mind with an

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idea

idea of something noble, frightful, amiable, hurtful, or the like. From this account of the nature of the Passions it may be inferred, that *Angels* and all *separate Spirits* are not subject to them, because the body must concur as well as the soul; nor perhaps *brute creatures*, because the soul must contribute to them as well as the body. The *Stoics* gave the name of *πάθος* to all extraordinary emotions of the soul, as accounting them *Diseases*, the word according to *Cicero* having that signification; which therefore he chooses rather to call *Perturbations*, than *πάθος Passions* or *Diseases*. The name of *Passions* belongs to those *mixed* perceptions, because the mind in certain circumstances, and within certain degrees, has no dominion over itself or the body, is in a manner *passive*, can neither help the agitations of the blood and spirits, nor help being itself affected by them. *Omnes enim motus, qui non voluntate nostra fiunt, invicti & inevitabiles sunt; ut horror frigida aspersis, ad quosdam ictus aspernatio, ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pili, & rubor ad improba verba suffunditur, sequiturque vertigo prærupta cernentes.*

“ All those emotions, which depend not upon our Will, are not to be restrained or avoided by us; such as shuddering upon having cold water suddenly thrown upon us, and dislike upon being touched in a par-

“ particular manner ; on receiving very
 “ bad news the hair stands on end, the
 “ countenance is flushed upon hearing im-
 “ modest words, and the head grows giddy
 “ with looking down a precipice.” It is
^d Seneca a Stoic who talks thus, which, to
 omit other quotations that will be inserted
 in their proper places, may convince us,
 that the Stoics when they recommend the
 destruction of the Passions, did not mean
 the *natural impressions* of objects, from
 which they were sensible it would be a vain
 endeavour of any man intirely to free him-
 self. And therefore the same * Author says,
Nil ex his quæ animum fortuito impellunt,
affectus vocari debet. Ista, ut ita dicam, pa-
titur magis animus quam facit. “ None of
 “ these sudden impressions ought to be call-
 “ ed *affections* of ours, because in them the
 “ mind is *passive* not *active*.” This latter
 part of the sentence is very true, but oddly
 brought as a reason of the former, when it
 is a reason of the direct contrary ; for be-
 cause the soul is passive in receiving these
 impressions, they ought therefore to be call-
 ed *affectus*, affections, the word necessarily
 denoting *Passion*, and being used by the best
Latin Authors to express the *Greek* word

Παθος.

SECT.

* De Ira. L. 2. C. 2.

* Ibid. C. 3.

SECT. IV. The objects of the Passions are mostly things sensible; for these having a nearer alliance to the body, as parts of the same whole, that is, of the corporeal universe, are more fit to operate upon it, and to produce in it consenting motions and affections. This accounts for the observation of an ingenious ^f Author (of which he himself assigns not the reason) "that the
 " noblest desire in our nature, that of *universal happiness*, is generally calm, and
 " wholly free from any confused uneasy
 " sensation." The reason is, that the *object* of this desire is so far from being *sensible*, as not easily to strike the *imagination*; which is the reason of its not causing any corporeal emotion; as that is the reason of its being without any sensible pain, and what the Author calls a *confused sensation*. But though things *sensible* must be owned to be the *chief objects* of the Passions, yet they are not the *only*. The object may be *spiritual* and invisible though the Passion be *sensible*. The love of God, the hope of Heaven, the dread of Eternity, and the joy of Assurance, may become proper Passions, and have the same general nature with our common Love, Hope, Fear, and Joy, while the objects are exceeding different. But then it is remarkable, that these Passions are not so easily

^f *Hutcheson* of the Passions. Sect. 11.

easily raised, are less violent, and must borrow the assistance of the imagination. The Passions which terminate on sensible objects often surprize a man, and take forcible possession of him, they need not be invited or cherished, they intrude into the mind, and grow upon us without our approbation. On the contrary, the more refined Passions are kindled by collecting the thoughts, and centering them for a long while together on the object, they increase by slow degrees, and must be carefully cultivated and improved. Our other Passions are too often impetuous and ungovernable, these are generally remiss and languid; the others need to be cooled, these to be inflamed. Finally—Spiritual objects draw forth the Passions, but it must be by the help of the imagination, a faculty next bordering upon sense. The mind is forced to have recourse to sensible representations, in order to transmit the efficacy of spiritual things to the body, to engage the fancy first, and by that the Passions. And this must be the reason, that spiritual and heavenly things are in *Scripture* so frequently illustrated by similitudes, taken from the common objects and occurrences of life.

SECT. V. The Passions are in their nature *indifferent*. [§] Πᾶσι μὲν ἔκ ἐστίν, ὅθ' αὖ ἀπελάτ,

§ *Arist. Eth. Nicom. L. 2. C. 5.*

על' at Kana. "The Passions are neither "good nor evil," but according to the good or ill use that is made of them, and the degrees to which they are permitted to rise. Of the innocence of the Passions, or that there is no essential vitiosity cleaving to them, we cannot desire a better proof, than that they are ascribed to God himself, who in the sacred Writings is represented as angry, grieved, repenting, jealous, passionately desirous of his people's happiness, and the like. It must be granted, that these expressions are to be understood in a qualified sense, by way of resemblance or accommodation, not rigorously. But what then? If the Scripture in condescension to the weakness of our apprehensions, and the frame of our beings, describes the blessed God by our imperfections, yet still they are our innocent not our sinful ones. Should this not be thought sufficient to establish the point, the history of our Saviour puts it beyond all controversy, whom we find to have been a man of like Passions to ourselves, though better attempered and regulated. From hence it must follow, that *Passion* is an original appendix of human nature, not a part of its corruption.

SECT. VI. The usefulness of the Passions is in general owing to the union of the soul and body, from hence they have their original,

ginal, and were given us for a kind of *spring* or *elasticity* to correct the natural *sluggishness* of the corporeal part. The *Mathematicians Vis Inertiae* (we owe this term to *Kepler*) by which every body opposes its removal out of the state it is in, may be applied here. The body is an unactive principle, and by the laws of union would communicate an indolence and heaviness to the mind, did not the Passions help to agitate the dull mass of lumpish matter, and thereby to invigorate the thoughts and affections of the soul.

“ Man never exerts himself but when he
 “ is roused by his desires; while they lie
 “ dormant, and there is nothing to raise
 “ them, his excellence and abilities will be
 “ for ever undiscovered; and the lumpish machine, without the influence of his Passions,
 “ may be justly compared to a huge windmill
 “ without a breath of air.” This observation has some foundation in truth, tho’ like most of the observations of the same Author it is stretched to an extravagance. ⁱ *Motus animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; alteri, appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur; appetitus impellit ad agendum.*

“ There are two powers in the soul, Reason and Desire; Reason is chiefly employed in finding out Truth; Desire impels to Action.” I distinguished before
 between

^h Author of the Fable of the Bees. p 200.

ⁱ *Cic. de Offic. L. 1. §. 36.*

between *pure Affection* and *Passion*; pure Affection does not seem to have any *uneasiness* connected with it, but the Passions, at least in the *absence* of their objects, do. This uneasiness supplies the *imperfection* of our *Reason*, and excites us to action, where that alone would fail to do it.

SECT. VII. The *Passions* gave birth to *Poetry*,^{*} "As it is natural upon certain occasions to run or to dance, to sing or to cry; though these kinds of voices and motions are not the most simple, or the most easy; so *great Passions* make men speak in a manner which appears *forced* to those who are in *cold blood*, abounding with more exaggerations, comparisons, bold figures, and extraordinary words, than common language. Moreover, the same principle which makes men sing is the cause of their measuring their words, that they may sing them more commodiously, observing a certain quantity and number of syllables, the peculiar sound and harmony, and in fine, a cadence which ought to return from time to time. We ought not therefore to wonder, that we find among all nations, and of all times, some kinds of verse, as well as singing and dancing, especially among
" the

^{*} Abbè *Fleury's* Discourse on Poetry in general, inserted in *Calmet's* Dissertations. V. 1.

“ the *Orientals*, who being naturally more
“ *witty* and *passionate*, have been some of
“ the first who cultivated this natural incli-
“ nation, and reduced it into an art.” To
this observation of the *Abbè Fleury* I would
add some passages of *Father Calmet*, in his
tract on the *Poetry* of the *Hebrews*. “ There
“ are *two* sorts of *Poetry*, the one natural,
“ the other artificial. Natural Poetry is as
“ antient as men. *Reason* and *cool blood*
“ speak in a manner *simple* and *direct*, but
“ *Passion* expresses itself with *force* and *vi-*
“ *vacity*. A vehement and figurative ex-
“ pression, and an elevation of sentiments
“ suited to the greatness and quality of the
“ subject, constitute what I call *natural*
“ *Poetry*; and this gave birth to what I
“ call *regular* and *artificial* Poetry. This
“ latter kind paints the sentiments and Pas-
“ sions in a strong and pathetic manner,
“ which is common to it with natural
“ Poesy; but then it represents them in
“ chosen and studied phrases, ranged in a
“ certain measure, and with a proper ca-
“ dence. This is what distinguishes it from
“ the other.”

SECT. VIII. From hence we may ob-
serve, that all the *politer arts* which mini-
ster to pleasure, such as *Poetry*, *Painting*,
Music, and the like, have their *original*
from the Passions. And what is said here
in

in general of the influence of the Passions on Poetry, is more particularly true of *Admiration*.¹ Dr. Jackson hath some observations on this head very well worth transcribing. "Were Arts to begin anew, Poetry, which was the *first* and most common amongst the *Antients*, in all probability would spring the last, and grow the slowest amongst us." For which he assigns this reason. "He is a Poet by nature (saith an excellent Poet and divine Philosopher) who is apt to be ravished with the true and native beauty of such objects as are represented to his senses, and can express his conceptions by such pleasant resemblances, as often as he shall have occasion to utter his mind in writing or set speech. This inclination or disposition is the ground or soil whereon Poetry doth naturally grow, whether in antient or modern breasts; but the antients had this advantage. The fashion of the world in their times was more apt to ravish their thoughts with admiration, wonderful events were then frequent, nor did their frequency abate, but rather increase wonderment, because their variety was great, and the apprehension of invisible or supernatural powers in them usual. So that admiration was then inforced upon men, and the breasts of such as diligently observed these events,

¹ On the Creed. B. I. C. 14.

“ or were any way disposed by nature for
“ the faculty, were inspired with lively and
“ sublimate affections, apt to vent them-
“ selves in such poetical phrase and resem-
“ blances, as we cannot reach unto, unless
“ we raise our invention by art and imita-
“ tion, and stir up admiration by medita-
“ tion and study. And because neither our
“ senses are moved with any extraordinary
“ effects of God’s power, nor our minds
“ bent to observe the ways of his wisdom,
“ so as we might be stricken with true ad-
“ miration of them, we have fewer good sa-
“ cred Poems than of any other kind.”

SECT. IX. I shall be easily excused, if I
close this account of the influence of the
Passions on Poetry, with some observations
relating to the subject borrowed from the
learned and ingenious Author of the Inquiry
into the Life and Writings of Homer. Sect. III.

“ The Geographer *Strabo*, a wise man, and
“ well acquainted with antiquity, tells us,
“ That *Cadmus*, *Pherecydes*, and *Hecatæus*,
“ first took the numbers and the measure
“ from speech, and reduced that to *Prose*,
“ which had always been *Poetry* before.
“ And the admired judge of the sublime,
“ in the fragment of a treatise we have un-
“ happily lost, has this remarkable sen-
“ tence. Measure, saith he, belongs pro-
“ perly to *Poetry*, as it personates the vari-

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"ous Passions and their language, uses
 "fiction and fables, which naturally pro-
 "duce numbers and harmony. It was for
 "this reason that the Antients in their *ordi-*
 "*nary discourse* delivered themselves rather
 "in Verse than Prose—He thought the life
 "of the Antients was more exposed to
 "accidents and dangers, than when Cities
 "were builded, and men were protected
 "by Society and a Publick; and of conse-
 "quence their discourse was more passionate
 "and metaphorical—I do not in the least
 "question, but that the first things which
 "were committed to writing in *Grace*, as
 "Oracles, Laws, Spells, Prophecies, were
 "in Verse—The *primitive parts* of the Lan-
 "guages reputed *original* are many of them
 "rough, undeclined, impersonal, mono-
 "syllables, expressive commonly of the
 "*highest Passions*, and most *striking objects*,
 "that present themselves in *solitary savage*
 "life." The Author introduces this ac-
 "count of Language with the description,
 "which the antient *Heathen* Writers give of
 "the beginnings of the human race, which
 "he seems to approve, or says nothing in dis-
 "like of. So that the "origin of Language
 "seems to have been certain rude accident-
 "al sounds, which that naked company of
 "scrambling mortals emitted by chance.
 "Upon this supposition it will follow,
 "that at first they uttered these sounds in a
 "much

“ much higher note, than we do in our
“ words now, occasioned, perhaps, by
“ their falling on them under some Passion,
“ Fear, Wonder, or Pain; and then using
“ the same sound, either when the object
“ or accident recurred, or when they wanted
“ to describe it by what they felt from
“ its presence — Hence came the antient
“ opinion, that Poetry was before Prose.”
Though I cannot intirely approve this account of the original of Language, because not agreeing with the account which *Moses* gives of the *first* Language, which the parents of mankind seem to have been taught immediately by God, yet it is a probable account of the rise of the various Languages formed by the rude Colonies dispersed over the earth after the confusion at *Babel*. To return.

SECT. X. The Passions have a *threefold* use, with respect to *Knowledge*, to *Virtue*, and to *Happiness*. As to *Knowledge* and *Truth* itself they have their use, in as much as there is ground to question, whether in the present state of human nature, if there were no Passions, mankind would not by degrees sink into the most profound ignorance. A person seldom makes a considerable progress in any art or science, for which he has not a sort of passionate prepossession. And were it not that men apply

ply themselves to different studies, one to cultivate this part of learning, another that, how small would the common stock of knowledge be. The *learned* as well as the *trading* world subsist by mutual labours, helps, and improvements, and are addicted to different pursuits by the various Passions which God hath placed in them, as the springs of their several motions. ^m *Philosophiæ denique ipsius Principes numquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. Ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem, accepimus. Ubi enim quidquid esset, quod disci posset, eo veniendum judicaverunt. Num putamus hæc fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisse?* “The prime masters of Philosophy “ would never have been able to make so “ great a progress in their studies, if they “ had not been pushed on by an ardent desire of knowledge. History informs us, “ that *Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato,* “ visited the most remote countries, thinking themselves obliged to go wherever “ any knowledge might be gained. And “ can we think this could be done, if their “ Passion for knowledge had not been very “ great?” ⁿ *Cicero* indeed, who takes the part of the *Stoics*, pretends that it was from *Reason alone* these great men acted, without any

^m *Cic. Tusc. Quæst. L. 4. §. 19.*

ⁿ *Ibid. §. 25.*

any thing of passionate desire. *Quid? Vos studia, libidinem vocatis? Quæ vel optimarum rerum, ut ea sunt, quæ profertis, sedata tamen & tranquilla esse debent.* "What! "Would you call the desire of truth a *hot* "Passion, libido? When the desires of the "best things, such as those which you in- "stance, ought to be sedate and calm." If by *libido* Cicero means such a desire as puts a man out of the command of himself, *vehementior appetitus, qui procul absit a naturæ constantia*, §. 21. it is certain the study of Philosophy does not presuppose any such perturbation as Philosophy condemns. Nor did the *Peripatetics* by their *ardor animi*, ardor of mind, understand any such irregular motion, but a *mixed* inclination, in which *sound Reason* concurred with bodily temper to carry a man towards a particular object.

SECT. XI. If we consider the Passions in relation to *Virtue*, it will appear they are of admirable use, for the *acquisition*, for the *trial* and *exercise*, and for the *evidencing* of it. The conviction of the mind, and rectitude of the judgment are not enough; there may be these where not one step is made towards the attainment of *Virtue*. This was the first foundation of *Eloquence*, which in its original intention is nothing else but the art of ingaging the Passions on the side

of Reason and Virtue. And therefore an *Orator* deserves not that name, who addresses himself only to the Understanding, and who is a master of stile and argument, but not of the Passions. Such a one does but *half* his work, while he possesses himself of the *Reason* of his hearers, without captivating their *hearts*. A people inured to war grow bold and hardy, which is the view upon which some politic princes act in sending out their troops to foreign nations and states, when they have no quarrel of their own upon their hands. So Virtue *often exercised* in combating the Passions, gains strength and vigour, and improves into a habit and complexion of soul. From the conflict between Passion and Reason, when victory declares for the latter, it is obvious to conclude, that there is an empire in the soul of man, and that it is the indefeasible right of the intellectual part to govern and direct the inferior powers.

SECT. XII. This conflict the ° *Cartesians* explain after the following manner. The soul, though united to the whole body, they imagine to be in an especial manner present in the *brain*. And because all the parts of this are double, the *Glandula Pinealis* excepted, (which Anatomists call *Conarion*) and the soul is but *one*, no better seat could have been

been chosen for its residence than this gland, which lies in that part of the *brain*, where there is the greatest concourse of animal spirits. As often as any Passion is raised, the spirits are in a commotion, and smartly strike upon this gland; whereupon the soul exerts its authority to quell the mutiny, and moves the gland according to the advice of its own Reason, not by the impulse of the Passions. I mention this notion for the fancifulness of it, rather than any probability attending it; for indeed it is intirely inconsistent with fact, as we learn from the following anatomical account given of the *brain* by ^P Monsieur *Le Clerc*. *Ventriculi, sc. Cerebri, qui quasi receptacula spirituum animalium habebantur, plerumque inveniuntur pituitâ pleni; ut Cloacarum potius sint loco, quæ superfluum humorum partem excipiant, & per Infundibulum ejiciunt. Conarion nihil est præter Cerebri quamdam excrescentiam, quæ pituitâ, non spiritibus animalibus, undequaque adluitur.*

SECT. XIII. The best and most demonstrative evidence a man can have of his being virtuous is drawn from the Passions. A man may be deceived with respect to his *Senses*, but not as to his *Passions*. In a

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dream

^P *Physica*. L. 4. C. 7. §. 11. See also *Le Memoire de Mr. De le Peyronie*, in the *History of the Academy of Sciences*, for 1741.

dream he may fancy himself to see what he does not, but can never think himself to be angry, or sorrowful, or glad, when he is not so. From whence flows the satisfaction that *Virtue* brings with it, to be preferred before the pleasures of *speculation*, as well as the delights of *sin* and *sense*. Pleasures of speculation may be built on a mistake, but *Virtue*, consisting in the conquest and due government of the Passions which we feel within us, can never be a deception. And it is the same as to the progress which a person makes in *Virtue*, and the price at which he values it. This is best known by the greater or less degree of the Passions, the moderation of them towards earthly objects, and the intenseness of them towards such as are spiritual and divine. The love of *Virtue* is not wrought up to the degree it should be, if it is not followed with a passionate warmth, which shall impart its influence to the mechanism of the body, and create a generous indignation against *Vice*, as a thing unworthy the dignity of a human soul, and unsuitable to its expectations. Not but great allowances must be made for difference of temper and constitution. That degree of Passion which mixes with the *Virtue* of a man, whose disposition is *lively* and *sanguine*, cannot be expected from one of a *cold* and *flegmatick* complexion. Yet, as there is no man without his Passions in a lower

lower degree, the observation how they work upon different objects will afford him a great deal of light into his own character. For it is gross hypocrisy to pretend a love to Virtue, and yet from an affected tranquility to continue unmoved, when the publick rights of mankind, and the eternal laws of Reason are violated, though at the same time we can warmly resent the most trifling injuries offered to ourselves.

SECT. XIV. As for *Happiness*, the Passions by being subservient to *Virtue* are of course subservient to *Happiness*. The noblest satisfactions of life arise from a warm love to God and man, from the clear and full testimony of a good conscience attending a Virtue thoroughly tried and greatly advanced, and raising high our hopes from God and for eternity, and from the easy and abundant practice of what is good and excellent, to which our Passions well directed carry us. And as to our other enjoyments, it is to be ascribed to the Passions that life has any *briskness* in it. These strike a vivacity through all our operations and enjoyments, of which they are destitute without them. Without these a man is scarcely awake, existence is insipid, the scene of the world affects him no more than the fleeting images of a dream. This is the case of a drowsy indolent soul. While the
man

man who has lively Passions, under the direction of strong and sedate Reason, has the truest injoyment of himself and all things around him. As the winds purge the air and preserve it wholesome, so do the Passions put the blood in motion, and by this means promote the health and vigour of the body; upon the vigour of whose organs in a great measure depends the vigour of the mind, as from both together arise all the pleasurable and entertainment of life. If it be objected, that the Passions often cloud and pervert the judgment, plunge men in Sensuality and Vice, push them on to commit a thousand extravagances, and are accountable for more than half the tragedies, and complaints of human life. I own these to be effects of the Passions, but deny that they are the *necessary* effects. The best things may be abused, and when they are so, prove more hurtful than others. They who think this the crime of the Passions, should therefore abstain from meat and drink, because they are by many made the occasions of excess; to prevent diseases they should try to clear the body of *all* its humours, and break *all* the strings of an instrument, as the best way to avoid discord in the notes. To which I might add, that though the Passions themselves belong to *uncorrupted* nature, yet the over ballance of some one particular Passion or other, which
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we may observe in every constitution, may be justly reckoned a consequence of the *Fall*, and of the gradual degeneracy of mankind since.

SECT. XV. The controversy about the *Seat* of the Passions may be soon ended; for as Passion signifies a sensation of the soul, it must be lodged there, and not in any part of the body. As this sensation is joined with a tumult or agitation of the spirits, the Passion must go along with the spirits moved. Those in *Admiration* (which seems to be a more speculative Passion, as being employed chiefly about the *novelty* or *grandeur* of objects) are in the *Brain*, the great instrument or condition rather of thought and contemplation. In other Passions, which respecting the good or evil of objects, proceed from a principle of self-preservation, the spirits agitated are in the *Heart*, the fountain of life, and fittest residence of those motions of the animal spirits, which are intended for the benefit and preservation of life.

SECT. XVI. To know whether and how far the Passions are under the regulation of *Reason*, it will be of use to distinguish between *Αισθησις* or *Φαντασια*, the *first stroke* or *surprize* on the *sudden appearance* of the object, and *Προληψις* or *Συγκαταθεσις*, the *opinion*,
consent,

consent, or approbation of the mind added to the former. This distinction is made by ^a *Antoninus*, ^r *Seneca*, and other *Stoics*, with this further remark, that the *first* is out of our power, but the *other*, in which the soul is voluntary and active, may and ought to be prevented. *Affectus est, non ad oblatas rerum species moveri, sed permittere se illis; & hunc fortuitum motum persequi—Illa prima agitatio animi, quam species injuriæ incussit, non magis ira est, quam ipsa injuriæ species; sed ille sequens impetus qui speciem injuriæ non tantum accepit sed approbavit.* “Passion is not being moved with the first appearance of things, but giving up ourselves to them; and following this accidental impulse. The first commotion of mind which the appearance of an injury excites, is no more the Passion of *Anger*, than the appearance itself is; but the following impetus is the Passion, which not only entertains the apprehension that we have *been hurt*, but owns it to be a right apprehension.” It is then an allowed fact, that the first commotion of the spirits cannot be prevented, the *physical* reason of which seems to be this. All sensation and motion is performed by means of the *Nerves*. ^t The *Nerves* are of
two

^a *Anton.* L. 5. §. 26.

^r *Epist.* 87. & *Aul. Gell.* L. 19. C. 3. vid. & *Salmas.* in *Epiet.* & *Simplic.* p. 50.

^t *Senecæ De Ira.* L. 2. C. 3.

^t *Religious Philosopher.* V. 1. Contemp. 9. §. 7.

two kinds, such as are derived to the *spinal marrow* from the *Cerebrum* or *fore part* of the *Brain*, and those that come from the *Cerebellum* or *hinder part*. Of these two sorts the former only are under our command, and the instruments of all our *voluntary* motions; the latter are *not immediately subject* to the direction of our Will; and it is on these the Passions of the soul depend, as far as they communicate with the body. For as the motions of the *Heart*, the *Stomach*, the *Bowels*, and the like, are performed by these *Nerves*, so in violent Passions it is certain that these several parts are liable to be considerably affected. This shows why the first impressions of the Passions are not immediately in our power; as it is likewise not in our choice (the eye being open, and the object presented, and all the other requisites supposed) whether we will see or no. What we do to secure the mind against violent impressions must be by way of *prevention*, or, after the first surprize, by *strongly directing* the mind another way.

SECT. XVII. As for the opinion or judgment of things whether present or future, as being good or evil, this according to the *Stoics* is a *false judgment*, and *in our power*. It is a *false judgment*, because according to them Virtue is the *only good*, and Vice

Vice the *only evil*. This is the ground upon which they condemn the Passions; by which they do not mean those *sudden commotions* which prevent all thought, but those which flow from our *opinion* of things. *Chrysippus* places the Passion in this opinion itself; *Zeno* in the emotion of the mind consequent to it; but the followers of one and the other agree in this, that it is the false opinion of things that makes the Passion blameable. * *Cicero* argues at length against all *Perturbations* of mind, as the same with what the *Stoics* meant by their *Passions*, who, according to him, allowed of a *reasonable desire* of what are usually called good things, which they termed *voluntas*, and *delight* in them, which they called *gaudium*; but declare against the *Perturbations* which they called *libido* and *lætitia*. They further allowed of *caution* against evil, though not of what *Cicero* calls *metus* or *dread*, by which again they meant a *perturbation* or disturbance of mind. So far they seem to differ in words only from the *Peripatetics*, but in condemning *all Grief* under present evils, *ægritudo animi*, they not only oppose all other *Philosophers*, but *common sense* too. *Cicero* seems liable to the same charge also, when he finds fault with the *Peripatetics* for saying, that *Anger* was *usefully* given us by nature, and declares

* Tusc. Quæst. L. 4. §. 16, 17. &c.

declares his opinion that it ought to be entirely discharged.

SECT. XVIII. But with the leave of *Cicero* and of the *Stoics*, I must declare on the side of a Philosophy more agreeable to the necessary feelings of human nature, and to common sense. I cannot think the opinion with regard to things external so much in our power, but that though we allow Virtue to be a *principal* good, and Vice the evil *most* to be dreaded, we must judge other things to be good or evil besides these, though not in an equal degree. But then, whether we shall *indulge* to the Passion we feel is certainly matter of our choice; as it is further certain, that without this indulgence the Passion would expire much sooner; I mean the sensitive part of it, or the disorder into which nature is thrown. For though this be at first involuntary, yet by being countenanced it gets ground, and owes its strength and duration to us. Not that I imagine our authority to be so absolute in this case as *Adam's* was. It is not improbable that during the state of innocence man had a greater command over the Passions, even in respect of the part which the *body* hath in them, than we can now pretend to have. As the fluids of his body were better tempered, than to subject him to the incursion of violent Passions on
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the unexpected appearance of things, so we may reasonably suppose it was more in his power to stop the career of a Passion, by laying a restraint upon the impetuous current of the blood and spirits. To this purpose I think it very observable, that the *Evangelist* (*John xi. 33.*) describing what passed at the grave of *Lazarus*, does not say concerning our Saviour, that *he was troubled*, as we have translated it, but ἐταράξευ εαυτον, *he troubled himself*. The meaning whereof seems to be this, that finding in himself the same tender emotions of humanity which others feel on like occasions, though he could have resisted and over ruled them, yet he rather chose to give free way to them, to shew that he was truly a man, and framed with the same Passions as other men, though better able to controul them; wherein it is likely he was resembled by innocent man.

SECT. XIX. The two general rules for the management of the Passions concern the *direction*, and the *moderation* of them; the *first* their *object*, the *latter* their *degree*. The first is called *ὀρθοπραξία*, or *Passion rightly determined*. *Grief* is in general an innocent Passion, but *Grief* at the excellent qualities, or noble actions, or happy success of another, which is then know by the name of *Envy*, offends against this rule of choosing a proper object of our Passions. *Joy* is a delight-

delightful Passion, but to rejoice in iniquity, though it may be pleasant, is highly criminal. The latter is called *Melipotrophia* or *Passion duly moderated*, proportioned to the value of the object, and to its own intention and end. *Efficiendum autem est, ut appetitus Rationi obediant, eamque neque præcurrant, nec propter pigritiam, aut ignaviam deserant; sintque tranquilli, atque omni perturbatione animi careant.* Ex quo elucebit omnis constantia, omnisque moderatio. "We should reduce our appetites into subjection to Reason, never suffering them to run before it, nor yet through sloth or cowardice to desert it, preserving them sedate, and the mind undisturbed by them. This will give us the ornament of a steady and composed temper." So that according to Cicero there may be both an excess and a defect, in which sentiment he forsakes the Stoics, who allow not of the Passions in any degree as far as they are voluntary. "A wise man will not yield to the impressions of Anger, Joy, Grief, or Pity, but strive against them all he can," wherein they make him wise beyond the intention of nature, which cannot be supposed to have given a man Passions with a design they should be opposed in their whole kind, but only tempered and regulated. *Nimis magna*

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* Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 29.

y Seneca. Epist. 116.

na promittitis, nimis dura præcipitis. Nos humunciones sumus; omnia nobis negare non possumus. Dolebimus, sed parum. Concupiscebimus, sed temperate. Irascemur, sed placabimur. “You Stoics pretend to things too great for human nature, and give precepts too severe. We are weak men, who cannot deny ourselves every thing. We will grieve, but not violently. We will desire, but with moderation. We will be angry, but not implacably.” This plea for the Passions *Seneca* mentions with dislike, and insists on an absolute dispassionateness; and *Cicero* argues for the same thing; and this is the *Stoical Apatby* so much talked of. The *Epicureans* and the *Stoics* were guilty of an extreme on either hand, one declaring a perpetual war against the Passions, the other suffering themselves to be subdued by them; and perhaps both these extremes had their original from the same project, of putting an end to the contest between Passion and Reason. The *Epicureans* were for renouncing their Reason, and sinking human nature to a level with the beasts; the *Stoics* disclaimed all voluntary Passions, and aspired to be Gods.

SECT. XX. The particular *Directions* proper to be observed for well regulating the Passions are such as these.

I. Let

* Tusc. Quæst. L. 4. §. 17.

1. Let us endeavour to improve our minds in sound knowledge, and particularly to furnish it with right notions of those things which are the common incentives to the Passions. The Understanding was appointed for a guide to the Affections, but before it can perform this part as it ought, it must be furnished with light in itself. According to the doctrine of the *Stoics*, the Passions do either immediately consist in opinion, or depend intirely upon it, so that we should have no Passions if we were not led away by false opinions. Though this be not a true representation of the matter, since opinion and Passion are two things, and where the opinion is right, the Passion may be wrong, for want of serious consideration and firm resolution, yet it is too plain to be denied, that opinion is the usual cause or foundation of excessive Passions. We distinguish things into the good or evil things of the *soul* and of the *body*, of this *life* and the *next*, of *time* and *eternity*. Let us get and settle just notions of these things with respect to their different weight and value, considered *absolutely* in themselves, and *comparatively* one with another, and often revolve these in our thoughts, and we shall find this single rule of unspeakable use. Do the objects of sense and time raise frequent commotions in our breasts? And is it not easy to apprehend what is commonly

the reason of it? Did we judge these things to be *trifles*, should we give them so much power over us? And are they more than *trifles* in comparison of those things, which affect the well-being of our souls, and our everlasting state? Are we not reasonable and immortal, I speak as to our better part, and what then are those things which we are to esteem of real importance to us, but such in which we are interested, considered as reasonable and immortal? What does not make us better or worse in our *moral* and *religious* character, or as to the state of our souls; what does not promote or hinder our preparation for eternity, cannot be good or evil in a *high* degree, and therefore will not justify a strong Passion. They are fine words of a *Heathen* Moralist. "*Quid enim ei videatur magnum in rebus humanis, cui eternitas omnis, totiusque mundi nota sit magnitudo?*" "What can appear great in human things to that person, to whose view all eternity lies open, and the greatness of the universe?"

SECT. XXI. 2. Be careful to observe a proper medium in respect of bodily gratifications, not using too much indulgence on the one hand, nor too great severity on the other. The former of these extremes is by far the most dangerous and the most common,

^a Tusc. Quæst. L. 4. §. 17.

mon, but both of them are to be avoided. A life of sensuality gives birth to numberless Passions; for when nothing else is minded but pleasing the senses, and the appetites of the fleshly part, the Passions grow headstrong and mutinous; the reason of which is plainly this, that the Passions being rooted in the body, are consequently fed and nourished by the same methods, as the body is pampered and rendered less fit to obey the mind. Whoever therefore would not be subject to the impulses of violent Passions, let him be *temperate in all things*, and live in the practice of frequent instances of self-denial. A few there are who run into the extreme of giving the body *too little*, some through a sordid parcimony, and others through mistaken principles of Religion. Whatever the principle be, if persons do not keep the *golden mean*, but deny themselves what is convenient as to meat and drink, society, and other innocent relaxations, there are certain Passions to which they are peculiarly liable, and of a very bad kind too, such as *spiritual pride*, a *blind zeal*, and *uncharitableness*, and a *savage sourness*, and *moroseness* of temper. The accounts we have of the temper and behaviour of many *Monks* and *Recluses*, both of the *Roman* and *Greek Church*, and of those who far out-do them, both in superstition and austerity,

among the *Eastern Bramins*, are a sufficient demonstration of the evil of running into this extreme.

SECT. XXII. 3. Another good direction for regulating the Passions is, either to make the object *familiar* to our minds, or to *keep out of the way* of it, according as we perceive one or other of these tends to abate the Passion. *Love*, and *Anger*, and *Envy* are generally fed by thought, while *Fear* lessens. Do we find in ourselves the seeds of *Ambition*, *Covetousness*, or *Sensuality*? Are we inclined to doat upon the pomp or riches, or pleasures of the world; do these things dazzle our eyes, and bewitch our hearts? Let us *turn away our eyes from beholding vanity*. If we suffer our imagination to dwell upon these things, the effect will be near the same as from the sight of them; our Passions will be awakened, and we shall envy the prosperous wicked, and be tempted to learn their ways. We must therefore either not think at all of these things, or view them on the dark side, for they have all a dark side as well as a bright one. Let us think of the dangers that attend those which the world reckons its best things, and the cares and troubles and disappointments which are bred out of them. Such thoughts, if we entered deep into them,

them, would convert our Admiration into Contempt, our Love into Indifference, and our Envy into Pity. Are we inclined to fear where no fear is? Let us bring our minds up close to the object, in order to convince ourselves that there is no ground for such terrible apprehensions. *Ignorance* is in this respect like *darkness*, it breeds unreasonable fears and surmises, every shadow becomes a frightful spectre; and we startle at the first appearance of that, which when we come to examine it hath nothing in it dreadful. This method would sometimes be of use to qualify the fear of death itself; I mean to the truly good man, who perhaps is more afraid of death itself, than of the state which follows after death. The pain of dying, in all likelihood, is nothing so great, as that we suffer in many distempers of the body; and generally speaking it is soon over. This moment we are struggling with the agonies of death, the next we are entered into everlasting rest.

SECT. XXIII. 4. Another very important rule to be observed is, that we watch against the *beginnings* of Passion. What the wise King remarked of *Strife* is true of other Passions, *the beginning of them is as when one letteth out water*; the breach at first may be

X 4

easily

^b Prov. xii. 14.

easily stoppt, but let alone soon widens, till at length the banks are thrown down, and the flood deluges the neighbouring plain. It is seldom if ever any Passion rises to its height in a moment, it does not take possession of the soul all at once, but by degrees; so that usually we have sufficient warning to think of our danger, and sufficient time to put ourselves in a posture of defence. This is very wisely and kindly ordered by nature, or rather by the God of nature, since we should find it a much harder task to quell and restrain a Passion if we were always to engage it in its full strength. How many, for the sake of venting their Passion, when they have been angry, have given their tongues a liberty to run on, till they have talked themselves into the height of Passion, thus as it were fanning the flame with their own breath; which shows *Cicero's* advice to his Brother, a man of a passionate temper was very good, "That as much as possible he should keep silence when he was provoked, that he might not further incense himself by his own words." And there is the same reason why we should watch the beginnings of other Passions, for the Passions not restrained chase themselves, and like the wheels of a chariot take fire by the rapidity of their own motion.

SECT. XXIV. 5, Let us conquer one Passion by the help of another, either of the *same* kind, as Fear by Fear, and Love by Love; or of a *different*, as Anger by Love, Fear by Hope, Sorrow by Joy, as we see there is occasion, and prudence shall direct us. To overcome a Passion which grows upon us, we may frequently imploy another of the *same* kind with good success; as the Fear of God, to banish the Fear of man, and the Love of God and of our Neighbour, to get free from the Love of the world. Hear what the living *Oracle* of truth says, *Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do. I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear; fear him, who after he has killed, has power to cast into Hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him.* Let us fear to offend him, and then we shall have no great cause to be afraid of any thing else; because all things else are under his controul and direction, and compared with his displeasure are as nothing. On the other hand, in combating a Passion we may borrow help from a Passion of a *different* kind. Are we prone to be *angry* with our brother *without a cause*, and *beyond measure*? Let us cherish *brotherly love* in ourselves, as a most excellent and amiable affection; let us

us consider the reasons we have to love our Neighbour as ourselves, till we come to be acquainted with this love from our own experience, as well as in the notion of it; and then whenever our Anger begins to grow extravagant, our love and benevolence will be at hand to check and suppress it. Is our temper inclined to *sadness*, so that *sorrow filleth our hearts* upon small occasions, and sometimes we hardly know why? Let us dwell more upon the *joyous* views and prospects which Religion affords us; let us think often of the goodness of God, and how many things we enjoy which are fitted to promote gladness of heart; that the good things of life are abundantly more than the evils of it; that the good things of it flow from the divine benevolence, and even the evil things of it shall, by the same goodness, be made to contribute, some way or other, to our final happiness; alway supposing that we ourselves concur with the designs and methods of the divine benignity.

SECT. XXV. 6. Would we succeed in our endeavours to regulate our Passions, our *watchfulness* over them must be *constant*, and our *care* to govern them *habitual*. Every single victory obtained by our Passions concurs to establish their empire; as on the contrary, a continued vigorous resistance will

will in time destroy it. To be sometimes vigilant, at other times careless, now strict and severe, and then remiss, is but trifling in a matter of the greatest moment. Who that wisely considers his true interest, would be content to spend his life in rolling a stone up hill, and then leaving it to run down again? Let me further take notice, that though we should exercise some rule over our spirits for the greater part of our time, and only now and then let our Reason sleep, yet even this would not be sufficient. For besides the mischiefs our Passions may do in the intervals of licence, they will prove much more untractable at other times. An habitual command of our Passions is sooner obtained, than one which is every now and then interrupted; it being the same here as in other habits, whatever we would have to be easy in the practice, we must make habitual; and that it may become habitual we must be constant in it.

7. We should meditate often on the shame and evil of disordered Passions, and the honour and happiness which attend the reducing them within the bounds of Reason. As we are reasonable creatures, and naturally pursue good and fly from evil, if we clearly see that the government of our Passions is every way for our interest, and their govern-

governing us in every respect opposite to it; that one brings us to the injoyment of the best ends we can propose to ourselves, and the other sets us at the greatest distance from them; if we clearly discern this, and often and attentively consider it, we are not such enemies to ourselves, or so indifferent to what concerns our own interest and happiness, as not to be influenced by these motives,

SECT. XXVI. 8. Let us not forget our dependance upon God, and to beg of him, that as his hand hath formed us with this variety of Passions, so by the same hand he would *over-rule* their motions, and guide the vessel in this perilous voyage of life, until it arrive safe at the haven of eternal rest. Besides, our being qualified by humble and fervent supplications to receive assistance from heaven, the apprehension that our succeeding herein is highly pleasing to God, and the hope of his favourable influences, will naturally give a great degree of strength and spirit to our endeavours; for to our prayers we must join our most resolute and constant endeavours. This minds me of the last advice.

9. Be persuaded that we *can do a great deal* in the government of our Passions; and hereupon resolve that you will rouse the latent strength of your souls, and exert it in this

conflict. Remember it is in our power to follow the preceding advices; and let this excite you to follow them. You can watch against the incursions of Passion; you can resist and fight against them, when they invade your quiet; if you do not *strive* against them, you must not call this *weakness*, but *sloth*. The use of this single direction cannot be easily conceived; men fancy they can do nothing, and therefore will not attempt any thing, but tamely deliver themselves up to be bound by the enemy, and used at discretion. ^a *Seneca's* words are worth remembering, (applying them to the *moderation* of the Passions, not as he does, to the *total denial* of them) "Would you know
" why we cannot do these things? It is be-
" cause we do not believe that we can. We
" love our Vices, and then defend them;
" and had rather be at the trouble of ex-
" cusing them, than shaking them off. Na-
" ture has been liberal enough, would men
" use the strength that she has given them,
" and collecting their forces imploy them
" in their own defence, instead of turning
" them against themselves. The *true* cause
" is that we *will not*, that we *cannot* is only
" a *pretence*."

Read

Read on the subject of this Chapter,

Ciceronis Tuscul. Quæst. L. 4.

Curcellæi Eth. C. 4.

Mori Encheir. Eth. L. 1. C. 6, 12.

Whitbii Eth. L. 1. C. 8.

Grove's Posth. Works. Vol. 4. Tract. 6. On the Government of the Passions.

Hutcheson on the Passions. Sect. 4 & 6.

Watts of the Passions, and of the Use and Abuse of them in Religion.

Cheyne of Health and Long Life. C. 6.

Claggett's Sermon on Prov. 25. 8.

Clarke's 17 Sermons. Ser. 6.





C H A P. VIII.

Of the *primitive Passions, Admiration, Love, and Hatred.*

SECT. I. **A**LL the Passions are reducible to these *three* heads, of *Admiration, Love, and Hatred*, which may therefore be stiled the *primitive Passions*. *Admiration* is that sudden surprize at the novelty of an object, by which the soul is fastened down to the contemplation of it. The inclination for novelty is universal, and so prevalent in its influence as to be almost necessary to recommend the best and most excellent things; which no sooner cease to be new, than they are looked upon with indifference. Which, by the way, may be one ground of the expediency of *sleep*; (and there is the same reason for the variety of the *Seasons*) for though the time spent in sleep may seem to be all lost, yet when it is considered that by this retirement from the world every twenty four hours, by this suspense and inaction of the senses, the scene appears with a fresh beauty every morn-

morning, just as a man's home is more agreeable to him, after he hath been some time absent from it; we shall discern one reason more to admire the wisdom of the Creator, in appointing so great a portion of our time for sleep. But may we not admire things for their *antiquity*? We may so; and the reason is, that in this case even their *age* is a novelty, in regard of our not having observed the like before, or not often. That novelty should carry the mind to a more fixed and attentive view of objects is not difficult to be accounted for, since novelty is attended with pleasure.

SECT. II. There are these few things which I would remark concerning this Passion.

1. In *Admiration* every man, where he can do it, secretly regards *himself* as the measure of all things round about him, both as to his body and his mind; and I believe, where this unobserved comparison is made between the things admired and ourselves, the *Admiration* is generally stronger than in other cases. If a man admires the vastness of the *Whale*, or the almost imperceptible dimensions of the *Mite*, it is because he himself is but a kind of *Mite* to the one, as he is a *Whale* to the other. And yet he admires not other men for this reason, because though compared with the *Whale* or the *Mite*

Mite they are exceeding great or little, compared with himself they are neither. Does he admire one man's courage and another's pusillanimity? The cause is, that he comes short of the one, and surpasses the other.

“ What the real Magnitudes of Bodies are,
“ I doubt no one can justly tell, nor were
“ it of any use to us to know, since their
“ *Analogical* Magnitudes to the Magnitude
“ of our Bodies is all that we have any concern about. Thus taking our own Hand
“ or Foot or Height for our Standard, all
“ things about us are represented in a constant uniform proportion to these; so that
“ we are thereby informed of that Distance
“ and Magnitude of objects that is most natural and familiar to us, and is also most
“ necessary for our security and preservation. And the same is true of every other animal
“ small or great. Thus take an *Elephant*, a
“ *Man*, and a *Mite*, and present the same
“ object to them all three, and it shall appear not of the *same* Magnitude to them,
“ but in a Magnitude in some sort reciprocally proportional to their own bulks,
“ that is, to the *Elephant* less than to the
“ *Man*, and to the *Mite* much greater than
“ to either. And this of necessity from the
“ different Magnitudes and Fabrick of their
“ *Nerves* and *visual Organs*, and from the
“ necessity,

Y
“ Cheyne's Philosophical Principles of Religion, p. 351.

“ necessity of their preservation and seeking
 “ their food.”

SECT. III. 2. *Greatness* or *excellency* is the most general and most proper object of *Admiration*. Even when *littleness* is the immediate object, this is commonly the object that terminates the view. The works of nature or art, which are of an unusual *smallness*, are admired, not so much for their *smallness*, as for the *greatness* of the wisdom or skill conspicuous in them. For we can behold a particle of mere undiversified matter, though incomparably smaller, without any such wonder.

3. *Novelty* is essential to *Admiration* as a Passion only; for though as the object grows familiar the Passion lessens, and is at length scarcely discernable, yet the intellectual affection may still continue. Upon this account *knowledge*, which destroys the Passion of *Admiration* wholly, if the object of it contain things worthy of our contemplation and acquaintance, does proportionably increase that *Admiration*, which is founded not in their *novelty*, but in their real *beauty*, *greatness*, or *excellence*. Were I to advise how the pleasure of the Passion might be best continued, I would say, do not keep the mind too long attentive to what it admires. On the contrary, to one
 who

who is desirous of injoying the pleasure of a rational *Admiration*, I would recommend the closest and longest attention, and the most familiar acquaintance with great and noble objects. The Passion of *Admiration*, after *Adam* had been used to contemplate the glorious scene above, and around him, cannot be supposed as great as it was the first moment he opened his eyes upon it; but the rational impression must be the same or stronger, and the intellectual delight greater, as he grew better acquainted with the immense wisdom, power, and goodness, discoverable in the frame of things.

SECT. IV. 4. The alteration caused by the Passion of *Admiration*, is confined to the spirits lodged in the *Brain*. The *Heart* lies quiet and undisturbed, the reason of which was given before, namely, that the object *immediately* under contemplation is the *novelty* of the thing, not its *good* or *evil* qualities. It is acknowledged that pleasure is joined with *novelty*, and pleasure is the same as good, but then pleasure is not directly the object of *Admiration*, but rather the consequence of it. *Novelty* is the cause why a thing is admired, and the object of *Admiration*; though perhaps did not pleasure go along with the *novelty*, we might admire but should not continue the contemplation of an object, because we

should be without any motive to do it. In other words, *novelty* is the *cause* and the *object* of *Admiration*, and the pleasure arising from *novelty* is the true cause of *curiosity*, in which *Admiration* generally issues. And then further, the pleasure of *novelty* is not a good inherent in the thing *itself*. The same thing may cause *Admiration* in one and not in another, because its being new or old is purely accidental, and makes no change in the thing itself.

5. The *commotion* that follows *Admiration* is soon over. At the instant that the object first presents itself, the spirits are mightily alarmed, and (as Monsieur *Des Cartes* observes) forcibly determined to that part of the *Brain* where the image is newly formed, and to the *Muscles* which serve to hold the external senses in the same posture; but when this is done they settle in a fixed and quiet suspense.

SECT. V. *Admiration* was in general disgrace among the Antients, and condemned particularly for these two reasons, that it was the disease only of *weak* and *ignorant* minds, and that it laid the foundation of an *unhappy* life. This is the thing objected to it by ^b*Horace*.

Nil

*Nil admirari, prope res est una, Numici,
Solaque quæ possit facere & servare beatum.*

Not to admire, is all the Art I know,
To make men happy, and to keep them so.

In answer to this I say, that the Antients do not seem to have taken *Admiration* in a *strict* and *philosophical* sense, but for an *extravagant* opinion of things, expressing itself by excessive hopes and fears about them, as it is certain, from the following lines, that *Horace* understood it.

— *quid censes munera Terræ?
Quid Maris, extremos Arabas ditantis & Indos?
Ludicra quid, plausus, & amici dona Quiritis,
Quo spectanda modo, quo sensu credis, & ore?
Qui timet his adversa, fere miratur eodem
Quo cupiens pacto; Pavor est utrique molestus;
Improvisa simul species exterret utrumque:
Gaudeat, an doleat, cupiat, metuatne, quid ad
rem;*

*Si, quidquid videt melius, pejusve suâ spe,
Defixis oculis, animoque & corpore torpet?*
Ep. 6.

Admire we then what Earth's low entrails
hold,
Arabian shores, or *Indian* seas unfold;
All the mad trade of Fools and Slaves for
Gold?

Or Popularity ? Or Stars and Strings ?
 The Mob's applauses, or the gifts of Kings ?
 Say with what eyes we ought at Courts to gaze,
 And pay the Great our homage of amaze ?
 If weak the pleasure that from these can
 spring,

The fear to want them is as weak a thing :
 Whether we dread, or whether we desire,
 In either case, believe me, we admire ;
 Whether we joy or grieve, the same the curse,
 Surpriz'd at better, or surpriz'd at worse.
 Thus good or bad, to one extreme betray
 Th' unbalanc'd mind, and snatch the man
 away.

Pope.

And if this were their meaning they were much in the right to brand it with a note of infamy, since a man of such a temper forfeits the credit of his understanding, and is infallibly wretched. *Fortis animus* (says *Cicero*) *in rerum externarum despicientia cernitur, cum persuasum sit, nihil hominem nisi quod honestum decorumque sit admirari oportere.* “ A truly great mind discovers it-
 “ self in a contempt of things external, from
 “ a settled persuasion that a man ought to
 “ admire nothing but what is virtuous and
 “ morally beautiful.” But according to the explanation before given of this Passion, no reasonable man will condemn it. *Admira-*
tion,

tion, though the daughter of Ignorance, is the mother of Knowledge. It shows ignorance, but it is as nature gives indications of distempers, in order to their cure. Accordingly it is very observable, that this Passion operates most powerfully in Children, making them inquisitive and willing to take pains to stock and improve their minds, which otherwise would be waste and unfurnished. ^a *Si quas res in vita videmus parvas, usitatas, quotidianas, eas meminisse non solemus; propterea quod nullâ nisi novâ aut admirabiliore commovetur animus. At si quid videmus, aut audimus egregie, turpe, aut honestum, inusitatem, magnum, incredibile, ridiculum, id diu meminisse consuevimus.* “ If we see any
“ thing trifling, usual, and of daily occurrence, we do not commonly remember
“ such things, because the mind is not naturally much affected but with what is
“ new or admirable. But if we see or hear
“ any thing in a great degree vicious, or
“ excellent, uncommon, great, incredible,
“ or ridiculous, these things usually make
“ a deep and lasting impression on the memory.” This is another great advantage we owe to this Passion, that the memory is considerably aided by it; for whereas the images of things would else pass by unheeded, and scarce leave any print behind, *Admiration*, by fixing the view of the mind,

Y 4

impressas
^a Cic. ad Heren. L. 1.

impreses ideas, and renders them more *clear* and *lasting*, and thus by degrees supplies us with the materials of the intellectual building. From this end of *Admiration* it is obvious to infer, that whoever admire things purely for amusement, not to increase their knowledge, are justly to be condemned for contradicting the design of nature.

SECT. VI. *Curiosity* is the effect of *Admiration*, and to *Curiosity* we are indebted for all those fine discoveries which have been made in the several Sciences. ^e Διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον πρῶτα φιλοσοφεῖν, says the *Prince* of the *Peripatetics*. “It was from their proneness to admire that men heretofore, as well as now, learned to philosophize.” I shall advance no more than admits of easy proof if I add, that *Religion* itself is in great measure bred by *Admiration*. For what is it imprints on the mind the belief and reverence of a divine Being, but an admiring view of his works? *Jovis omnia plena*. The creation is nothing else but a heap of wonders, all proclaiming the wisdom of the Deity in forming them, and of man in adoring him upon that account. With how much reason therefore does ^f *Milton* describe the first man, from the contemplation of the surprising scene around

^e *Arist. Metaph. L. 1. C. 2.*

^f *Paradise Lost. B. 5. L. 152. &c.*

around him, rising to this noble acknowledgment and veneration of the boundless perfection of the great Creator.

These are thy glorious works, Parent of good,
Almighty, thine this universal frame,
Thus wondrous fair ; thy self how wondrous
then !

Unspeakable, who fittest above these heavens
To us invisibly, or dimly seen,
In these thy lowest works, yet these declare
Thy goodness beyond thought, and power
divine.

SECT. VII. *Admiration*, according to the different character of its object, is called *Esteem* or *Contempt*. Esteem is the admiration of an object on account of its *excellence* ; Contempt for its *insignificance* or *worthlessness*. Hence it is easily apprehended what is meant by self-esteem and self-abasement, and what by our esteem or contempt of others ; whereof the former is stiled *Veneration*, the latter *Slight* or *Scorn*. Esteem and contempt are in the nature of things the same, whether they regard ourselves or others ; the *joy* or *sorrow* that mingles with them in one case or the other, is extraessential to the Passion itself, § and proceeds from self-love, joining with either of them,
Some

§ See *Mari Ench. Eth. L. 1. C. 8, 14.*

^h Some measure of self-esteem is necessary to give a man a modest assurance, as this latter is necessary to preserve a man from being trampled on by the world. *Tu modo enitere, ut tibi ipse sis tanti, quanti videberis aliis.* Was good advice of ⁱ Pliny to a friend. “Strive to be as deserving in your own impartial judgment, as you would be thought by others.” The chief thing we are to guard against here is *self-conceit*, especially if we are in prosperity. ^k *Tales enim nos tunc esse putamus, ut jure laudemur: ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata, cum homines inflati opinionibus, turpiter irridentur, & in maximis versantur erroribus.* “At such a time we are apt without reason to think ourselves deserving of praise. This vanity betrays us into numberless faults, and exposes us to the most just and severe ridicule.” Self-conceit thus defeats its own design, and by discovering an overweening value of a man’s self, renders him contemptible to others, and reduces him to the condition which ^l *Horace* humourously describes.

Quin sine Rivali teque & tua solus amares.

Left without Rival to admire yourself.

Self-

^h See *Spe&ator*. V. 8. N°. 588.

ⁱ Ep. 3. L. 1.

^k *Cic. De Offic.* L. 1. §. 26.

^l *De Arte Poet.* L. 444.

Self-esteem, or contempt, seem designed to intimate to us, that it is our duty to be and do what may *deserve* our own approbation, and to avoid all such things as would justly lessen us in our own opinion. They should also teach us to be more humane and charitable in our judgment of others, it being reasonable, that when we differ so little from others, and yet are so prone to think well of ourselves, we should not be backward to acknowledge the merit of any man.

The only justifiable cause of *self-esteem* (as *Cartes* with good reason remarks) is the *right use* of one's *Liberty*, because this is the only thing a man can properly call *his own*. The conduct of this by the dictates of sound Reason is true generosity, and of great service to fortify the mind against slander and defamation.

^m—*hic murus abeneus esto,*
Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.

Be this your brazen wall, your sure defence,
Thoughts free from guilt, and conscious innocence.

SECT. VIII. *Veneration* is an esteem of some *free agent*, as in a capacity of being *beneficial* or *hurtful* to us, joined with a desire

^m Horat. L. 1. Ep. 1.

fire of subjecting ourselves to him. There may be *Admiration* of a *Tyrant's* grandeur and dominion, which, being without any desire of putting ourselves within the reach of his power, cannot be called *Veneration*. The account which ^a *Cicero* gives of *true Glory* differs little from *Veneration*. *Summa igitur & perfecta gloria constat ex tribus his, si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat.* "They have attained the highest glory, "who have gained the affection and confidence of a people, and whom with an inward esteem they declare worthy of the chief honours in the commonwealth." The *usefulness* of this *Passion* is best discovered in *civil* and *religious* societies; nor does it obscurely hint to us, that we ought to honour our superiors; and that there is a Providence which hath wisely ordered this *Passion*, to secure the performance of the duties owing from the inferior part of mankind to those above them. *Dedignation* or *Scorn* is *Admiration* in conjunction with *security*, or the contempt of a free agent as *unable* to benefit or to hurt us. ^o *Despiciunt autem eos, & contemnunt, in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant. Non enim omnes contemnunt, de quibus male existimant. Nam quos improbos, maledicos, fraudulentos*

^a De Offic. L. 1. §. 26.

^o Ibid. L. 2. §. 10.

dulentos putant, & ad faciendum injuriam instructos, eos haud contemnunt quidem, sed de his male existimant. "Men look

"down with contempt on those who want
"resolution, prudence, and strength of
"mind and body, but they do not contemn
"all of whom they think ill. Those whom
"they look upon as wicked, slanderous,
"deceitful, and qualified to do mischief,
"though they think ill of and abhor them,
"they by no means despise." The use of
this Passion is to guard the tranquility
of the soul, and to lay that *fear of men*
against which our Saviour cautions (*Luke*
xii. 4.) and which has been so fatal to many
in tempting them to abandon a good cause,
to which they wanted courage to adhere.
Socrates will be for ever quoted as an illu-
strious example, for his contemning the im-
potent malice of *Anytus* and *Melitus*, who
might kill his body, but could do no more.
And this is the only case wherein this Passion
is to be admitted. A scorn of others, as sunk
too low for us to apprehend any thing from
them, is founded in a mistake. The con-
temptuous neglect of any man is not pru-
dent, forasmuch as there is no man of so
little consideration, but he may one time or
other have it in his power to do us a kind-
ness or the contrary. These are the *ends*
and *uses* of *Admiration*, which it never fails
of answering while kept within bounds.

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If we suffer it to pass its proper limits it may be of ill consequence. The *excess* of this Passion is often followed with a stupor or astonishment; and not seldom with that distemper which the Physicians call *Catalepsis*, whereby a man is held motionless and stiff like a statue. This should caution us against the excesses of this Passion, but is no argument against the Passion well regulated.

SECT. IX. The next class of Passions are *Love* and *Hatred*, with their dependants. The antient *Philosophers* meant much the same by their *Επιθυμία και θυμος*, the *concupiscible* and the *irascible* part. Nothing is more known than *Love*, and yet nothing almost harder to be defined. You may take this general idea of it, *Love* is the gravitation or weight of the soul towards *good*. I choose to describe it thus, rather than by a *motion* of the soul, because there is such a thing as *Love at rest*. But even then, though the motion be over, the gravitation continues, and is the cause of the soul's adherence to the beloved object; much after the same manner as it fares with a heavy body when settled on its center. This affection may be conceived separate from any alteration in the body, and is then what we call *intellectual* or *rational Love*; or is attended with an agitation of blood and spirits, and then it is called *sensitive* or *passionate Love*; it is as

as a Passion we are at present concerned with it. *Hatred* is an endeavour of the soul to *disunite* from that which it apprehends to be *evil*. So that the object of these Passions are *good* and *evil*, each of which is either *negative* or *positive*. Negative *good* or *evil* is nothing but the *negation* of the *contrary* in a subject capable of it. Positive *good* or *evil* are terms equivalent to *pleasure* or *pain*.

SECT. X. Before I descend to a more particular view of these Passions, I would make a few *general* observations concerning them.

1. The pleasures or pains conveyed by the *body*, and occasioned by sensible objects, are ordinarily much more lively and forcible in the perception, than those which are *purely intellectual*. The thing is undeniable, and the reason of it, I believe, not hard to be produced, being probably grounded in the different manner of conversing with sensible objects, and the objects of the Understanding. With the former we have a *direct* correspondence, with the latter only by *reflection*; the former we know to exist by a kind of immediate perception, the other by reasoning and deduction. It is therefore no more to be wondered at, that the pleasures and pains of sense should be commonly most pungent, than that the
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fight of any thing should affect more than a mere report about it. However that be, the consequence is plain, that the strongest Passions are produced by sensible objects. The *pure Affection* may be greatest to divine and heavenly things, when the *Passion* exceeds on the side of sense. The good man grieves most for his sins, and yet, perhaps, at the same time, sheds more tears for the loss of a near relation; and while he loves God and delights in him above all things, his joy flows most sensibly after having received some temporal deliverance.

SECT. XI. 2. We have a more lively idea of misery than of happiness. The cause of this lies in the advantage which pain has above pleasure in the present constitution of things. We are not so happy for the time we enjoy pleasure, as we are miserable while we suffer pain. The greater any pleasure is, the shorter is its seeming duration; whereas pain, on the contrary, appears so much the longer. The ways of receiving pleasure are of a stinted number, but pain assaults us innumerable ways. Every part, every member, every pore of the body, as well as every faculty of the soul, may be an inlet to pain. A lesser degree of pain overcomes a greater degree of pleasure, and one trouble is enough to embitter many comforts. I take notice

notice of this to introduce another observation.

3. The Passions that have *evil* for their object (other circumstances being equal) work more violently, than those which terminate on *positive* good or pleasure. ^P *Sunt enim, qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi consent; voluptatem severissime contemnant, in dolore sint molliores; gloriam negligant, frangantur infamia; atque ea quidem non satis constanter.* "It is common to observe persons

" who in contrary circumstances do not preserve a consistent character of Virtue; they can steadily resist the sollicitations of pleasure, but yield to the violence of pain; are indifferent to glory, but cannot stand against disgrace." We see these words of *Cicero* often made good. The *hope* indeed of a *vast good* may weigh more than the *fear* of a *slight evil*; but let the evil be considerable, and conceived to be approaching, men will do more to avoid it out of fear, than they will to secure an equal good that is the object of their hopes. The instruction to be drawn from hence regards the wise Providence of the Creator, since self-preservation is more necessary than affluence, the absence of evil than the presence of good, and pleasure may better be dispensed with than pain can be borne.

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SECT. XII. 4. The ill actions, which men are prevailed on to commit through their *barred of evil*, are for the most part more excusable, than those which are done out of the *love of pleasure*. Ἐκείνῳ μᾶλλον εἰσικεν ἡ Ἀκολασία τῆς Δειλίας, &c. "Incontinence" has more of the *Will* in it than *Fear*, for the object of that is pleasure, of this pain. "Now pain does as it were put a man besides himself, threatening destruction to nature; but it is not so in regard to pleasure, in regard to which therefore we are more voluntary." This justifies the observation of Cicero. *Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur, eum frangi cupiditate: nec, qui invictum se a labore præstiterit, vinci a voluptate.* "It is no way reconcileable with a virtuous character to yield to lust, when we conquer fear; and when we have proved superior to labours, to be subdued by pleasure." For besides that *Fear* takes away more of our liberty than the other Passion, the excess of this last is reckoned an argument of a more corrupt and profligate temper, and to have a complacency in the vicious practice which the other has not. And as *Reason*, so *Law*, puts a difference between them; he that kills

¹ *Arist. Eth. ad Nicom. L. 3. C. 1.* See also an excellent passage to the same purpose quoted from *Theophrastus* by *Antoninus. L. 2. §. 10.*

² *De Offic. L. 1 §. 20.*

kills a man out of *anger* shall escape better than another, who commits the same fact that he may succeed to the possessions of his neighbour. He that steals to prevent *starving* shall have more favour, than one who robs to maintain his *luxury*.

SECT. XIII. 5. The Passions in which *Love* predominates are more agreeable to the *original* intention of nature, than those which are ranged under *Hatred*. This is plain from hence, that they have a more friendly influence upon the body, and tend, within proper bounds, to the preservation and happiness of life which the other do not. " It is a thing well known to *Naturalists* (saith ^f Bishop Cumberland) that " Love, Desire, Hope, Joy, especially " when conversant about some great good, " do mightily assist the motion of the *Blood*, " and *Heart*, which is necessary to animal " life; so that the *Arteries* and *Veins* are " filled with a fluid of a milder nature, and " more fit for circulation; spirits of a more " agile kind are generated, and the whole " circulation of the *Blood*, and by consequence all the animal functions, are performed with greater freedom. On the " contrary, in *Hatred*, *Envy*, *Fear*, *Sadness*, " the motion of the *Blood* is obstructed, and " the *Heart* so oppressed that it cannot exert

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" itself

^f De Legibus Naturæ. C. 2. §. 19.

" itself as it should. From hence the coun-
 " tenance becomes pallid, and innumerable
 " inconveniences follow in the intire œco-
 " nomy of the body, more especially in the
 " functions of the *Brain* and *Nerves*; as
 " for instance, the diseases usually attribu-
 " ted to the *Spleen* and *Melancholy*." Af-
 ter which having given, from *Dr. Harvey*,
 the history of a person who consumed away
 with the desire of a revenge which he could
 not accomplish, he makes this reflection.
 " That men are admonished by the very
 " nature of the animal affections, that it is
 " for their advantage to be of as benevolent
 " a disposition towards all as possible, since
 " the hatred of a single person was so fatal
 " to the man who harboured it." To pro-
 ceed now to particulars.

SECT. XIV. *Love* regarding its object as
absent begets *Desire*; as *present* either imme-
 diately or in prospect, in reality or imagina-
 tion, it breeds *Joy*. *Love* of *Desire*, ab-
 stractedly considered, is a *simple tendency to-*
wards good, and retains its name of *Desire*.
 When considered as wishing the good de-
 sired to some Being or other, it is called
Benevolence. These two are in fact insepa-
 rably united, it being impossible that any
 one should desire a thing for no one's sake;
 however, it will be never the worse if we
 treat of them distinctly. *Desire* being a
 most

most vigorous and spritely principle is the original of *Diligence* and *Activity*. All the powers of nature without this would be dormant, and the most charming objects be unable to provoke us to the pursuit of them. The motion of the *Heart* in strong desires is extremely vehement, and from the *Heart* great forces of spirits are detached to the several members of the body, which dispose a man for action, and give a briskness and chearfulness to his endeavours. For as my Lord *Bacon* says excellently, "Human life
" destitute of some great end, either really
" so, or in fancy, hath nothing of *Race*,
" nothing of vigour in it, but is faint and
" languishing for want of desire to animate
" it. Which shows the miserable case of
" *Kings*, who have *few* things to *desire*,
" and *many* things to *fear*. Whence it
" comes, that *Princes* many times make
" themselves desires, and set their hearts
" upon toys. The reason is, that the mind
" of man is more cheared and refreshed by
" profiting in small things, than by stand-
" ing at a stay in great." As we would
have *Desire* to be a blessing, and answer
the ends for which it was planted in our na-
ture, we must neither let it loose to objects
that are not in our power, nor indulge it to-
wards those that are to an excessive degree;
which would create a pain greater than the

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pleasure

pleasure of fruition amounts to; nay, and prevent the satisfaction which we should otherwise derive from the enjoyment; for this is found by constant experience to be always the *less*, in proportion as it was *over-valued* in the desire and expectation. Upon this account we should consider the end of this Passion; and seeing that is manifestly to excite and quicken us in the prosecution of some good, we ought as it were to suspend, or lay it aside, till we are upon the point of execution, least it spend itself in fruitless efforts; the consequence of which will be, that the spirits will be exhausted, their edge blunted, and we shall have little heart or strength left when there is occasion for them.

SECT. XV. *Benevolence* or *Desire* considered as having at once some *good thing* in view, and *some person* on whose account this good is desired, either centers in a man's *self*, or in some *other person*; if in himself it is *Self-love*; if in another *Charity*, or *Benevolence* in the more *usual* acceptation of the word. *Self-love* is a word of itself innocent enough, did not custom apply it to signify a very bad thing; nor is the affection to be found fault with, when it is well regulated; for it can be no crime surely for a man to love himself. *Self-love* is inseparable from our Beings; and as to the general

ral Passion no way in our power. " *Principio generi animantium omni est a Natura tributum, ut se, vitam, corpusque tueatur, declinetque ea, quæ nocitura videantur, omniaque, quæcumque ad vivendum sint necessaria, inquirat, & peret.* " This is the " first desire implanted in every kind of " animal by nature, the desire of preserving " itself, its body and life, and avoiding what- " ever appears hurtful, and of finding out " and procuring whatever is necessary for " supporting its life." *Self-love* is also made the *measure* of that love we owe our neighbour; and, as shall be shown in another place, is the plainest and most compendious rule that was ever thought on. As they *revile* human nature who deny the possibility of any such thing as a *disinterested Benevolence*, so they, on the other hand, seem not well to *understand* it, who allow little or nothing to *Self-love*. Concerning which " *Cumberland* hath this ingenious observation. " That they who would be " thought to neglect rewards, and endeavour to deduce all the Virtues from Gratitude only, are yet under a necessity of " acknowledging, that Gratitude flows from " the memory of benefits received. Now " it argues as much *Self-love*, that we are " excited to do well by benefits already

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" con-

^u Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 4.

^w De Leg. Nat. Prolegom. §. 23.

“ conferred, as when we are influenced by
“ the hope of the like to come. Yea, in
“ some respects he acts more generously,
“ who is excited by a good only hoped for
“ (since hope always supposes something of
“ uncertainty) than another, who does the
“ same things for the sake of equal advan-
“ tages, of which he has already the cer-
“ tain possession.” That Gratitude shews
more of *Self-love* than Hope does, or even
as much, I cannot think with this Author ;
for though Gratitude supposes *Self-love* as a
remote foundation, yet as the grateful per-
son has no regard to his own advantage in
being grateful, and the benefits he requites
would be as much his own if he was un-
grateful, it is but just to him to acknow-
ledge, that Gratitude as such is disinterested,
being excited by a sense of the goodness of
the disposition, and directly terminating in
the good of the benefactor. That Grati-
tude and Hope are plain indications that
Self-love is a part of human nature is certain,
and sufficient to our purpose.

SECT. XVI. Were it not for *Self-love*
the Laws of God, in the present degeneracy
of mankind, would be of little or no force.
Even that ingenuous obedience which good
men perform to the divine Commands, tho’
it be the *immediate* fruit of *Love to God*, had
its first rise from *Self-love*. The Passion
then

then is not possibly to be extinguished, and if it were, ought not to be so out of prudence; but it is according to our management of the natural affection, the measures we take to gratify it, and the good or bad principles upon which we cherish it, that we make a Virtue or a Sin of Necessity. There are these two *Rules* which ought never to be forgotten in the government of *Self-love*. The *first* is, that we do not *misapply* it, mistaking one part of our composition, and that the worst too, for *ourselves*, being more careful for our bodies than for our souls, for the interests of this life, than about the concerns of eternity. The *second* rule is, that we do not suffer *Self-love* to ingross us so far, as to exclude the love due from us to others, or the love of God for *himself*, and the love of Virtue as such; for as * *Cicero* well observes. *Qui Summum Bonum suis commodis, non honestate metitur, si sibi ipsi consentiat, neque amicitiam colere possit, nec justitiam, nec liberalitatem.* "He who places the chief happiness of man "in any private advantages or enjoyments, "separate from Virtue, if he be consistent "with himself, can neither be a friend, just, "or liberal." This minds me of the other branch of *Benevolence* (to which in common language the name *Benevolence* is confined) which is stiled,

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* De Offic. L. 1. §. 2.

SECT. XVII. *Charity*, or the love of others. Some have thought (as particularly Mr. *Hobbes*, who herein, as well as in many other of his opinions, was a follower of the *Epicureans*) that the love of others, however *disinterested* it might sometimes appear, is only *Self-love* in disguise. But how little reason there is for such a narrow notion as this will be seen, if we only consider, that we are commanded ⁷ to love our Neighbour as ourselves; which we are so far from doing (if Mr. *Hobbes* says true) that we do not love him at all. That *Benevolence* is a *natural* affection is thus easily proved. In all intelligent Beings, whose faculties are undepraved, it is natural for the affections to be conformable to right Reason. Where Reason directs one way, and the affections of the soul draw another, nature cannot be in its original rectitude. Now every man's Reason, at the same time that it directs him to seek his own happiness in the most likely methods of acquiring it, will tell him, that it is fit every other man, who has not forfeited his title to it, should be happy as well as himself, and that he should contribute to it, so far at least as he will not prejudice himself by so doing. This natural Reason dictates, and to this therefore the affections must be naturally inclined.

SECT,

⁷ Luke x. 27.

SECT. XVIII. But to proceed from *Reason* to matter of fact; the *pity* which naturally and immediately arises in the human bosom on sight of persons in distress, and the *satisfaction* of mind which is the consequence of having removed them into a happier state, are instead of a thousand arguments to prove *disinterested Benevolence* to be *natural* to man. We appeal to every man's own feeling, and may well trust the cause upon this issue. Did *pity* proceed from a reflection we make upon our liableness to the same ill accidents which we see befall others, it were nothing to the present purpose; but this is assigning an *artificial* cause of a *natural* Passion, and can by no means be admitted as a tolerable account of it; because *Children*, and persons most *thoughtless* about their own condition, and incapable of entering into the prospects of futurity, feel the most violent touches of compassion. If we reflect upon what passes within, do we not find our compassion for others, and desire of relieving them, and our good wishes for others, and joy in their prosperity, in a thousand instances *going before*, and *unattended* with any consideration of our being in any danger from their evils, or having any interest in their prosperity? Remove the scene to the most *distant* ages and *nations*, and we as naturally and readily *feel* for the
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the unfortunate, and *wish well* especially to the honest, the kind, the brave, and well deserving, and injoy peculiar *satisfaction* in their prosperity. And then as to that charming delight which immediately follows the giving joy to another, or relieving his sorrow, and which, when the objects are numerous, and the kindness of importance, is really inexpressible; what can this be owing to, but a consciousness of a man's having done something praise worthy, and expressive of a great soul? Whereas, if in all this he only sacrificed to vanity and *Self-love*, as there would be nothing generous in actions that make the most shining appearance, so nature would not have rewarded them with this divine pleasure; nor could the commendations which a person receives for benefits done upon selfish views, be at all more satisfactory, than when he is applauded for what he doth without design, because in both cases the ends of *Self-love* are equally answered. The conscience of approving one self a benefactor to mankind is the noblest recompence for being so; doubtless it is, and the most interested cannot propose any thing so much to their own advantage; notwithstanding which the inclination is nevertheless unselfish. The pleasure which attends the gratification of our hunger and thirst, is not the cause of these appetites, they are previous to any such

such prospect ; and so likewise is the desire of doing good, with this difference, that being seated in the intellectual part, this last, though antecedent to Reason, may yet be improved and regulated by it, and is no otherwise a Virtue than as it is so.

SECT. XIX. This *Love* to others as it regards *all* in common still keeps its name of *Charity*, of which I shall have occasion to discourse more at large hereafter. As it is contracted like the beams of the sun in a burning glass, and falls in a more especial manner on some select person or persons, there are these *two* remarkable species of it, *Friendship*, and *natural Affection*. Though *Friendship* may seem too refined to be a Passion, yet that it is so is visible enough ; for when two friends meet or part, the countenance puts on a different air, the heart beats faster or slower, and the spirits sink or rise after the most surprising manner. Few natures are so savage but we discern the seeds of this Passion in them, by the choice which they make of some particular companions or favourites, for whom they have a stronger fancy and kindness than for others. It has been very unjustly made an objection against *Christianity*, “ that it has nothing in “ commendation of *Friendship*,” since the *Founder* of this Religion was himself an eminent example of it ; who, together with
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the generous love he had for all mankind, and more especially for his Disciples, honoured one of them with the distinguishing character of his ² *beloved Disciple*. By this Passion nature hath intimated the great importance of *Friendship* to human life, and the care which should be taken in the choice of a friend, and in the regulation of our commerce after he is chosen.

SECT. XX. The *Storgē* of the Greeks, in *English*, *natural Affection* (as the word is translated *Rom. i. 31.*) is that Passion which endears natural Relations one to the other. The affection between *Parents* and *Children* is more especially denoted by this word.
^a *Commune animantium omnium est cura quædam eorum, quæ procreata sunt.* "There is
 "planted by nature in all animals an affection to their off-spring." But there is a great difference betwixt the natural affection of mankind, and that of other animals to their young. These latter as soon as their young are capable of shifting for themselves abandon the care of them, while mankind extend their cares not barely to the preservation of their Childrens lives, but the adorning of their minds, and are prompted by an affection which dies not with their Childrens want of them, but outlives that, and

² John xix 26, 27.

^a *Cic. de Offic. L. 1. §. 4.*

and the Children themselves too. As *Self-love* was designed for the conservation of the individual, the intention of this was to perpetuate the species. This affection extends also to other natural Relations. ^b *Sanguinis autem conjunctio, & benevolentia devincit caritate homines. Magnum est enim, habere eadem monumenta majorum, iisdem uti sacris, sepulchra habere communia.* "The ties of
 " blood unite men strongly in affection and
 " friendship. For it has great weight with
 " men, to have the same monuments of
 " their common ancestors, to use the *same*
 " *sacred rites*, and to have the same bury-
 " *ing place.*" These are the words of *Cicero*, upon which I shall make a Reflection, which I judge to be well grounded. It is not *merely* the *relation* itself that ingages mens affections one to another, but the having an interest in the same progenitors, and perhaps not so much the former as the latter. The mutual respect for these common fountains in which they unite, creates an esteem for each other. A *second* thing I
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^b *Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 17.*

^c In ipsis veterum ædibus erant *Penates* cuius familix proprii, & eo ipso differebant a *Laribus*, quippe qui erant *communes* omnibus. — Utrisque simulachra dedicata erant, & aræ posite ac foci, res in domo sanctissima; a quibus nemo poterat sine ingente scelere abstrahi. Quemadmodum vero ad hæc sacra non nisi illi admittebantur, ad quos aliquando transitura esset sacrorum hæreditas; ita non arctior poterat esse conjunctio, quam qua quis in alterius gentem & sacra transferat. *Heinscii, Antiquit. Roman. Syntagma. V. 1. p. 144.*

would remark is, that this *Benevolence* generally springs from external considerations, such as those mentioned by *Cicero*, which makes me think, that there is not so much endearment now between Relations, as in those times when there were so many things common to persons of the same kindred and family. The same nature, the same country, the same blood, attract love, both as they are *common* and as they are *distinguishing*; and the affection is more intense the less common these are, and the more distinguishing.

SECT. XXI. It is worthy of observation, that the *Love* is usually greater of *Parents* to their *Children*, than of *Children* to their *Parents*. This is a manifest proof of the *wisdom* of divine Providence, which has suited the degrees of this Passion to the ends which it was designed to serve; for the *Love* of Parents to their Children is more necessary for the preservation of their helpless offspring, and of more consequence to society, than, *vice versa*, an equal affection in Children to their Parents. Parents can do more for their Children than their Children for them; and it is much seldomer that these need the help and direction of the other, than that the other are obliged to these. And from hence we learn what boundaries are to be set to this Passion. For the usefulness

fulness of it being what the Author of nature intended in planting it within us, we should never let it run to that extreme, which would make it prove an injury rather than a benefit, either to Parents or Children. This is done, when by over indulgence Parents ruin their Children while alive, or by their too passionate affection for them when dead (at what time it can never answer nature's end in giving this tenderness) prejudice their own health and tranquillity. To this reason of the extraordinary *Love* of Parents to their Children I shall add two others.

1. The desire of *immortality*; which obtains so far, that there are few who would not be immortal in every thing belonging to them, and are not loth to die even in their names and memories. Hence it proceeds, that Children giving us a prospect of enjoying this imaginary kind of immortality, our affection to them is raised to a higher degree than otherwise it would be.

2. There is in man, as a sociable creature, a desire of being beneficial to the world, and Children affording us hopes that they will prove serviceable in it (by which means we shall become useful, at least at second hand; the Parent having some kind of interest in his Childrens virtuous actions, if the effect of a good education) nature hath taught us, in pursuance both of the

principles of Self-love and of universal Benevolence, to love Children likewise upon this account. So much for *Desire*, or *Love*, regarding its object as *absent*.

SECT. XXII. When the object is *present*, *Love* produces *Joy* or *Delight*. And a thing may be *really* present, or *presentiated* to the mind, and this two ways. 1. A good may as it were be made present by *Faith* and *Hope*, of which it will not be proper to treat here, but under the *mixed* Passions. 2. It may be made present by pure *Fancy* and *Idea*. Persons of a strong imagination can transport themselves into a Paradise of their own forming, and are often so taken up with the creation of their own brain, that they have scarcely the leisure to reflect, that it is otherwise than real. The folly of indulging to such imaginations you may see ingeniously exposed in the *Spectator*, in the story of the *Glass Man*, and by *Gay* in his *Fables*. This extraordinary force of imagination is commonly seen in mad people; and it being necessary that there should be some degree of it in most of the productions of wit, especially those of Poets, hence came that saying, *Nullum bonum ingenium sine mixtura Dementiae*.

Great Wits to Madness still are near allied,
And thin partitions do the bounds divide.

Dryden.

SECT

SECT. XXIII. As to these pleasures of *Fancy* we are to take heed. 1. That we do not entertain ourselves with them too often, least thereby we bring ourselves out of conceit with our real condition, and are kept from aiming to better it; which however strange it may seem, is the natural consequence. One would think that after having represented a fine and delightful scene to ourselves, and found how far it surpasses our real circumstances, the next thing we should do would be, endeavour to supply what is wanting. But on the contrary, the usual effect is, that we repeat those pleasures of the imagination the oftner, and cover the defects of our condition with gay but false colours; and thus content ourselves with a *dream* of Learning, Virtue, or Riches, while we are in reality ignorant, vicious, and poor. And as long as we can do this, we shall never be at the pains to lay a solid foundation of satisfaction. 2. When we give way to such imaginations, we ought never to indulge them so far, but that we should carry with us this reflection; *that it is all mere imagination*. It may be objected, that the pleasure will hereby be destroyed. It will be lessened, I confess, but not intirely taken away; and, which will more than ballance this inconvenience, we shall by this method prevent the regret

that would otherwise seize us when the play is over, and waking as it were out of this pleasant dream, we find ourselves to have been under a delusion.

SECT. XXIV. As to that *Joy* which springs from the real presence of the beloved object, there are these two rules to be remembered. 1. Our *Joy* should never exceed the value of the object. The reason is, that though *Joy* may rise, as it is too apt to do, at the first possession above its external cause, it gradually subsides and sinks so much the lower, as it was before too high. When we see ourselves to have been in a mistake, we are always disgusted with that which led us, though innocently, into it. 2. Our *Joy* should be less or greater in proportion to the fixedness or uncertainty of the enjoyment. The thing enjoyed may possibly be of considerable worth, notwithstanding which I should be very imprudent to let loose the reins to *Joy*, if I am in danger every moment to be deprived of it. For who does not see, that the more I am taken up with the fruition, the less prepared I shall be for the loss; which will be felt the more, for the unallayed pleasure which I had in the enjoyment? What an unanswerable argument is this against the excessive love of this world and its good things, that

that they are not only of little worth, but uncertain too.

SECT. XXV. Before I leave this head of *Joy*, I would take notice of one peculiar sort of *Delight*, which arises from the contemplation of *Beauty*. Some appropriate the name of *Complacency* to this species of *Delight*, and confine it to the objects of *Sense*, giving this as the reason why those desires which arise from *Complacency* and *Horror* are the most violent, namely, because they are owing to sensible objects, which are always most forcible in their operation. But certainly there is such a thing as *intellectual Beauty*; *Virtue* is so, being nothing else than the symmetry, proportion, and good order of the powers and passions of the mind, and actions of the life, consenting among themselves, and with the Law of Reason and of God. And if it be natural for us to be charmed with *corporeal Beauty*, the design no doubt was, that by this we might be led to the love of *intellectual*, which our Reason will tell us must surpass *corporeal*, as much as the subject in which it is seated is nobler than the other. The *Heathen Philosophers* had the same sentiments of this matter; ^a *Cicero* particularly exceeds himself when he talks of it. *Nec verò illa parva vis naturæ est, rationisque,*

A a 3

quod

^a De Offic. L. 1. §. 4, 5. §. 28.

Quod unum hoc animal sentit, quid sit ordo, quid sit, quod deceat, in factis, dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum, quæ adspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura, ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multò etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat: cavetque ne quid indicorè, effeminatevè faciat; tum in omnibus & opinionibus, & factis, ne quid libidinosè aut faciat aut cogitet.—Formam quidem ipsam, Marce Fili, & tanquam faciem honesti vides; quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, (ut ait Plato) excitaret sapientiæ. “ It is no small excellence of our

“ rational nature, that man alone of all
 “ animals has an idea of order and decency,
 “ and a harmony in words and actions,
 “ Even in the objects of sight no other animal apprehends a beauty, regularity, and
 “ proportion of the several parts; which
 “ Reason transferring from the eyes to the
 “ mind, and from sensible to moral objects,
 “ determines that beauty, consistency, and
 “ order are much more to be studied and
 “ maintained in our designs and actions;
 “ that we should avoid all indecency and
 “ effeminacy of behaviour, and all immodesty of thought and action.—I have
 “ sketched out to you, Son Marcus, what
 “ I may call the form and countenance of
 “ Virtue,

“ Virtue, which (as *Plato* says) if it could
 “ be made visible to the eye would excite a
 “ strong affection.” I shall conclude the
 whole with an observation taken from Dr.
More, which I believe to be just. By that
deliquium, or *failure of Sense*, which is some-
 times the effect of an extreme *Joy*, nature
 seems to signify, that the soul is capable of
 greater pleasure and felicity, than the struc-
 ture of these mortal bodies has fitted them
 to bear.

SECT. XXVI. I pass on to the consider-
 ation of *Hatred*, which I defined before, an
 endeavour of the soul to *disunite* from that
 which it apprehends to be *evil*. *Hatred* of
 an evil begets a desire of escaping it when
 distant; and supposing it to be past, or we
 find ourselves out of danger of it, *Joy*. As
 much as to say, we should bear our suffer-
 ings the more chearfully at present, because
 when they are over they will create *Joy* in
 the reflection.

—*Forsàn & hæc olim meminisse juvabit.*

“ It will be pleasant hereafter to look back
 “ on the dangers we are now encoun-
 “ tering.” When the evil is present it
 produces *Grief*, together with a desire of get-
 ting clear of it. *Grief* is necessary in the
 present state to rouze us, and set us on our

guard against what is hurtful and destructive; to ballast the mind against a thoughtless levity, to temper our carnal Joy, and as a silent monitor that we are not yet arrived at the region of happiness. The desire of escaping an evil may be considered as *solitary*, without desiring it may fall upon some other person, and then we term it a *hatred of flight* or *aversion*. They are only *moral* evils, or the evils of the next life, and troubles of our own creating, that we may desire absolutely to avoid. As to the outward troubles and afflictions of life, we should only desire to be kept from them, on condition the wise disposer of things sees it to be best. When with the desire of escaping an evil ourselves, there is joined a desire that it may befall some other person, it is called *Malevolence*, or hatred to the persons of others; which seems to be intirely unlawful, unless we could know a person to be absolutely abandoned of God, which it is impossible we should without a particular revelation; or unless we have good reason to think, the evil may prove a means of reforming the person, and thus produce a greater good. Though we may hate the *vices* of men we ought to wish well to their *persons*. As to *Grief*, if the cause of it be *moral* evil, or evil committed, it is a commendable Passion, and ought to be cherished so far, as that it may be a punishment of
of

of our folly and wickedness, and produce repentance and endeavours of amendment, but no further. As to the *natural* evils of this world, we ought to grieve very moderately for them, abstracting from the sins that procured them, because they are ordered by infinite wisdom and goodness, there is hope they will blow over, and it is certain at the furthest they will end in death.

Consult on this Chapter, besides the Books mentioned under the former,

Mori Encheir. Eth. L. 1. C. 7, 8, 9.

Hutcheson's Inquiry of Beauty and Virtue.
Treat. 2. Sect. 2.

— of the Passions. Sect. 3 & 4. 1 & 2 Sect.
are proper to be read under the former
Chapter.

Stubbs's Dialogue on Beauty.

Turnbull's Principles of Moral Philosophy.
P. 1. C. 1. p. 46. &c. C. 2. p. 69. C. 6
& 7. & P. 2. C. 2.

Cheyne of Health and Long Life. C. 6.

Spectator on the Pleasures of the Imagination.
Vol. 6. N^o. 412, 413, 414, &c.
Vol. 8. N^o. 588, 611.



CHAP. IX.

Of the mixed Passions, those that have Admirati^{on} blended with them, and those which are compounded only of the Passions which fall under Love and Hatred.

SECT. I. **T**HE Passions hitherto discoursed of are simple in their nature, those yet behind are *mixed* and *compounded*. They may be ranked into two orders, such as have something of *Admirati^{on}* in their composition, and such as are compounded only of the Passions which fall under *Love* and *Hatred*.

I. There are Passions in the composition of which *Admirati^{on}* is a principal ingredient, viz. *Ambition*, *Glory*, *Shame*, *Emulation*, *Horror*, and *Consternation*.

SECT. II. *Ambition* is the Passion men have for grandeur; *Admirati^{on}* and *Desire* are the two parts of it. This Passion is not amiss if directed aright; on the contrary, it was

was infused into our natures as a fire to ferment and exalt them. ^a *Sallust* has a most judicious reflection to this purpose. *Primo magis Ambitio quam Avaritia animos hominum exercebat; quod tamen Vitium propius Virtutem erat.* "Ambition got footing in the world before Avarice, being more agreeable to nature; and though a Vice, approaching nearer to a Virtue, and indeed capable of being easily transformed into one." Every man is filled with a certain vague and indeterminate idea of greatness, to which he aspires, and which, if he made a true estimate of things, he would find worldly grandeur to be so far from filling up, as not to deserve any share of his *Ambition*. This is the true reason that men are never satisfied with this sort of greatness, but still reaching higher. ^b *Habet hoc Vitium omnis Ambitio, non respicit.* "This is the universal fault of the ambitious, they are still looking higher." No present greatness answers the idea they have within them, which represents something infinitely more noble and elevated; which something when it comes to be unfolded, is at bottom nothing else but that glory and perfection, to which the human nature shall be raised in the state of the blessed. This therefore should be the highest mark of our *Ambi-*

^a De Bello Catalin.

^b Seneca.

Ambition, and subordinate to this, a present dominion over ourselves, not over others. For as ^c *Cicero* with his usual sagacity takes notice. *Veri videndi cupiditati adjuncta est appetitio quædam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene a natura informatus velit, nisi præcipienti, aut docenti, aut utilitatis causa, justè, & legitimè imperanti; ex quo animi magnitudo existit, humanarumque rerum contemptio.*

“ To the desire of knowledge is joined in
 “ man a desire of superiority and indepen-
 “ dence, so that a mind that understands
 “ its own worth loves liberty, and cares
 “ not to be subject to any, excepting such
 “ as direct and advise him for his good, or
 “ ruling according to good laws injoin what
 “ is right, and for the common good.
 “ Hence arises greatness of mind, and a
 “ contempt of the world.” By the word *principatus* in this passage *Cicero* means liberty and a freedom from all slavish dependence, as appears by the explication that follows. This natural Passion for liberty shows the absurdity of all endeavours to enslave others; since all are alike fond of liberty, and have the very same right to it. A *tyrannical Ambition* has often the most fatal consequences, and gives every age abundant reason to curse it. And because this ^d *false Ambition* is that which mankind generally

^c De Offic. L. 1. §. 4.

^d Ibid. L. 1. §. 19.

rally run into, from hence it hath happened that *Ambition* is become the name of a *Vice*.

SECT. III. *Glory* and *Shame* have for their objects such things as tend to procure men *Esteem* or *Contempt*, *Praise* or *Disgrace*, from themselves or others. *Glory* is made up of *Joy*, *Self-love*, and *Esteem*. No *Passion* is more natural to great minds; the pulse of the heart is not more necessary, than this noble pulse of the soul. * *Etiam sapientibus cupido Gloriæ novissima exuitur*, says *Tacitus*.

“The desire of *Glory* is the last *Passion* a “wise man puts off.” By kindling the hope of an honest fame, it is a spur to laudable and useful enterprizes. Let us remember to build our *Glory* upon *Virtue*, to prefer *Virtue* itself to the praise of it, that is, the substance before the shadow; and to act so, as that it may appear we do not so much pursue *Glory* as are followed by it; and can be satisfied with the approbation of God and of our own consciences, when through corruption, or out of envy, the world is unjust to us, detracts from our best actions, and loads us with censures and reproaches. There is something truly great in the character which^f *Sallust* gives of

Cato.

* Hist. Lib. 4. And to the same purpose *Simplic.* C. 48.
Εσχατος λεγεται των Παθων χιτων η φιλοδοξια.

^f De Bello Catalin.

Cato. *Esse quam videri bonus malebat, ita quo minus Gloriam petebat, eo magis illam adsequebatur.* “ He was more studious to “ be really good, than to appear so; and “ thus the less he aimed at *Glory*, the more “ he acquired.” For the sentiment of “ *Pliny* on this head is very just. *Quanto majore animo honestatis fructus in conscientia, quam in fama reponatur, sequi enim Gloria non appeti debet.* “ How much greater his “ mind, who places the reward of Virtue “ in the pleasures of a good conscience, “ than his who seeks it in fame; for *Glory* “ should be rather the consequence than “ the motive of good actions.” If we desire *Glory* therefore, let us do it not so much for its own sake, as for the capacity into which it puts us of doing more honour and service to the cause of Virtue and Religion; and within this limitation we shall preserve the innocence of this Passion.

SECT. IV. *Shame* is compounded of *Sorrow*, *Self-love*, with some mixture of *Contempt*. From this account of *Shame* it appears, that neither the best nor the worst men are capable of it. Not the best, because conscious to themselves that they make a right use of their faculties, and are above contempt; nor the worst of men neither, because through custom they have over-

overcome the modesty of the rational nature. Among all the Passions there is not one more *powerful* than this, nor perhaps more *serviceable* to mankind. Such is the force of *Shame* as to over-rule the *fear* of death itself. Witness those of the female sex, who having given up their Virtue, to prevent the *Shame* which would attend the discovery of their lewdness, stifle the fruit of it in defiance to the Law, to which their lives are forfeited by the murder of their infants. Witness also the many thousands who meet death in the *Field*, or in the *Breach*, to avoid what appears to them more terrible, the reproach of cowardice. For I am verily persuaded, that to one who is acted by true courage, the love of their country, or the desire of glory, there are ten whom the dread of disgrace pushes forward in battle. *Shame* is a bridle upon corrupted nature, it restrains multitudes from doing ill, and brings others to repentance after they have done it. The first we may call *antecedent*, the other *consequent Shame*. This Passion may have some bad effects, as in those infamous women before mentioned; but if a woman here and there murder her innocent child to hide her *Shame*, how many of both sexes are kept from the sin that led to it, merely by this inward check? We may say of a man *past Shame*,

Shame, that he is *past Hope*. ^b *Nam negligere quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti.* "For to
 " be wholly regardless what men think of us
 " is the mark, not only of an arrogant, but
 " an abandoned mind." Whereas on the
 contrary, according to the observation of the
ⁱ *Poet*, a sense of *Shame* is a proof of some
 remaining sense of *Virtue*. *Erubuit—Salva
 res est.* "He blushes—There is hope of
 " him."

SECT. V. There is a virtuous, a natural;
 and a vicious *Shame*. A virtuous *Shame* is
 that which secures us against secret sins from
 a reverence of the divine *Omnipresence*, and of
 our own *Reason* and *Conscience*. A natural
Shame is chiefly caused by the consideration
 of our fellow creatures; concerning which
 there is this remarkable, that where there
 is *Reason*, though it be but in its dawn, as
 in ^k *Children*, or blended with corruption,
 as in wicked men, we do not care to have
 it a witness of our follies and vices. A vi-
 cious *Shame* is that which makes men dis-
 claim Religion and Virtue, when they have
 not the *fashion* or *company* of their side.
 This *Shame* argues a base and dastardly spi-
 rit,

^b *Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 28.*

ⁱ *Teren. Adelp. Act. 4. Sce. 5.*

^k *Maxima debetur Puero Reverentia.—*

Juv. Sat. 14. v. 17.

rit, and has destroyed thousands. To be ashamed of what is in itself excellent, amiable, and praise worthy, out of regard to the wrong judgments of the thoughtless, the ignorant, and debauched, is as absurd and unreasonable, as it would be to swallow poison, and refuse wholesome food, out of deference to the opinions of a parcel of mad men, among whom we happened to fall.

SECT. VI. *Emulation* is a generous ardor kindled by the brave examples of others, to imitate, to rival, and if we can excel them. There is involved in this Passion esteem of the person whom we emulate, of the qualities and actions in which we emulate him, and a desire of resemblance, together with a joy springing from the hope of success. Every one must be sensible of the use of this Passion, as a motive to things great and praise worthy. There is in the animal part an aversion to labour, which makes us glad of any excuse for humouring our sloth, and ready to interpret what is a little difficult to be impossible. Now examples deprive us of this refuge; for what is done, or has been done by others, may be done by us, and we are ashamed to be in the rear of mankind, and to come short of those, who set out in the world with no greater advantages than ourselves.

Extremis pudeat rediisse.—

Virg. Æn. L. 5.

“ Let Shame at least prevent our being di-
 “ stanced by all.” *Theses, Themistocles,*
Cæsar, with many others, that might be
 mentioned from history, are celebrated in-
 stances of the power of this Passion. Nay,
Emulation is not only of use to single per-
 sons, but to whole States. “ The death
 “ of *Epaminondas*, General of the *Thebans*,
 “ during whose time *Thebes* even rivaled
 “ *Athens*, was no less fatal (as ¹ *Dr. Potter*
 “ well observes) to the *Athenians* than it
 “ was to his own Country; for now there
 “ being none whose Virtues they could
 “ emulate, or whose Power they could
 “ fear, they lorded it without a rival; and
 “ being glutted with too much prosperity
 “ gave themselves over to idleness and lux-
 “ ury, which at last ended in the destructi-
 “ on of their glory by *Philip*.” ^m *Sallust*
 makes the same observation as to *Rome* and
Carthage, only that he ascribes the Virtues
 of the *Romans* not to *Emulation* but *Fear*.
Metus hostilis civitatem in bonis artibus reti-
nebat. “ The fear of the enemy kept the
 “ city observant of useful arts and disci-
 “ pline.” He might more justly have men-
 tioned

¹ Greek Antiq. V. 1. p. 10.

^m De Bello Jugurth.

tioned both as conspiring causes, if the word *metus* does not imply the other too. And ^a *Velleius Paterculus* mentions both. *Remoto Carthaginis metu, sublataque imperii æmula, non gradu sed præcipiti cursu a Virtute descitum, ad Vitia transcursum.* “The fear of
 “ *Carthage* being removed, and the rival in
 “ empire destroyed, the *Roman* people did
 “ not decline gradually from *Virtue*, but
 “ run headlong into *Vice*.” The abuse we are chiefly to guard against in relation to this *Passion* is, that it does not betray us into *Envy*; that not being able to raise ourselves to the height to which others have climbed, we do not wish their fall, much less help to pull them down.

SECT. VII. *Horror* arises from the sight of objects that have something in them vast and frightful. It is a compound of *Admiration* and *Fear*; not without a mixture of *Pleasure* sometimes, from which if predominant it is denominated a *pleasing Horror*. Such a *Horror* seizes us at the view of vast and hanging precipices, a tempestuous ocean, or wild and solitary places. This *Passion* is the original of *Superstition*, as a wise and well tempered awe is of *Religion*.

° *Jam tum Relligio pavidos terrebat agrestes
 Dira loci; jam tum sylvam saxumque tremebant.*

B b 2

Hoc

^a L. 2. §. 1.° *Virgil. Æn. L. 8. v. 349.*

*Hoc nemus, hunc, inquit, frondoso vertice collem
 (Quis Deus, incertum est) habitat Deus; Arcades
 ipsum
 Credunt se vidisse Jovem, cum sæpe nigrantem
 Ægida concuteret dextra, nimbosque cieret.*

A reverent Fear, (such superstition reigns
 Amongst the rude,) ev'n then possesst the
 Swains.

Huge rocks and gloomy woods their minds
 dismay,

Some God they knew, what God they could
 not say,

Amidst these sacred Horrors did abide.

Great Jove himself, 'tis said, they've seen to
 ride

The clouds in thunder, deals his bolts around,
 And scatter tempests on the teeming ground.

The antient *Heathens* had a fancy that some
 God or other inhabited groves and unfre-
 quented places; for such places naturally
 strike people with a kind of *Horror*, which
 disposes them to a secret dread of some in-
 visible power. Both the fact and the reason
 of it are contained in the lines just quoted
 out of *Virgil*. In like manner all awful
 and extraordinary appearances in nature, as
Thunder and *Lightning*, *Eclipses*, *Comets*,
Earthquakes, and the like, fill vulgar minds,
 ignorant of the causes of them, with super-
 stition, and are converted into omens and
 prodi-

prodigies, so that we can allow the ^P Mantuan Poet to say.

*Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes, & inexorabile Fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.*

Happy the man, who skill'd in Nature's laws,
Of strange effects can trace the secret cause;
Can prodigies and vulgar fears despise,
Styx fabled waves, and cruel destinies.

And had ^a *Lucretius* only attacked those phantoms of a scared imagination, he would have deserv'd the thanks of mankind; for Superstition is not a greater enemy to the peace of mens minds, and of the world, than it is to Religion. But when he makes all Religion to be Superstition, and has such lines as these following,

*Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,
Quod multa in terris fieri cœloque tuentur,
Quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
Possunt, ac fieri divino numine rentuo.*

For groundless terrors mortal minds invade,
Num'rous effects observing in the skies,
And o'er the earth, for which their Reason fails,

B b 3

Well

^P *Virgil. Georg. L. 2. v. 490.*

^a *De Rerum Natura. L. 1. v. 152. &c.*

Well to account by known mechanic laws,
Falsely ascribing them to pow'rs divine.

we cannot without detestation behold him
thus in arms against the belief of a God and
a Providence.

Primos in orbe Deos fecit Timor.—

“An unreasonable Fear first created Gods.”
says this hardy Atheist; whereas on the con-
trary, *God first planted Fear* in the minds of
men; it is his *creature* not his *Creator*. I
confess, the Fear or Awe suggested by a
survey of God's works, is one of the first
things that prepares men to be religious, or
to adore and obey a supreme Being; but
this is not Superstition, it is *EvoGene*, a rati-
onal Piety, and the most reasonable disposi-
tion in the world.

*Hunc Solem & Stellas, & decedentia certis
Tempora momentis, sunt qui formidine nulla
Imbuti, spectant.*—

Horat. L. 1. Ep. 6. v. 3.

This vault of Air, this congregated Ball,
Self-center'd Sun, and Stars, that rise and fall,
There are, my Friend, whose philosophic eyes
Look thro', and trust the Ruler with his skies;
To him commit the hour, the day, the year,
And view this dreadful all without a Fear.

Pope.

If

If by beholding these things *without Fear*, the *Poet* means without any awe of the great Creator, they are not to be looked upon as *Philosophers*, who can so calmly view this astonishing frame, but the most stupid of mankind; if the superstitious only were levelled at, all men in their senses will approve what he says.

SECT. VIII. When *Fear* is so immoderate as in a manner to confound the faculties, and incapacitate a person for consultation and execution, it is then termed *Consternation*. The proper definition then of *Consternation* is an excess of *Horror*, owing to the ill government of our *Admiration* and *Fear*. The language of this Passion Dr. *More* thinks to be, that there is some *latent evil* in nature of a most formidable and prodigious size, for which we ought to be always prepared; whether this be each person's particular *death* or the *dissolution* of the *world*. I like the conjecture, and am of opinion it may be made use of to account for the universal prevailing of that notion, concerning the *conflagration* of the world among the antient *Heathens*. Let these famous lines of *Ovid* serve instead of other authorities, that might be brought to the same purpose.

B b 4

Esse

*Esse quoque in fatis reminiscitur, affore tempus,
Quo mare, quo tellus, correptaque regia Cæli
Ardeat; & mundi moles operosa laboret.*

There is an awful period fixed by Fate,
When this wide Earth, the Seas, and vaulted
Heavens,
Shall form one general blaze, and fire destroy
This grand and spacious frame.

For though the notion was probably convey-
ed down by tradition from *Noah*, yet that it
was so readily entertained, took such deep
root, and spread so far, is best resolved into
a proneness in mankind to this Passion.
Not that the Passion itself is to be allowed
of; for since *Consternation* stupifies the mind,
involves it in a maze, and disables it for
providing against the coming evil, what
does the discovery of the evil signify? It is
just as if some ravenous monster should be
making towards a person, and one standing
by should warn him of his danger, but at
the same time by chaining him down, put
it out of his power to defend himself, or fly
from his enemy. We should by a good *con-*
science labour to fortify ourselves against such
an amazing dread of the worst event that can
befal us. An *Heathen* Poet could say,
speaking of a man of integrity,

Si

Si fractus illabatur orbis,

Impavidum ferient ruinae.

“ Should the whole frame of nature round
him break,

“ In ruin and confusion hurl'd;

“ He unconcern'd could hear the mighty
crack,

“ And stand secure amidst a falling world.

SECT. IX. II. It remains that I now consider the Passions compounded of those which fall under *Love* and *Hatred*. For distinction sake we may divide them into two sorts, such as more immediately regard *ourselves*, and such as have *others* for their object. Of those which concern *ourselves* the following are the principal, *Fluctuation*, *Resolution*, *Hope*, *Fear*, *Security*, *Despair*, *Jealousy*, and *Distaste*. *Fluctuation* consists of *Desire* and *Grief*. The design of it was that we might not be too hasty in the choice of means, lest we should mistake in our choice. *Omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate & negligentia; nec vero agere quidquam, cujus non possit causam probabilem reddere.* “ All our actions ought to be clear
“ of rashness and negligence; nor should
“ we ever do any thing for which we can-
“ not give a good reason.” The uneasiness
caused

caused by a suspension of mind is an advertisement of nature, that some things require more thought, and are of greater moment than others; as likewise that in settling our judgment and determinations concerning certain matters, we should imploy our utmost circumspection; and after mature counsel having fixed our opinion, which before floated, should not easily recede from a purpose so well formed. The error into which men are apt to run upon this article is, that they are often *over wary*, and consume a deal of time about things, which either do not deserve or demand deep consideration. By this means that caution is thrown away upon trifles, which should have been reserved for things of weight and full of perplexity. They consider where there is no need, and perceiving their folly herein, run into another extreme, and act *precipitantly* where they should be most *cautious*.

SECT. X. *Resolution* is that Passion which encounters difficulties and dangers; when it has to do more peculiarly with dangers it bears the name of *Boldness*. *Desire*, *Joy*, and *Sorrow* enter into its constitution; but then *Joy* is by far the stronger infusion. There is a degree of sadness from the prospect of opposition and the possibility of miscarrying; but not equal to the pleasure which

which the greatness of the end proposed, and the well-grounded hopes of attaining it inspire; and which so dilutes the other that it is hardly perceived. This Passion is of excellent service to render the mind unmoved by all the assaults of temptation, and to carry it on in the pursuit of a worthy object, till it is in possession of it. Does some noble cause require our assistance, in which we must fight our way, and every step we advance carry our lives in our hand? There is nothing like this generous Passion to hearten and animate us. Our only concern here is, that we be engaged for *Truth* and *Goodness*, not to maintain our *Mistakes*, our *Humours*, or *Vices*. This is not so properly *Resolution* as *Obstinacy*, *ἰσχυρὰν ἀποκρίσιν*, an unreasonable attachment to the opinions or designs we have once taken up.

SECT. XI. *Hope* is the desire of some good, attended with a belief of the possibility at least of obtaining it, and enlivened with *Joy*, greater or less, according to the greater or less probability of our possessing the thing for which we hope. *Fear* is a desire of avoiding some evil which it is apprehended may come upon us, the reflection on which causes *Sorrow*. Of what consequence these Passions are in human nature no one can be ignorant, they being the great handles by which it is turned and governed,

Society

Society could not subsist but by the succour it borrows from *Hope* and *Fear*; neither could *Religion* be kept up but by the same means. Nothing but these can ordinarily restrain men from Vice, or invite them to the practice of Virtue; and they are the main springs of action, and rewards and punishments are the weights that put these wheels and springs in motion. From hence, by the way, we learn the great excellency of the *Christian Religion*, which to ingage us to observe its laws, has proposed to our *Hopes* and *Fears* objects so much superior to any that are to be met with in the other Religions of mankind. And further, these being the leading Passions in our nature, so that these when wrought up to a height will tame and conquer other Passions that oppose them, and reduce one the other too, we see the wisdom of God in the formation of man, since by our *Hopes* and *Fears* our other Passions are easily managed. And this, as I hinted before, is one of the greatest arts in *Morality*, to set *Affection* against *Affection*, and by the help of one to master and reclaim the others. After the manner of expert *Politicians*, who ballance and keep in order one party and faction by its contrary. What I have hitherto said regards these Passions in *common*, I have something to remark of each in *particular*.

SECT. XII. Scarce any Passion seems to be more natural to man than *Hope*, and considering the many troubles he is encompassed with, none is more necessary. For life void of all *Hope* would be a heavy and spiritless thing, very little desirable, perhaps hardly to be borne. Whereas *Hope* infuses strength into the mind, and by so doing lessens the burdens of life. If our condition be not the best in the world, yet we hope it will be better, and this helps us to support it with patience.

“ See, some fit Passion ev’ry *Age* supply,
Hope travels thro’, nor quits us when we die.
 Till then, *Opinion* gilds with varying rays
 Those painted clouds that beautify our days;
 Each want of happiness by *Hope* supplied,
 And each vacuity of sense by *Pride*.
 These build as fast as knowledge can destroy:
 In Folly’s cup still laughs the bubble, *Joy*;
 One prospect lost, another still we gain;
 And not a Vanity is giv’n in vain.

This forwardness to hope is an argument of the goodness of God, who hath provided this Passion as a remedy against excessive *Grief* and *Sadness*. By *Hope* nature does as it were say, though he be weak, sinful, afflicted, mortal, yet *let not man despair*.
 Yea,

“ *Pope’s Essay on Man. Epist. 2. l. 263.*

Yea, supposing a man to live in the greatest prosperity, still he must hope for something beyond it, or he will be an unhappy man. The true reason of which is, that the things of this world not being designed for our happiness, do not satisfy us in the possession of them; and therefore be our present enjoyments never so many, leave us under necessity of hoping for something further; of which, because it is distant, we think better than of the things we have in hand, and are apt to flatter ourselves that it will afford us more comfort and satisfaction. Were there no life besides this, it would perhaps be our wisdom to encourage such a hope, because though it be groundless, it helps nevertheless to pass away life the more pleasantly. But as things stand at present, it is a great folly to be always in hope of more happiness from new worldly acquisitions. We may indeed, whatever our condition in the world be, however easy and well accommodated, still hope for something better, nay, we cannot but do so; which makes it evident to me that there is such a happiness as we hope for to be attained; it not being conceivable that the great God, the Author of Nature, would drill us on with fallacious hopes. But our fault is, that we hope for this happiness from the enjoyments of this world, which is only to be looked for from the favour of
God,

God, the satisfactions of a good conscience, and the perfect pleasures of a future life. Nor further, is it unlawful in affliction to hope, that we shall see the cloud disperse, and enjoy a brighter and clearer season. This without doubt is allowable, provided we do not limit the Providence of God as to the time or manner of our deliverance, or depend upon it as a thing certain, or make the hope of it our main stay and refreshment in adversity. And as *Hope* is the great comfort of drooping minds, so it is the life of industry and labour, and the support of a resolute perseverance. *Alexander* preparing for his *Asian* expedition, parted his hereditary Dominions among his Friends, distributing to some *Villages*, to others *Boroughs*, to others *Cities*, and being asked, "What he had left for himself?" replied, "*Hope*." I shall conclude with observing, that of all *Hopes* those are most unaccountable, which set by matters of present concern to take in a long hereafter, as if life was not measured by *years* but *ages*.

" *Vita summa brevis spem nos vetat inchoare longam.*

" The short duration of human life forbids
 " us to indulge Hopes which require a
 " long train of years for their accomplish-
 " ment." Men send their views into di-
 stant

" *Horat. L. 1. Ode 4. v. 15.*

stant futurities, and overlook the precipice that is just before them.

SECT. XIII *Fear* too is of very great importance, not only as it is the original of *Caution*, but *Humility*. Is a man superior to creatures without Reason? Or in his condition advanced above those of his own species? The voice of his *Fear* is, *let not man be proud*. He has too many things to fear to be ever secure; and from these fears may be taught, that he is a poor, precarious, dependent Being, a *worm* that may be soon crushed, a *bubble* that may be quickly broken, and where is he? "God, (says an excellent
" * writer) seems to have intimated the use of
" this Passion in every motion of our natural
" Fears. Our natural Fears are either *sudden*
" or *deliberate*. The *sudden* are such as
" come upon us surprizingly, and without
" deliberation, and of these we may very often
" observe, that they are immoderate and
" ungovernable. But how unreasonable forever
" such Fears may seem to be, they
" carry a most reasonable admonition along
" with them, and upon each of their surprizing
" motions seem to whisper, *thus it is that a man ought to fear God*. Our
" *deliberate* and *just* Fears are as just to the
" same intimation, and in each of their
" motions

* Dean Young in his Sermon of the Wisdom of fearing God. Vol. 1. Ser. 3.

“ motions *point out God* to the first glances
“ of our reasoning. For if it be reasonable
“ to fear want, how much more reasonable
“ is it to fear him whose bounty is the
“ fountain of all our supplies? And the
“ like may be argued of all the evils and
“ dangers that we fear.”

SECT. XIV. *Hope* when advanced beyond the fear of a disappointment ends in *Security*; *Fear* when it comes to be without any mixture of *Hope* issues in *Despair*. These two are of use in some cases, though but in few. The former to free us from the torment of needless care and thoughtfulness. Only we must be cautious on what grounds we bottom our *Security*; and that it does not betray us into a lazy neglect of the means necessary to our end, and of the accidents that may deprive us of it. *Despair* is of use to disengage the mind from the pursuit of things, which it sees an impossibility of compassing, that it may turn its activity to what is in its power. Though here again we must have a care, that our *Despair* be not the result of a laziness of temper, or meanness of spirit, and so make us relinquish a good that was attainable, and well worthy of our pursuit, for the sake of something which has little else to recommend it, but that it is easily come at.

SECT. XV. *Jealousy* is that peculiar uneasiness which arises from the fear that some rival may rob us of the affection of one whom we greatly love; or suspicion that he has already done it. If it proceed no further than a fear that this *may be*, it is of use to make us more vigilant in our conduct, more studious to please the beloved person, and to excel the competitor. If there be a suspicion that we actually are upon the losing hand, it is a most disquieting Passion. The first sort of *Jealousy* is inseparable from *Love*, before it is in possession of its object; for he that loves would be loved, and be to another what that other is to him, something essential to his happiness. This latter is often unjust, generally mischievous, always troublesome. Our concern is to watch against it as much as we can, that it may never make a part of our temper and character; as it does not, if we are only jealous when there is sufficient reason to be so; and to conceal the Passion that torments us as much as is possible; since nothing tends more to alienate the affection which we would secure, than perpetually throwing out expressions and marks of our *Jealousy*. The fear of being robbed of any good which we highly prize is sometimes expressed by this name; but then we are jealous of our rival, as in the former case we are of the person, whose affection is in dispute.

SECT.

SECT. XVI. *Disgust* or *Satiety* is a friend of *Temperance*, for generally speaking (as Dr. *More* thinks) we nauseate those things in which we have been guilty of too sensual indulgences, or in which there is danger of our being so. Besides this, we are taught by the *Satiety* which is bred by the use of all external sensible things, the wisdom of applying our contemplation and love to objects of a spiritual nature, and above all to the great God, whose infinite perfections and works will furnish scenes and pleasures ever new and transporting to eternity.

Besides the Books referred to under the preceding Chapters, consult

Des Cartes De *Passionibus*.

Seneca De *Ira*.

Watts on the *Passions*.

Smith's Select *Disc.* of *Superst.* & *Atheism*.

Spencer of *Prodigies*. C. 5.

Spectator and *Guardian* on the love of *Fame*, on *Hope*, *Fear*, *Jealousy*, &c. particularly *Spectators*, N^o. 19, 27, 45, 73, 77, 99, 139, 151, 188, 219, 224, 255.

Young's *Universal Passion*.

Pope's *Temple of Fame*, and *Ethic Epistles*, particularly to Lord *Bathurst*.



C H A P. X.

*Of the mixed Passions which regard
others, and of the improper Pas-
sions.*

SECT. I. **T**HE Passions which express the temper of mind we are in towards *others*, are chiefly these, *Irrifion*, *Commiseration*, *Congratulation*, *Envy*, *Anger*, *Gratitude*, and what the *Latins* call *Defiderium*, but we want a word to express in English. *Irrifion* is that mirth which is raised in us by the sight of another's *Absurdities* or *Misfortunes*. It is made up of joy and hatred, hatred of *Aversion*, not of *Malevolence*; and if the evil be sudden and unexpected vents itself in laughter. Though we hate the evil, yet we rejoice that it is no greater, for (as *Aristotle* remarks) this Passion is only conversant about evils of a lighter kind. It may be of use to consider *Irrifion* distinctly, as it has for its object the *Follies*, or as it regards the *Misfortunes* of others.

SECT.

SECT. II. As to their *Follies*, ^a Mr. *Hobbes's* account of it is, that it is nothing else but sudden glory arising from the conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others. This may be too often the reason why men do laugh at each other, but was never designed by nature, which cannot be supposed in any of its productions to have consulted the gratification of mens pride and ill humour. Nature or its Author seems rather to have intended this Passion partly as a relief against the melancholy, which the mean figure that human nature makes would excite in a generous mind, did not this help a little to shake it off. Were it not for this Passion, every good man would be an *Heracitus*. This Passion was designed also partly as a means of rallying people out of their *Follies*; and according to Dr. *More* was the original of *Satire*, as *Love* and *Bravery* were of *Epic* and *Tragic* Poesy. The *Carelessness*, *Inconstancy*, *Humour*, *Affectation*, *Impertinence*, and in short all the lesser follies and imperfections of mankind are fitly enough treated with *ridicule*; and as these are generally the subjects of *Horace's Satires*, one cannot but be pleased with that vein of pleasantry which runs through them.

C c 3

Omne

^a De Homine. See *Spectator*. N^o. 47.

*Omne vaser vitium ridenti Flaccus amico
Tangit; & admissus circum præcordia ludit,
Callidus excusso populum suspendere naso.*

Unlike in method with conceal'd design,
Did crafty *Horace* his low numbers join;
And with a fly insinuating grace,
Laugh at his Friend, and look'd him in the
face:
Would raise a blush where secret Vice he found,
And tickle whilst he gently prob'd the wound.
With seeming innocence the crowd beguil'd;
But made the desperate Passes when he smil'd.

Dryden.

Vice, as it signifies grosser faults, is not a thing to be laugh'd at, and therefore when *Satire* flies at these, *Juvenal's* way of assaulting it with a virtuous indignation is much more agreeable; though he too by some images, which were better concealed, too frequently offends against the rules of decency. They are still more mistaken in the object of *Irrifion*, who endeavour to laugh *Virtue* out of countenance. Nay, I will beg leave to say, that where there is substantial *Virtue*, though it be rough and unpolished, we should be cautious after what manner we divert ourselves with the persons in whom it is found, out of reverence to
what

what is valuable in them; and leaft they learn to be more fashionable at the expence of their innocence. In a word, we fhould lay down this as a firft principle of fociety, fo to manage our whole behaviour, and particularly this part of it, as to convince others we do not insult them, or take any delight in expofing them, but are acted by pure good humour and benevolence. ‘*Cicero* in two words well expreffes all the duties of converfation. *Maximeque curandum eft, ut eos, quibufcum fermonem conferimus, & vereri & diligere videamur.* “ We “ fhould take the greateft care, that they “ with whom we converse may fee, that we “ both *esteem* and *love* them.”

SECT. III. Confidered as to the *Miffortunes* of others, *Irrifion* is, as it were, the voice of nature congratulating its own happinefs, that when liable to the moft fatal accidents, it is fo ordered by a wife and good Providence, that we fhould only feel lighter or more tolerable evils. This construction of the Paflion before us fhews all fuch to be inexcufable, who can draw mirth from that which fhould move their compaffion, a diffigured body, a mind diftracted by fury or madnefs, and very grievous and afflictive accidents befalling others. Such men have neither gratitude nor humanity;

C c 4

‘ De Offic. L. 1. §. 38. See *Guardian*. Vol. 1. N^o. 24.

nity; neither gratitude to God, who has given them what others want; nor humanity to pity others, who are not so happy as themselves.

SECT. IV. *Commiseration* is a compound of *Love* and *Sorrow*. The necessity of this Passion is manifest, since the world as it is at present cannot be without it. Miserable objects meet us wherever we turn our eyes, and that they might not demand our succour in vain, the common Father of all hath put this soft advocate into our bosoms to plead in their behalf.

^d ——— *Mollissima corda*

*Humano generi dare se natura fatetur,
Quæ lacrymas dedit. Hæc nostri pars optima
sensus.*

Naturæ imperio gemimus—

——— *Quis enim bonus,—*

Ulla aliena sibi credat mala?

Compassion proper to mankind appears,
Which nature witness'd when she gave us tears:
Of tender sentiments men only give
Those proofs; to weep is our prerogative:
To shew by pitying looks and melting eyes,
How with a suffering Friend we sympathize,
By nature's impulse (tho' to us unknown
The sufferer be) we make the loss our own.

Who

^a *Juven. Sat. 15. v. 131. &c.*

Who can all sense of others ills escape,
Is but a *brute* at best in human shape.

This just and lovely account of human nature is given us by a heathen *Satirist*; but according to Mr. *Hobbes*, *Commiseration* is a *selfish* Passion, and wholly derived from narrow principles. The sight of another man's misfortunes begets compassion, not so much for *him* as for *ourselves*, whom we know liable to the same calamitous accidents. But though self-love may come in for a part in the pity of some men, yet that it is the most natural or adequate cause of it, I can by no means allow. We see men of the most generous dispositions, whose fortunes are well guarded, and their tempers proof against the darts of adversity when shot against themselves, yet strongly disposed to sympathize with others; and children and persons least capable of making reflections on their own danger most open to this tender Passion. It is worth observation as we pass, that though all the miserable are protected by this Passion, especially those who are thought to suffer undeservedly, yet if on the one hand a person appears insensible of his calamity, either through stupidity, or a haughtiness of temper; or on the other hand, instead of bearing up against it, poorly sinks under it, makes his affliction greater than it is, or gives himself up to abject and
unmanly

unmanly complaints, our pity is moved less strongly. A *Stoical* apathy real or affected seems to upbraid the common weakness, and therefore as it would be thought above the pity of mankind must not expect it. The stupid are disregarded, the proud opposed, and the effeminate scorned.

—*Si vis me flere, dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi.*

“ We must grieve ourselves, if we will have
“ others grieve for us ;” but after such a
manner, that it may be seen, that we are
not fond of shewing our grief, and though
some of it will break out, yet we retain the
greater part behind.

SECT. V. *Congratulation* is that joy which
our love to another makes us receive from
the gifts of nature or Providence bestowed
upon him, the flourishing of his reputation,
the ease of his circumstances, and the suc-
cess of his designs. It is a wise and a laud-
able Passion. He who is ever ready to fel-
icitate others on their happy condition, as
he deserves, so he is most likely to have the
good wishes of the whole world, and to
enjoy his prosperity with the approbation of
all. Nothing more advances a man's own
character, or sets his virtues in a more ad-
vantagious

vantagious light. ^f *Pliny*, speaking of *Capito*, who had erected *Syllanus's* Statue in the *Forum*, has these fine sentiments upon it. *Scias ipsum pluribus Virtutibus abundare, qui alienas sic amat. Redditus est L. Syllano debitus honor, cujus immortalitati Capito prospexerit pariter & suæ. Neque enim magis decorum & insigne est, statuam in Foro Populi Romani habere, quam ponere.* “ You may
 “ be assured he is very virtuous himself
 “ who manifests such a regard to Virtue in
 “ another. *L. Syllanus* has received the
 “ honour he merited, and *Capito*, while he
 “ has thus endeavoured to render *Syllanus's*
 “ fame immortal, has equally secured his
 “ own. For it is not more an honour to
 “ have a Statue in the Roman *Forum*, than
 “ it is to confer this honour on the well-
 “ deserving.” Both this and *Commiseration*
 are founded in *Benevolence*; for it being
 supposed that we sincerely will another's
 happiness, which is *Benevolence*, we com-
 passionate him if he falls short of it, we re-
 joice with him if he attains it.

SECT. VI. Of these two Passions, *Delight*
 in the prosperity of others, and *Compassion*
 for their distresses, it is judiciously observed
 by ^s *Dr. Butler*, “ That the last is felt much
 “ more

^f L. i. Ep. 17.

^s See his Sermons at the Roll's Chapel. Ser. 5. on Com-
 passion.

“ more generally (and I would add, much
“ more strongly) than the former. Tho’
“ men do not universally rejoice with all
“ whom they see rejoice, yet, accidental
“ obstacles removed, they naturally com-
“ passionate all in some degree whom they
“ see in distress, so far as they have any
“ real perception or sense of that distress;
“ insomuch that words expressing this lat-
“ ter, *Pity, Compassion*, frequently occur;
“ whereas we have scarce any single one by
“ which the former is distinctly expressed.
“ *Congratulation* indeed answers *Condolence*,
“ but both these words are intended to sig-
“ nify certain forms of civility, rather than
“ any inward sensation or feeling. This
“ difference or inequality is so remarkable,
“ that we plainly consider *Compassion* as it-
“ self an original distinct particular affec-
“ tion in human nature; whereas to rejoice
“ in the good of others is only a conse-
“ quence of the general affection of love
“ and good-will to them. The reason and
“ account of which matter is this. When
“ a man has obtained any particular advan-
“ tage or felicity, his end is gained, and
“ he does not in that particular want the
“ assistance of another; there was therefore
“ no need of a distinct affection towards
“ that felicity of another already obtained;
“ neither would such affection directly car-
“ ry him on to do good to that person.
“ Whereas

“ Whereas men in distress want assistance,
“ and *Compassion* leads us directly to assist
“ them—Such is our make, and that of
“ the world about us, that any thing may
“ become the instrument of pain and sor-
“ row to us. Thus almost any one man is
“ capable of doing mischief to any other,
“ though he may not be capable of doing
“ him good; and if he be capable of doing
“ him some good, he is capable of doing
“ him more evil. And it is in numberless
“ cases much more in our power to lessen
“ the miseries of others, than to promote
“ their positive happiness, any otherwise
“ than as the former often includes the
“ latter; ease from misery occasioning for
“ some time the greatest positive enjoy-
“ ment. This constitution of nature,
“ namely, that it is so much more in our
“ power to occasion and likewise to lessen
“ misery, than to promote positive happi-
“ ness, plainly required a particular af-
“ fection to hinder us from abusing, and
“ to incline us to make a right use of the
“ former powers, *i. e.* the powers both to
“ occasion and to lessen misery, over and
“ above what was necessary to induce
“ us to make a right use of the latter
“ power, that of promoting positive hap-
“ piness.”

SECT. VII. *Envy* stands in direct opposition to *Congratulation*, or the joy we feel from the prosperity of others, being a composition of *Sorrow* and *Hatred*; not only as *Hatred* implies a simple *Aversion*, but as it signifies *Malevolence*, and for that reason ought to be intirely banished from the human heart. *Envy*, as I observed before, is nothing else but *Grief* mistaken in its object. Does a man merit and become his good fortune? *Envy* in this case is the most unreasonable thing in the world. Does he prosper in his wickedness? Still there is no room for *Envy*; he may be punished with success, or at worst is the instrument of Providence. So that upon the whole, *Envy* cannot be placed among the *original* Passions, and accordingly says ^b Dr. *Hickman* (ingeniously enough, were the observation equally solid) “*Envy* and *Malice* make their abode not in the *Heart*, but in the *Spleen*; and the *Spleen*, they say, is the only ⁱ superfluous part of the body, as these splenetic humours make the only useless Passions of our soul.” *Envy* certainly is the basest, most mischievous, and the most tormenting Passion in the world. Every envious man is *Heauton-timorumenos*, a Self-

^b See his Sermon on the Passions.

ⁱ That the *Spleen* is not superfluous, see Sir *Richard Blackmore's* Essay on the *Spleen*.

a *Self-tormentor*. It was wittily said by *Bion*, seeing a *spiteful* fellow look *sad*,
 “ That he knew not what to think was the
 “ cause of his melancholy, whether some
 “ disaster of his own, or some good fortune
 “ of another.”

SECT. VIII. If we would prevent this Passion in ourselves, and not excite it in others, it may be our prudence to observe the following *Rules*. Would we preserve ourselves from envying others? Let us consider that the meanest of us enjoys more than he can pretend to deserve.—Instead of envying another for the advantages of birth, learning, or outward condition, let us labour to excel him in Virtue, and by contentedness of mind set ourselves above him.
 “ Every man, says ^k *Cicero*, cannot plead
 “ Causes, govern the Commonwealth, or
 “ manage a War; but let every man do
 “ what is in his power; let him be just,
 “ faithful, liberal, modest, and temperate;
 “ *quo minus ab eo id, quod desit, requiratur*;
 “ and no body will expect from him that
 “ which was never trusted to him.”—Carefully shun a busy inquisitive temper.—Dwell more at home, and you will have less temptation to make invidious reflections upon others.—Aim not at an eminency in too many things, because this is the way to be out-

^k De Offic. L. i. §. 33.

out-done in all; and thus we ourselves lay the ground-work of our own discontent.— Let the things we make choice of, in order to excel in them, suit our genius and abilities. *In immensum proderit nobis illud Democriti salutare præceptum, quo monstratur tranquillitas, si neque privatim, neque publice multa, aut majora viribus nostris egerimus.* “The salutary advice of *Democritus*, “if we observed it, would be of inconceivable service to produce tranquillity of mind, that we should never in private or publick undertake things above our abilities.” ¹ *Seneca* cites these words by way of prevention against *Anger*, but I think they are more useful against *Envy*.— Finally, when we are disposed to envy another for some advantage, ballance this either by some ^m opposite disadvantage in himself, or by some advantage you have of him in another respect. Would you decline the *Envy* of others? Let them not know by your behaviour, that you are sensible of your having the better of them. A privilege managed with vanity and ostentation is always envied.—And whatever advantages you enjoy show yourselves willing that they should be common, and assist others in their endeavours to participate of them.—Make
 supe-

¹ De Ira. L. 3. C. 6.

^m See *Horat.* L. 1. Sat. 1. and *Spectator.* Vol. 8. N^o. 558, 559.

superior learning; power, or riches public blessings, and then superiority will produce general satisfaction not discontent, and you will be generally admired and beloved, not envied—These are the likeliest ways to avoid *Envy*, though after all a person eminent for merit and advantages must not expect to pass through such a world as ours, without being subject to this *Tax*, as my Lord *Bacon* calls it, for his distinction; according to the observation of ⁿ *Horace*.

—*Diram qui contudit Hydram,*
Notaque fatali portenta labore subegit,
Comperit Invidiam supremo sine domari.

He that kill'd *Hydra*, He design'd by Fate
 To quell the monsters rais'd by *Juno's* hate;
 Tho' He, the mighty He, had always try'd,
 Found *Envy* vanquisht only when he dy'd.

Creech.

SECT. IX. *Anger* is subservient to *Fortitude*, by rallying the scattered spirits; and putting them into a lively motion, according to the observation of *Theages*. “*Anger* and *Desire* are both useful, this to provide what is good for the body, the other to guard it against evil; the former discharging the office of a Soldier, the latter of a Purveyor.” It is worth observation,

D d

that

that *Anger* is far from being ° a *selfish* Passion, since it is naturally excited by injuries offered to others, as well as to ourselves, and was designed by the Author of nature not only to excite us to act vigorously in defending ourselves from evil, but to interest us in the defence or rescue of the injured and helpless, and raise us above the fear of the proud and mighty oppressor. *Hatred*, that is, a *Hatred of simple Aversion*, *Desire* and *Self-love* go to the forming of this Passion, when it regards damage or injury done to ourselves; *Benevolence* makes a part of it, when it is roused by injustice done to others. If it proceeds so far as *Revenge*, it bears the same relation to *injuries*, that *Gratitude* doth to *benefits*, both seek *retaliation*, but in one it is a Vice (unless where it aims at the correction and amendment of the offender, and the cure or prevention of injustice) in the other a Virtue. The excess of this Passion is not more pernicious to others than to ourselves. *Dat pœnas dum exigit*, says *Seneca*, “It punishes the person himself, while he seeks to do mischief to another.”

SECT. X. The directions for regulating our *Anger* concern the Passion itself, or the expressions of it. As to the Passion itself,

° See Dr. Butler's Sermon on Resentment.

¶ De Ira. L. 1. C. 5.

self, regard is to be had to the *occasion*, to the *degree*, and to the *continuance* of it. To the *occasion*, that it be something considerable, and that the offence be voluntary, and done by one who was capable of knowing the evil of what he did. To the *degree*, that it never exceed the cause, or be so great as to discompose the mind, and put a man out of the possession of himself. To the *continuance*, that we never suffer it to lie fretting in the mind, till it rankle into settled malice. Anger may pass through the soul of a wise man, but ¹ *resteth only in the bosom of fools*. The height and ferment of the Passion ought not to out-last the day, according to that divine command, ² *Let not the Sun go down upon your wrath*; to the end we may be cool as the evening, and in calmness of soul offer up our devotions to a most merciful and forgiving God. That fire must not be spent in angry resentment, which should be consecrated to the altar, and is necessary to consume the sacrifice. As to the *expressions* of our Anger, we are, on the one hand, concerned to avoid those which would lessen our character, and render both us and our Anger contemptible; and on the other, all such as tend to irritate others, and procure us their hatred and ill-will; and the only sure way of preventing

D d 2

both

¹ Eccles. vii. 9.² Ephes. iv. 26.

both those evils is to moderate the Passion itself.

SECT. XI. *Gratitude* is in such a sense a Passion, as at the same time to be a branch of natural *Justice*, as ¹ *Cicero* reckons it; for which reason I shall wave saying any more of it here, and only take notice, that *Ingratitude*, the contrary to this, is no Passion; for nature (as if abhorring it) has appointed no motion of the spirits whereby it might be excited, but a mere *Vice* arising from pride, stupidity, or narrowness of soul.

SECT. XII. *Desiderium* or *Fondness* for the memory of persons and things that have been greatly beloved by us, (to which we have in *English* no single word that answers exactly) springs from the reflection on a past good, which we despair of enjoying again. It is of use by way of anticipation, to make us careful for the preserving of that, the loss of which is like to be followed with so much regret and sorrow; and to perpetuate the memory of it afterwards, if it deserve to live in our remembrance. The force of this affection is mostly seen at the death of friends.

Quis

Quis desiderio sit pudor, aut modus

Tam chari capitis?—

“How can so valuable a friend be too much regretted and lamented?” Says *Horace*, on the death of *Quintilius*; or of such as were eminent for extraordinary qualities of body or mind, or had been greatly beneficial to the world. So that in this Passion we may seek for the rise of funeral pomps, elegies, and orations. Hence the idolatry of *Heathens* and *Christians*, the worship paid by the former to their dead *Heroes*, and by the latter to departed *Saints*; which makes *Lactantius* derive the word *Superstition* from hence. *Superstitiosi autem vocantur, non quia filios suos superstites optant, omnes enim optamus, sed aut ii qui superstitem memoriam defunctorum colunt; aut qui parentibus suis superstites colebant imagines eorum domi, tanquam deos penates.*

I have now done with the *proper* Passions.

SECT. XIII. The *improper* or *secondary* Passions are next to be treated, which are thus named because they seem to be somewhat allied to the former in their original, and in the influence which they have on

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^t L. 3. Ode. 4.

^u De Vera Sap. L. 4.

the mind. These, though they will not come within the definition of Passion, do yet challenge a place in Morality, for the share which they have in most of our actions. Now these bodily impressions (for so I call them, after Dr. More) may be summed up under these two classes. First, *Sensation, Imagination, Temper, and Custom.* Secondly, *Education, Idiopathy, and Prosopalepsia.* Those of the first class, says my Author, agree in this, that they may be considered without any thing of proper Passion going with them; those of the second in this, that they are always attended with some such Passion. Though I must confess I see no clear ground for this distinction, I shall observe his division, and begin with those of the first class.

SECT. XIV. I. By *Sensation* in this place is not meant the immediate act of simple Perception, which is the most obvious import of the word, but that *bias* and *propension* to error which takes its beginning from hence; so that *Sensation* is a bodily impression inclining the soul to think of things, as in their own proper nature corresponding to what they appear to *Sense.* Hence those errors in the Philosophy of the vulgar, that all between the Earth and the Clouds is empty Space, that the Sun moves and the Earth stands still, and that smells and other secondary

secondary qualities are in bodies *without* us. The giving too much credit to the reports of *Sense* prepared the way for several blunders in the *Epicurean Physics* and *Morality*. In their *Physics*, which agree mostly with the notions of things taken up by the *common* people, as that the heavenly bodies are little bigger than they show to fight.

¶ *Nec nimio Solis major rota, nec minor ardor
Esse potest, nostris quam Sensibus esse videtur.*

Nor can the Sun's bright orb be greater, or
his heat
Be less, than what our faithful Senses teach.

In their *Morality*, as to instance only in that principle which is the foundation of it, that *sensual* pleasure is the chief happiness of man. I own that in a certain respect we may grant the *Epicureans*; that the *Senses* are not capable of being deceived; for besides that the structure of the organs, and the circumstances of objects considered, they ought not to represent things otherwise than they do; the *Senses* are purely *passive*, they receive impressions from surrounding bodies, but pronounce nothing concerning them, that is the business of the *Mind*, which delivers its opinion upon the diverse appearances of *Sense*, and too often not more *hastily* than
D d 4 wrong.

wrong. When therefore we talk of the errors of the Senses, the meaning is, that things are many times in themselves quite different from what they appear to the Senses; and that they who take their measures of judging from the Senses will unavoidably be led into a thousand mistakes.

SECT. XV. The *Reasons* why people trust so much to *Sense*, I believe are principally these two.

1. If *Sense* may err, why not *Reason*; if one power and faculty may be deceived, why not all others? At which rate we shall have no criterion of truth, nor be in possession of *certainty*, but universal *scepticism* must bear down all before it. I answer, that because *Sense* may be imposed upon, it follows not that *Reason* may. In case *Sense* misleads us, *Reason* may set us right again, so that here God hath provided a higher faculty to correct the errors occasioned by the faculties below it. And perhaps the fallaciousness of our Senses was designed for this very end, that we might make the more frequent use of our *Reason*. But should *Reason* be deceived, there is no faculty above this to inform it better, and it must be deceived fatally and eternally. And are not the *Goodness* and *Wisdom* of God our security, that he would not frame us with such a constitution of mind, as should naturally lead

lead us into error? Besides this, we are to consider, that the mistakes of *Sense* (when it does mistake) are not dangerous; it has little to do with Religion upon which depend our most important interests. But *Reason* rightly understood, and rightly managed, is to be the *measure* of our conduct, and consequently, if free from *prejudices*, we may be assured shall never err in matters of moment and consequence.

SECT. XVI. 2. If *Sense* may be deceived in one or more instances, why not in all? And if in all, we can be certain of nothing without us, the whole world may be a mere dream and apparition, and we ourselves no other as to our bodies. I answer, this way of arguing from our being deceived in *some* instances of *Sense*, that therefore we may be so in *all* is utterly inconclusive. We are misinformed in some cases it is acknowledged, and accordingly the wise Governor of the world has furnished us with *Reason*, that we might find out the mistake, and this by comparing things together it *easily* does. Wherefore if the *Reason* of mankind, after the most particular and diligent examination into things, does not charge any error on the *Senses* in the notices they give us at any time of outward objects, there is no sufficient cause why in *these cases* we should suspect our being deceived.

Not-

Notwithstanding which I shall recommend this * *Observation*, as extremely probable, that our *Senses* were not given us to inform us so much what things are in themselves, as of the *relation* they bear to each other, and to our bodies.

SECT. XVII. *Imagination* is a bodily impression, which inclines us to *believe* (without any authority from *Reason* for such a persuasion) the *present* or *future existence* of things, which neither are nor will be. *Persuasion* is absurdly made the *reason* of *Persuasion*. Ask some people why they are so confident of certain matters, they can give no better account of it than this, that the thing hath made such an impression on their minds, that they cannot but give themselves up to it; so that their faith is resolved into itself. *Sensation* is the cause of the mistakes we run into about the *nature*, *Imagination* about the *existence* of things. For an instance of this you may take the *dreams* of some fanciful people, which leave such traces behind, that even when waking they will not allow themselves to doubt that things will come to pass, which their *Imagination* made future in sleep. *Enthusiasm* owes its being to the same cause. Persons of a heated fancy are liable to unaccountable impulses, and then verily believe themselves

* See *Malbranch's Search after Truth*. B. I. C. 5, 6, &c.

selves inspired. And as women and some men have tender and lively Imaginations without a due ballance of Reason, it is no wonder that they lie open to a thousand delusions. *Apollo* is certainly to be admired for his wisdom, in choosing to deliver his Oracles by a *Priestess*, rather than by a *Priest*. A *Man* could not so easily have been thrown out of the possession of his understanding, and had all his faculties disordered with an holy fury. A *female* Imagination was required for this. You need only read *Virgil's* description of the *Sibyll* to be convinced of the propriety of this remark.

*Ventum erat ad limen, cum Virgo, poscere fata
Tempus, ait; Deus, ecce, Deus! Cui talia fanti,
Ante fores, subito non vultus, non color unus,
Non comptæ mansere comæ; sed pectus anbelum,
Et rabie fera corda tument; majorque videri,
Nec mortale sonans, afflata est numine quando,
Jam propiore Dei.*

Now to the mouth they come; aloud she cries,
This is the time, inquire your Destinies.
He comes, behold, the God! Thus while she
said,

And shivering at the sacred entry stay'd,
Her colour chang'd, her face was not the same;
And hollow groans from her deep spirit came;

Her

Her hair stood up, convulsive rage possess'd
Her trembling limbs, and heav'd her lab'ring
breast.

Greater than human kind she seem'd to look,
And with an accent more than mortal spoke.
Her staring eyes with sparkling fury roll,
When all the God came rushing on her soul.

SECT. XVIII. The same observation may be made of the *Sbe Saints* in the *Romish* Church, whose lives are stuffed with accounts of *Raptures* and *Visions*, such as *St. Bridget*, *St. Catharine*, *St. Teresa*, with many others; like to whom were *Prisca* and *Maximilla*, two famous enthusiasts in the *second* Century. We are also told by the *Jewish* Doctors, that the Scripture in prohibiting magical arts mentions a *Witch* only, because generally speaking those addicted to *Magic* were *Women*. And why *Women* more than *Men*? But on account of the overpoise of *Imagination*, which renders them more superstitious, and better disposed to believe a hidden virtue in spells and incantations. The same notion of *Women* being ofteneft led away by these delusions seems to have obtained in the *Heathen* world, whence * *Honace's Epodes* on *Canidia*. The best advice I can give here is, for persons of a fertile *Imagination* to consider, they are no more to be governed by *Imagination*

* See particularly Ode. 5. Epod.

nation than by *Sense*. That *Sense* is not so often deceived as *Imagination*—And as to the liveliness of the scenes represented on the stage of the fancy, it arises from pure *mechanism*, and is greater or less according to the temper which the body is in. The *Imagination* in short exerts itself most in the absence of *Reason*, as in the brains of *madmen*, and of persons *asleep*, which is abundantly enough to justify us in giving little heed to such a mimic.

SECT. XIX. *Idiosyncrasia* or *Temper* is a bodily impression owing to a particular complexion of nature, whereby the mind is either hindered or perverted in its contemplation of certain objects. It were easy to give a multitude of instances of this kind. I shall only exemplify it by those notions in Religion, which men most readily embrace, which generally speaking are suited to their respective tempers. Among the *Heatbens* the *Epicureans* seem to have been of a *sanguine* complexion, fond of a life of ease and pleasure, and accordingly took care that their *Gods* should be of the *same humour* with themselves, *negligent* of the affairs of the world, and placing their happiness in their *inactivity*. The *Stoicks*, on the contrary, may be described as men of an opposite character, *sour*, *unconversable*, and *severe*; which turned all their thoughts to *Fate* and *Necessity*.

Necessity. I might observe the same of the *Pharisees* and *Sadducees*, and shall leave you to find out a like difference in the *notions* and *tempers* of some *Moderns*. The best way to guard against mistakes from this quarter is, to divest ourselves, as much as we can, of ourselves; and abstracting from their evidence, to be equally indifferent to all opinions, not wishing before trial (merely because we are inclined to have it so) that one may prove true rather than another. As in a contest between persons we should not take parties, till it appears on which side the right lies; though it is natural to do it, even when they are both or all strangers. In order to this we should reflect, that an opinion is not the more likely to be true, because agreeable to our inclinations, any more than the contrary opinion, because suited to another man's. But the only standard of notions by which we can with certainty determine, whether they are true or false, is their *agreement* or *disagreement* with that *Reason* which is common to men of all tempers and complexions.

SECT. XX. *Custom* is a bodily impression which determines us with great violence to some thoughts or actions, for no other reason, but that we or others have been used to them. So that there is a *Custom* of *thinking* and a *Custom* of *acting*; there is like-

likewise a *private* and a *publick* Custom. A *private* Custom in *thinking* may be illustrated by this instance. A person having been used from his childhood to think, that a vessel being emptied of its liquor, there is nothing remaining behind, this notion is confirmed by length of time, and makes him unwilling to admit a *Plenum*. Thus a man long accustomed to any particular way of life (especially if vicious) finds it difficult to break off from it, which is an instance of a Custom of *acting*, as the other was of *thinking*. Again, there is *publick* Custom; and how many of the notions and practices of mankind have been received upon this principle? Why did *Polytheism* so generally obtain, and hold out against the evidence of Reason, but because by degrees the world grew accustomed to the notion? What makes the *National Religion* in every Country to be embraced by the generality, right or wrong, but its being the *established Custom*? And as to *actions*, the most barbarous Customs have prevailed in some Countries; and their being Customs hath reconciled others to them, who had otherwise good nature and good sense enough to have abhorred them. It is hardly possible to find an example of the force of Custom, more remarkable than one recorded by *Herodotus*, who tells us of *Darius*,
 “ That

" That having asked the *Greeks* who were
 " in his army, what sum of money would
 " be sufficient to induce them to eat their
 " deceased Parents, and they answering they
 " could never be hired to commit so great
 " a crime, he turned himself to the *In-*
 " dians, whose Custom it was to bury their
 " Parents in their own entrails, and put
 " the question to them, at what price they
 " might be bribed to burn the bodies of
 " their Parents, which was the manner
 " of the *Greeks*; the *Indians* signifying
 " the utmost abhorrence of the propo-
 " sal said, they hoped the King had bet-
 " ter thoughts of them." Some fed on
 human flesh, even that of their best friends,
 others scrupled eating of any flesh whatso-
 ever. You have an instance of each in
 two *Indian Nations* mentioned by *Hero-*
dotus in the same Book. To rescue our-
 selves from the tyranny of Custom, we must
 habituate ourselves more to the use of
 our Reason. A Custom in itself absurd is
 not a jot the more venerable for its an-
 tiquity or universality. Time or Numbers
 have no such power over Notions and
 Rites, as to change an error into a
 truth, or an absurdity into a reason-
 able practice. To proceed to the next
 class.

SECT. XXI. II. *Education* is only *Custom* circumstantiated by some vigorous affection conspiring with it. For generally we are more bigotted to what we have been accustomed by *Education* to venerate and practise, than we are to other things. The reason of which is, our having been taught to look upon some things as too sacred to be called in question, and too important to be neglected. ^b *Plerumque autem Parentium præceptis imbuti, ad eorum consuetudinem, moremque deducimur.* “The generality having rules of life instilled into them by their Parents from their earliest years, are insensibly formed to imitate their Customs and Manners.”

—*Adeo in teneris consuescere multum est.*

“Of such importance is it what our early Customs are.” Hence results an obligation on Parents to take the greatest care in the Education of their Children, since nature being set wrong at first, generally retains that plie ever afterward; and on those who have had the privilege of a good Education, to be grateful to their Parents, and thankful to Providence. “From my Father and Mother I learned such and such
E e “Virtues,

^b *Cic. De Offic. L. 1. §. 32.*

^c *Virgil. Georg. L. 2. v. 272.*

“ Virtues, (says ^d *Antoninus*) and to the
 “ Gods I am indebted for the happiness of
 “ such Parents.” “ If our Parents, says
 “ ^e another, have instructed us in good arts,
 “ we ought to give them the double ho-
 “ nour of Parents and Tutors, and to reve-
 “ rence them as images of the Deity, since
 “ like God himself they have been the au-
 “ thors to us both of our *Being*, and of our
 “ *well Being*.” Hence too arises an obliga-
 tion upon all to *Charity*, notwithstanding
 their different sentiments and opinions. Dost
 thou esteem thyself in the right, and thy
 neighbour in the wrong, and this in points
 apprehended to be of great consequence?
 Was not the foundation of this difference
 laid in your different Educations? If so, I
 see a great deal of reason why you should
 pity the supposed mistakes of your neigh-
 bour, but none at all for *persecuting* him
 on that account.

SECT. XXII. *Idiopathy* differs only in de-
 gree from *Idiosyncrasia*; for when through
 the predominance of *Temper* we are carried
 to like some things with that excess of *preju-
 dice* as to define all wisdom and happiness
 by the pursuit of them, what before was
 only *Temper* now commences *Idiopathy*.
 One man is an admirer of *Music*, another
 of

^d Lib. i.

^e *Simplic.* in *Epic.* C. 37.

of *Poetry*, and a third of the *Mathematicks*, and we would allow them to enjoy each his favourite study, so that they would but abstain from wondering that the whole world does not fall in with them, and not despise those who do not, as persons of no taste or judgment.

SECT. XXIII. *Præfopolepsia* is that bodily impression which inclines us to the love or hatred, esteem or contempt of things or persons, on account of some slight and trivial circumstances attending them. Not that our Author would be thought to condemn the art of *Physiognomy* in so much repute with the *Pythagoreans* and others, for he does not question but a person well skilled in this art may often hit the tempers and characters of people by perusing their faces. But when at first sight we are strongly prejudiced for or against persons or things, that are known to us only by some superficial circumstances, in which neither good nor evil is implied, and from which no argument can be drawn for the notions we take up of them; as when on the score of a person's name, or voice, or habit, or shape, and the like, we entertain a good or a bad opinion of him, we are then guilty of this unreasonable prejudice. So great is the weakness of human Reason, and so easily do we suffer ourselves to be deceived.

Consult on the subject of this Chapter,

Cartes & More De Passionibus.

Seneca De Ira.

Horatii L. i. Satir. i.

Watts on the Passions.

Butler's Sermons on Compassion, &c.

Grove's Sermon on Meekness. Vol. 5.

Spectator N^o. 47, 48. and

N^o. 558, 559.

Guardian and Spectator on the other Passions.

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